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CHAPTER I
SOCIAL REVOLUTION:
1.

Introduction:
The

A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The Rationale of This Study

~~volution

in Zimbabwe is an interesting case in

its own right, if only for its curious ending. 1 After a protracted period of guerrilla warfare, the revolution culminated in, of all things, an election.
Beyond this, the revolution in Zimbabwe raises the
more general question:
in Zimbabwe and why?
study.

What kind of a revolution occurred
This is the key issue addressed in this

In doing so, this study is informed by two theoreti-

cal traditions.

The first is the theoretical literature on

revolutions in general, particularly the literature that
asks questions why certain kinds of revolutions occur.

From

this literature a theoretical approach can be selected to
guide the examination of the events in Zimbabwe.

The second

tradition is the theoretical literature on African revolutions, particularly the work of those scholars who argue that
social revolutions in Africa are rare. 2 These scholars point
1

In the past, Zimbabwe was known as f.outhern Rhodesia,
Rhodesia and Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. The name Zimbabwe will be
used throughout this study.
2

For a review, see Ian R. Phimister, ''Zimbabwean Economic and Social Historiography Since 1970" African Affairs
78 (April 1979): 253-268.

2

out that revolutions in Africa are neither caused by nor
lead to socio-economic transformations.

They argue instead

that African revolutions occur in the context of decolonization and struggles against racial exclusivism.

Thus the

revolution in Zimbabwe brought a black regime to power but
left much else intact.
Thus, while this study is best seen as a case study,
it is informed by general theoretical concerns.

The remain-

ing sections of this chapter will explore these concerns by
offering a working definition of revolution, a discussion of
the theoretical conception of social revolutions, an examination of the theoretical literature, a summary of the theoretical approach, and an outline of the subsequent chapters
and their content.
2.

Revolution:

A Working Df!finition

Studies of revolution have spawned a myriad of terms,
definitions and associated typologies, reflecting and contributing to confusion as to what constitutes a revolution.

This

proliferation has resulted in a situation where similar events
are alternatively defined, and disparate sets of events similarly defined.

Indeed the definitions and terminology of

revolutionary studies has become a study in itself.
3

3

See Lawrence Stone, "Theories of Revolution", World
Politics 18 (January 1966): 159-176; and Isaac Kramnick,
"Reflections on Revolution: Definition and Explanation in
Recent Scholarship," History and Theory 11 (January 1972):
26-63.

3

Yet definitional differences are useful insofar as
they reveal the nature of and differences between accompanying theoretical statements.

Definitional differences are

also useful insofar as they reveal that revolutions are
multidimensional phenomena involving characteristic social,
psychological, economic, political and military events that
are intertwined on individual, group and societal levels, all
of which are subject to international influences as well.
Even if useful, definitional differences should nevertheless
not be overplayed, for studies of revolutions also reveal
4
two major areas of agreement.
First, revolution is consistently connected with
change in a causal and consequential sense.

In its pre-

modern usage, this change was seen as a part of the cyclical
order of human events, with no expectation that the change
would cause a qualitative change in the condition of men or
. t"1es. 5
soc1e

Since the 17th century, however, the cause and

consequences of revolutions are associated with progressive
socio-economic and political change.

This modern concep-

tualization of revolution is
4 see Carl Leiden and Karl M. Schmitt, The Politics of
Violence: RE!Volution in the Modern World (Englewood Cliffs,
New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1968), pp. 3-9.
5For a good study on the history of the notion of
revolution see Peter Calvert, Revolution (New York: Praeger,
1970).

4

inextricably bound up with the notion that the course of
history suddenly begins anew, that an entirely new story,
a story never known or told before, is about to unfold.6
Qualitative changes on the order of societies are thus an
integral component of revolutions, leading to much debate as
to how much and what types of changes are necessary to produce a revolutionary situation.
Most recent 7 scholars do not insist that sweeping or
fundamental change necessarily accompany revolutions.

Davies,

for example, defines revolutions as "violent civil disturbances that cause the displacement of one ruling group by
another that has a broader popular basis for support." 8 Gurr,
similarly, de-emphasizes the change component of revolutions. 9
The debate about the extent of change involved in revolutions
has led some scholars to
political revolutions.

di~tinguish

between social and

A social revolution, in the words of

one such scholar,
6

Hannah Arendt, On Revolution (New York:
1965)' p. 21.

Viking Press,

7An exception in this regard is Samuel P. Huntington,
Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven, Connecticut:
Yale University Press, 1968). Revolution is a "rapid, fundamental and violent change in the dominant values and myths
of a society in its political institutions, social structure,
leadership, and government activity and policies."
8
James C. Davies, "Toward a Theory of Revolution" in
James C. Davies, ed., When Men Revolt and Why (New York: The
Free Press, 1971), p. 338.
9

Ted R. Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton, New Jersey:
Princeton University Press, 1970), pp. 7-12. (Hereafter
referred to as WMR).

5

is set apart from other sorts of conflicts and transformative processes above all by the combination of two
coincidences: the coincidence of societal structural
change with class upheaval; and the c£ancidence·of
political with social transformation.
A political revolution, "transforms state structures, but not
social structures.

,,11

Mark Hagopian warns, however, against

overdrawing the boundaries between social and political
revolutions, since they are separated not by the amount or
extent of change involved but as to when and how different
types of changes come about. 12 These differences are useful
in distinguishing revolutions from non-revolutionary phenomena such as civil wars and coups, 13 and between types of
revolutions.
10Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolution: A
Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China (London:
Cambridge University Press, 1979), p. 4 (Hereafter referred
to as States and Social Rf!VOl uti on).
11 Ibid.
12Hagopian states: "Marx' stipulation that social
revolutions are ipso facto political revolutions helps to
clarify the problem from one side. We can furthermore point
out that a revolution which is primarily political will have
great difficulty in refraining from intervention in the
economic and status systems (i.e., in the areas usually termed 'social')." Mark r-. Hagopian, The Phenomenon of Revolution
(New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1975), pp. 105-106.
13A civil war can be defined as "a formal, organized
military clash between two competing governments or political
authorities or armed factions within the same territory."
Mostafa Rejai, The Comparative Study of Revolutionary Strategy
(New York: David McKay Company, 1977), pp. 21-22.

IJII"'".

6

Second, the term revolution is consistently associated
with overt conflict and violence.

Some scholars, indeed,

prefer to subsume revolutions under the general category. of
violence or conflict rather than change.

Gurr and Tilly, for

example, see violence as the definitive property of revolut 1. ons, 14 while the use of the concept internal war has gained
15
.
wide currency as a synonym o f revo 1 u t 1on.

Th ese sc h o 1 ars

are nevertheless careful to point out that although revolutions
are rare events, the violence accompanying them is not.

To

demonstrate this point, continua of violence are constructed
reflecting the magnitude and intensity of violent incidents
in the political life of societies.

Revolutions are, then,

typically seen as an extreme case of intense and widespread
violence

16

or conflict,

17

while less intense forms of violence

(like riots and violent strikes) are more common.
14

Ibid., pp. 7-12 and Charles Tilly, From Mobilization
to Revolution (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley, 1978),
pp. 189-222.
15

Internal war has been defined as "any resort to violence within a political order to change its constitution,
rulers, or policies." Harry Eckstein, "On the Etiology of
Internal Wars," History and Theory 4 (1965): 133.
16

Gurr's requirement is "highly organized political
violence with widespread popular participation, designed to
overthrow the regime or dissolve the state and accompanied
by extensive violence." Gurr, WMR, p. 11.
17

Tilly's requirement is that a revolution starts when
"a government previously under the control of a single,
sovereign polity becomes the object of effective, competing,
mutually exclusive claims on the part of two or more distinct
Polities." Tilly, p. 191.

7

Although there is agreement that violence and conflict
accompany revolutions a close identification of revolution
with violence makes it difficult to distinguish revolutionary
from non-revolutionary events like coups and civil wars:
Left out of this definition is all that gives revolution
its distinctiveness and its impact upon contemporaries.
It lacks the sense of the profundity of the crisis in a
society undergoing revolution. Of the stakes in revolution only· political power is considered; economic and
status stratification seems beneath consideration. There
is no inkling of what is to be done with power after the
insurrectionaries take over.l~
Finally, a close identification of violence and revolution
makes it difficult to distinguish between types of revolutions
except on the basis of the strategic-instrumental considerations in the struggle for power.

19

In summary, it is easy to exaggerate definitional differences, but such exaggeration neglects areas of substantive
agreement about the change and violence characterizing revolutions.

Definitional differences can best be seen as the van-

guard of theoretical differences about the types of change
and violence involved, its extent, timing and interrelationship.

In suspending the question of theoretical differences,

a working definition of revolution then reads as follows:
18

Hagopian, pp. 71-72.

19

see Sheldon S. Wolin, "The Politics of the Study of
Revolution," Comparative Politics 5 (April 1973): 343-358 on
tpe theoretical fascination with techniques of revolutionary
violence.

8

Revolution is a form of change simultaneously affecting several
societal dimensions.

Since several societal dimensions - the

economic, political, social and psycho-cultural - are affected,
it is possible to speak of the change as "far-reaching," and
since these dimensions together define society, it is possible
to speak of the change as "basic" and "fundamental".

Although

these changes may occur over a period of decades, the process
of change contains a violent struggle for national political
control.

Since the political groups seeking a transfer of

power use violence and since their goals reflect many recent
socio-economic changes, their actions can be described as
"illegal".

Finally, revolutions are marked by their "mass-

character", i.e. a significant amount of the population is
affected by the process of societal change and the violent
struggle for power is affected by popular participation. 20

3.

Social Revolution:

A Structural Perspective

As previously indicated, the multi-dimensional character of revolutions has resulted in a vast array of theories
attempting to explain revolutions.
20

There are indeed so many

This working description of revolution closely resembles that of Rejai.
It is not identical to his definition,
however, mainly because he holds a voluntaristic conception
of revolution, that is, revolutions are fundamentally the
Product of the will of determined revolutionaries. See Rejai,
pp. 7-8. Throughout this paper, revolutions are seen as
fundamentally the product of political and socio-economic
relationships or structures.

9

theories that they can be divided into well-stocked categories.
One categorization divides theories according to the
questions raised about revolutions.

Why men are willing to

engage in violent behavior is addressed by Gurr, when men are
willing to do so by Davies, and what the properties are of a
revolutionary course of events after men have decided to do

.

so by Br1nton

21

and Edwards.

22

on the attributes of theories.

Another categorization focuses
Some use concepts of social

psychology (Gurr), others that of political interaction
(Tilly), and that of systems analysis (Johnson),

23

socio-

economic and political class analysis (Skocpol, Barrington
Moore

24

and Paige

25

), and utilitarian decision-making

21 crane Brinton, The Anatomy of Revolution, revised
and expanded edition (New York:

Vintage Books, 1965).

22 r.yford P. Edwards, The Natural History of Revolution
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970).
23

Chalmers Johnson, Revolutionary Change (Boston:
Little, Brown and Company, 1966).
24

Barrington Moore, Jr., Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966).
25

Jeffrey M. P~.ige, Agrarian Revolution (New York:
The Free Press, 1975).

10

(Leites and Wolf).

26

Yet another categorization focuses on

the setting of revolutions, with theories applicable to western
settings (Brinton) and others to non-western settings (Sarke28
sian27 and Wolf).
Finally, a categorization can be made
29
between theories focusing on the causes
of revolutions (Gurr
30
and Johnson), those focusing on the course
of revolutions
(Brinton and Tilly), and those attempting to explain the out32
comes31 of revolutions (Barrington Moore, Eisenstadt,
Skocpol, Trimberger 33 and Wolf).
26 Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf Jr. Rebellion and
Authority: An Analytic Essay on Insurgent Conflicts (Chicago:
Markham, 1970).
27 Sam C. Sarkesian, "Revolutionary Guerrilla W''.rfare:
An Introduction" in Sam C. Sarkesian, ed., Revolutionary
Guerrilla Warfare (Chicago: Precedent Publishing, 1975), pp.
1-21.
28
Eric R. Wolf, Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century
(New York: Harper and Row, 1969). (Hereafter referred to as
Peasant Wars).
29The term cause typically refers to events before the
outbreak of violence.
30
The term course is often used to denote the historical sequence of revolutionary events between the precipitants
of a revolution (a violent strike, riots, or a defeat in war)
and the cessation of violence (usually after there has been a
governmental change) or Thermidor. The causal periods of
revolutions are often called preconditions, i.e. they precede
Precipitant events. These demarcations are, however, problematic because they depend not only on different views of the
historical sequence of revolutions but also on the conception
of the revolution overall. See Hagopian, pp. 194-250 and
Tilly, 216-219.

11

This summary of theories is not exhaustive, but it
does serve the purpose of pointing out that there are no
complete theories of revolution, explaining the causes,
course and consequences of revolutions in all dimensions
with universal applicability.

Theories typically attempt to

explain a particular question or set of related questions
about revolutions, the nature of which influences - if not
determines - the focus of the theory.

The question Why men

rebel, for example, leads logically to a focus on individuals'
state of mind in the presence of distressing socio-economic
circumstances, as well as a focus on the early or causal
31

Outcomes refer to the consequences or effects of
revolutions. There are different types of outcomes, depending on the focus and concepts of the analyst. Gurr, for
example, notes that a categorization exists between immediate
outcomes and long-term outcomes. Immediate outcomes are often
used to describe changes in the distribution of political
power between groups, social classes or other organizations.
Long-term outcomes are used to describe changes in larger
societal features, such as growth rates, demographic patterns,
distribution of societal resources and international position.
Ted R. Gurr, "On the Outcomes of Violent Conflict" in Ted R.
Gurr, ed., Handbook of Political Conflict (New York: The Free
Press, 1980), p. 138.
32 s. N. Eisenstadt, Revolution and the Transformation
of Societies (New York: The Free Press, 1978).
33

Kay E. Trimberger, Revolution From Above: Military
Bureaucrats and Development in Japan, Turkey, Egypt, and Peru
(New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Books, 1978).

12

period of the revolutionary process.

The question why a

particular kind of revolution occurred can lead to class
analysis or to the analysis of the interaction between socioeconomic conditions and the use of political power as
reflected in the work of Skocpol, Trimberger and Paige.

34

It is to the work of this latter group of scholars, here
35
grouped under the term of structuralists,
that this study
refers in its analysis of social revolutions.
3.1. The Causes of Revolution
Analysts like Skocpol, Trimberger and Eisenstadt
reject many of the presumptions and findings of earlier
causal theorists, particularly those of Gurr and Johnson,
while being more sympathetic - although not wholly so - to
thoseof Tilly and Marxian analyses.

Inequalities in an

objective and subjective sense, the political offensives of
ascendant classes, organizational theory, and the irreparable
rupture of a society's value consensus are all rejected as
adequate causal perspectives.

Instead, analysts adopt a

34 on the distinction between
structuralism of Skocpol, see Theda
Review of Barrington Moore's Social
and Democracy'' Politic& and Society

class analysis and the
Skocpol, "A Critical
Origins of Dictatorship
4 (Fall 1973): 1-34.

35
The subsequent sections are strongly influenced by
Jack A. Goldstone "Theories of Revolution: The Third Generation" World Politics 22 (April 1980): 425-453.

13

structural perspective

36

on revolutions' causes, stressing

the view that revolutions occur in societies with particular
political and socio-economic features, both sets of which
can be objectively determined.

It is the relationship between

political and economic forces that produces a crisis in a
society's system of social control (that is, a political or
governmental crisis) which renders that society revolutionprone.
What is the nature of the political-economic nexus?
All the societies that have experienced revolution, scholars
argue, were exposed to the historical forces of modernity,
especially the intrusion of the international capitalist
economy in domestic life and with resultant changes in
political and socioeconomic structures and ideas.

The shape

36 In distinguishing structural analyses from other
perspectives, Skocpol states: "Three major principles of
analysis need to be established as alternatives to features
shared by all the currently prevailing theories of revolution.
In the first place, an adequate understanding of social
revolutions requires that the analyst take a nonvoluntarist,
structural perspective on their causes and processes •.• In the
second place, social revolutions cannot be explained without
systematic reference to international structures and worldhistorical developments ••• In the third place, in order to
explain the causes and outcomes of social revolutions, it is
essential to conceive of states as administrative and coercive
organizations - organizations that are potentially autonomous
from (though of course conditioned by) socioeconomic interests
and structures.'' Skocpol, State and Social Revolution, p. 14.
By a structural perspective is meant an "impersonal ~nd non·
subjective viewpoint - one that emphasizes patterns of relationships among groups and societies" or a focus simultaneously
on "institutionally determined situations and relations of
groups within society and upon the interrelations of societies
within world-historically developing international structures."
Ibid., p. 18.

14

of the intruding forces may take many forms; in the nonwestern world, for example, it took the form of colonialism
with its allied economic and political ideas and forms.
Regardless of the differences in the shape of the intrusion,
however, the results are broadly similar:

these forces

engender substantial economic, political and social changes
in domestic structures and ideas.

The introduction of

colonialism, for example, leads to the introduction of the
notion of private property in societies previously characterized by communal systems of landownership. 37 It may also
lead to a polarization between developed and underdeveloped
sectors of societies, or to changes in the system of peasant
production. 38 Collectively, these changes produce instabibility.
To move out of the realm of instability and into a
revolutionary situation requires a consideration of the
state's political structures.

Here scholars view the states'

political structure neither as the executive committee of a
37wolf, Peasant Wars, pp. 276-286.
38 structural analysts are to a large extent in agreement with many of the views of dependency theorists. See,
for example, Andre G. Frank, "The Development of Underdevelopment" in Robert I. Rhodes, ed., Imperialism and Underdevelopment: A Reader (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1970),
pp. 89-100; Paul A. Baran, The Political Economy of Growth
(New York: Monthly Review Press, 1957); and Johan Galtung, "A
Structural Theory of Imperialism," Journal of Peace Research 8
(1971): 81-117.

15

particular class (or interests), with inevitable "intransigence", nor as a vacuous political arena where conflict takes
place.

The state's political

structure is viewed as an

administrative entity, staffed by bureaucrats, which is - to a
varying degree - dependent on certain social groups for the
supply of political support and economic resources in order
to fulfil its goals.

Although administrative structures may

vary, it is their weakness in the face of a (typically
international) crisis that produces a revolutionary situation.
A crisis is typically brought on by the need to increase
societal resources when the state encounters external military
or economic challenges, that is, wars or market competition. 39
An interstate war, for example, induces the state's
central political machinery to stimulate economic production,
to seek state revenues from such increased production, and to
exercise greater central control over resources.

If the

central political machinery fails to accomplish these goals either because of the political opposition of the state
bureaucracy's support groups (like the landed aristocracy) or
the inherent weaknesses of the type of economic organization
(like the type of peasant production) - the state is
39
Another way of explaining the administrative incapacitation is to view it as a clash between state and rural elites.
Normal tensions exist, but are increased when state elites
under pressure of war want to modernize political and socioeconomic practices and organizations. If the state elite is
closely linked to rural elites and encountersresistance from
them, the state is incapacitated.

16

. 1 y 1ncapac1
.
. t at ed .
administrat1ve

40

The collapse of the government or at least its administrative incapacitation is thus not the function of an "intransigent" elite.

There is a wide range of elite behaviour, even

within one state.

Typically it is the landed aristocracy that

balks at the reforming efforts of bureaucrats and if the latter relies on the former for political and economic cooperation the reforms are doomed.

The collapse of the government

also does not come when frustrated and mobilized masses
launch an assualt on the capital.

Rather, there is an admin-

istrative incapacity which results from political goals not
being met in a time of foreign military and economic challenge
because of domestic political opposition and weaknesses in
economic organization.
3.2. The Course of Revolution
A society marked by administrative incapacity, weaknesses in economic organization, the landed aristocracy's
opposition to political and economic reforms, and the experience of foreign economic or military challenge is in a
revolutionary situation; but this does not necessarily lead
to the experience of revolution.
includes in her

ana~ysis

Skocpol, for example,

a study of societies that were in a

revolutionary situation but did not experience revolution,
40

skocpol, States and Social Revolutions, pp. 47-51
and Eisenstadt, pp. 195-206.

17

such as nineteenth century Japan.

41

Trimberger also addresses

this question by studying how certain societies' bureaucracy
may move out of a revolutionary situation by instituting a
"revolution from above", that is, successfully instituting
reforms.

42

Although there has been no attempt thus far to develop
stage-type theories, most structural analysts agree that
revolutions have three critical developments in common.
First, for a revolutionary situation to develop into
a revolution a popular revolt has to coincide with the incapacitation of central state machinery.

Typically this

revolt is rurally-based and consists of portions of the
peasantry becoming politically conscious and active.
there is agreement among scholars that peasants

43

Although

play a

decisive role, there is disagreement as to which portion
of the peasantry is most likely to be active.

Skocpol

emphasizes the political autonomy of certain portions of the
41

Skocpol, States and Social Revolution, pp. 99-104.

42 T . b
r1m erger, p. 156 •
43

The definition of the term peasant varies, with some
viewing them as a population category while others use the
term as a class. Wolf states that peasants are "populations
that are existentially involved in cultivation and make
autonomous decisions regarding the process of cultivation. The
category is thus made to cover tenants and sharecroppers as
well as owner-operators, as long as they are in a position to
make the relevant decisions on how their crops are grown.
It
does not, however, include fishermen and landless laborers."
Wolf, Peasant Wars, p. xiv. Paige uses a wider definition of
"rural cultivators". Paige, pp. 25-40.

18

pesantry:
Peasants always have grounds for rebellion against landlords, state agents, and merchants who exploit them ••.
If they are to act upon, rather than silently suffer,
their omnipotent grievances, peasants mu~:t have 'internal
leverage' - some organized capacity for collective action
against their exploitative superiors. In my view, the
extent to which peasants have had such internal leverage,
particularly during historical political crises of
agrarian states, is explained by structural and situational conditions that affect: (1) the degrees and kinds
of solidarity of peasant communities; (2) the degrees of
peasant autonomy from day-to-day supervision and control
by landlords and their agents; and (3) the relaxation of
state coercive sanctions against peasant revolts .•. it is
never enough merely to identify different strata of
property holders, abstracting away from institutional
contexts.44
Wolf also notes the role of institutional or power relations,
but argues that it is neither the poor peasants and landless
labourers nor the rich peasant that will have internal
leverage.
The only component of the peasantry which does have some
internal leverage is either landowning 'middle peasantry'
or a peasantry located in a peripheral area outside the
domains of landlord control. Middle peasantry refers to
a peasant population which has secure access to land of
its own and cultivates it with family labor. Where these
middle peasant holdings lie within the power domain of a
superior, possession of their own resources provides the
holders with the minimal 4Ectical freedom required to
challenge their overlord.
The middle peasantry thus is the pivotal group in the popular
uprising and any factor, like ethnicity and geographic location, which adds to its "tactical mobility" also reinforces
44

Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions, pp. 115-116.

45wolf, Peasant Wars, p. 291.
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its revolutionary potential.

Poor peasants, landless

labourers and rich peasants are unlikely to engage in revolutionary activity, unless an "external force, such as the
Chinese Red Army, proves capable of destroying •.• the power
46
which constrains."
Paige, on the other hand, notes that peasants dependent
on income from wages, whether from sharecropping or migratory
labour, are likely to engage in revolutionary action.
statement is qualified, however, by the

re~uirement

This

that the

particular type of income has to be combined with a particular
type of income of rural classes in order to be a revoluticn.

Thus

A combination of noncultivators dependent on income from
land and cultivators dependent on income from wages lea1s
to revolution. Such a combination of income sources is
typical of sharecropping and migratory labor estate systems. The revolutionary movement demands the redistribution of landed property through the seizure of the state ...
A combination of noncultivators dependent on income from
capital and cultivators dependent on income from wages
leads to a reform labor movement.47
For Paige they types of rural income and the combination of
types is thus critical.
Second, it is important to understand that the peasantry (or rather critical portions of the peasantry) and their
actions do not constitute a self-liberating, ascendant class
in the Marxist mold, though they do have common interests.
46 Ibid. , p. 290.
47 Paige, p. 71. See also Theda Skocpol, "What Makes
Peasants Revolutionary?" Comparative Politics 14 (April 1982)
1982): 351-375.
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The peasantry functions as a pivotal population group with
similar interests which establishes a coalition with o~ is
led by marginal elites.

The revolutionary coalition incor-

porates the peasantry, elites and other population grohps.
In this coalition the marginal elites are important, f1Dr
they in effect constitute a revolutionary leadership, shaping
both the ideas that animate the revolution and the organizational forms of the coalition itself.

48

With regard to the revolutionary ideology generated
by the revolutionary elite, structural analysts note the conI

sistent appearance of radical nationalism or varietieslof
it. 49

They contest, however, that an understanding of' ideo-

logy is necessary to explain the practical strategies

~f

revolutionaries during the struggle for power or for explaining the outcomes of the revolution.

In part the de-emphasis

of ideology is due to the structural perspective of outcomeoriented analyses, which opposes the notion that revolutions
48
In describing revolutionary elites, Skocpol e
sizes that they should not be viewed as representative
classes or as willful individuals struggling to impleme
particular ideological vision of society. They should
viewed as "that which political leaderships in revolut
crises are above all doing - claiming and struggling t
maintain state power." Skocpol, States and Social Rev
pp. 164-165. But this still begs the question of why
individuals lead revolutions while others are follower
Here Wolf states that they are "marginal" men because
have been barred from positions of power by virtue of
unused skills or social positions. Wolf, Peasant Wars
pp. 287-289.
49
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Paige, pp. 59-71 and Skocpol, States and Soci 1
Revolution, pp. 168-171.
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are caused or carried out by a "determined, organized vanguard," though revolutionary elites may be determined and
well-organized.

From the structural perspective,

revolu~

tionary ideology is seen as a resource, insofar as its
nature projects a broad appeal to diverse segments of the
population and it facilitates the proselytizing efforts of
the revolutionary elite to encourage broadly-based popular
. .
t•1on. 50
part1c1pa

There is significant variation in the political organizations generated during the revolutionary process.

In

his study of the organizational forms of six revolutions,
Wolf notes that two forms are common, namely a military
organization (or army) and a para-military party.

Within

these organizational forms, however, there are different
types of political-military interaction.
In the Mexican and Algerian cases, the revolutionary
organization took the form of an army organized, respectively,
by a civilian-military leadership and a wartime coalition of
nationalists.

Since this type reflects the primacy of mili-

tary needs during the struggle for power, later efforts to
transform the army into a political party may meet with some
difficulty.

In the Russian, Chinese and Vietnamese revolu-

tions a different type emerged, where the "roles of the
50 skocpol, States and Social Revolution, pp. 169-171.
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armY and party were reversed."

51

The direction of the revolu-

tionary struggle was by a political party with a para-military nature:
In these three cases, it was the political parties of
middle-class revolutionaries who engineered the seizure
of power and created the social and military instruments
which conquered the state, and ensured transition to a
new social order. It is probably no accident that these
are also three countries which were characterized by
patterns of conspiratorial and secret societies before
the advent of revolution .•. It is here- and only herethat the party as a separate body comes to dominate the
other organizations thrown up by the revolution.52
The political party may be based in urban areas, as in the
case of Russia, or rural areas like China and Vietnam.

53

A

third type emerged in the Cuban revolution, and consisted
neither of an army nor a para-military party but "a small
group of armed rebels who, very much by accident, had established themselves in the one part of the island inhabited by
a tactically mobile peasantry.

Once in power, this rebel

group made use of the Communist party apparatus ..... 54

This

type is uncommon and has been criticized for its strategic
inefficiency. 5 5
51
52
53
54

wolf, Peasant Wars, p. 297.
Ibid., pp. 297-298.
Ibid., p. 298.
Ibid., p. 299.

5 5 Ibid.
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Thus there are two major organizational types, namely
the armY or military organization and the para-military
party.

Whether the para-military party is based in rural or

urban areas also results in organizational differences.

Two

questions logically emerge from these organizational differences.

One is why some revolutions generate a particular

organizational form.

The other question is what the impli-

cations of organizational forms are for revolutionary outcomes.
In addressing the question of why one revolution
generates a particular organizational form, Wolf notes that
there is no easy solution in the offing, but argues that
particular patterns are a function of the development of
revolutions, which includes support groups, ideological proclivity, strategic thinking, and the locus of warfare.
the Russian revolution, for example, the

In

development of an

organizational_formwas influenced by the existence of secret
societies before the revolution, the fact that the party
drew its main support not from the peasantry but from industrial workers in key regions, and that industrialization as
an ideological goal necessitated the development of cadre
that could occupy key economic positions in the post-violent
stages of the revolution.

In the Chinese revolution, however,

there
seem to have been tensions between groups in the party
which favored the Russian model of development, and those

24

who, during the years of protracted war, had learned to
put their faith in a peasant army with an egalitarian
ideology. The experience of war in the hinterland had
taken them far from the cities and industrial areas; it
had taught them the advantages of dispersal, of a wide
distribution of basic skills rather than a dense concentration of advanced skills. The citizen-soldiers of the
guerrilla army had, in fact, lived lives in which the
roles of peasant, worker, soldier, ang intellectual
intermingled to the point of fusion.5
The result was that a party did emerge, but that it contained
a military sub-organization that was increasingly powerful. 57
With regard to the later implications of organizational forms, Wolf notes that the Russian case is exceptional.
Here the development of a strong party and political component to the revolutionary movement coincided with the
development of an "effective managerial class and a population of skilled industrial workers." 58 The outcome is "a
strongly hierarchical society, operated by technocrats, 'experts and Red', but above all experts." 59 Where the party
component is not as strongly developed during the revolutionary struggle for power, as in the Algerian case, the army
forged during the struggle has to stabilize the society. ,.GO
56 Ibid., p. 300.
57 Ibid., pp. 300-301.
58 Ibid. , p. 300.
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid., p. 297.
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Even in the case of the Chinese revolution, where a party
did emerge during the struggle, the army may become increas61
ingly important and do so at the expense of the party.
Organizational forms are not the only factor to influence the outcomes of revolutions and have to be considered
along with such factors as international market forces and
domestic resources.

Yet it is during the revolutionary

process that political groups and ideas are defined:

an

elite emerges, as well as followers, which are linked in an
organizational form with political goals.
Third, structural analysts insist that the reaction of
the state to revolutionary challenge is a critical ingredient
of the course of revolutions.
this key role.

There are several reasons for

Perhaps the most important of these is that

the state's response to revolutionary challenge influences if not determines - the immediate outcome of the struggle for
power.

Changes by the challenged regime of policies, laws,

practices or resource distribution results in a redistribution
of groups' power once the violent phase of the struggle for
power has ended. 62 Here it is noted that the regime will not
be toppled if it manages to maintain centralized control over
its armed forces, prevents the disintegration of these forces,
61

Ibid., pp. 300-301.

62
Gurr, "On the Coutcomes of Violent Conflict",
pp. 254-255.
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and effectively uses them to counter the revolutionaries'
63
actions.
Another reason for the key role of the state in the
process of revolution is that, although the revolutionary
process was precipitated by administrative incapacitation and
the revolutionary crisis ''does entail institutional breakdowns and class conflicts that quickly change what is possible in a given society, many conditions - especially socioeconomic conditions - always 'carry over' from the old
regime." 64 During the revolutionary process the challenged
regime is, in other words, never totally dismantled.

So~e

portions of the old regime remain, others are transformed,
and another portion of it may disappear.
The importance of the ramants of the old regime is
underscored by the fact that clearcut victories (or losses)
are rare in revolutionary struggles for power.

In studying

internal wars which were begun or in progress in 119 nations
or colonies between 1961 and 1965, Gurr notes:
There were forty-eight distinguishable guerrilla, civil
and revolutionary wars, not counting coups, military
63 see John Ellis, Armies in Revolution (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1974); Katherine Chorley, Armies and the Art
of Revolution (London: Faber and Faber, 1943); and D.E.H.
Russell, Rebellion, Revolution and Armed Force: A Comparative
Study of Fifteen Countries with Special Emphasis on Cuba and
South Africa (New York: Academic Press, 1974).
64

skocpol, States and Social Revolution, p. 171.
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rebellions, or isolated instances of armed resistance.
By 1978 three were still major conflicts, while fragmentary accounts indicated that sporadic resistance
continued in nine other instances ••• clear-cut revolutionary victories are uncommon. It is also evident that
decisive outcomes are not as common in most internal wars
as they have been in the best-known historical examples,
for instance, France 1789 and 1848, the United States
1865, Russia 1917, China 1949, Greece 1949, Cuba 1959,
Nigeria 1970 and Vietnam 1974. Dramatic victory and
defeat have impressed these examples on political memory.
The more numerous revolts that have ended in compromise
and mutual exhaustion are less often remembered •.• 65
In studying the "endings" of revolutionary struggles marked
by the use of guerrilla warfare as a means, Pirouet comes to
a similar conclusion about their indecisive nature.

Here it

is noted that there are four different types of endings:
The first type of ending is a formally negotiated
settlement of the conflict between the regime and the revolutionary leaders, such as the Sudan.

All revolutionary lead-

ers are not necessarily involved in the negotiations or
included in the final settlement.

The reason is that the

challenged regime usually prefers to negotiate with the
moderate faction of the opposition, whether actual or perceived.

If the regime has decided that it cannot win and

concludes a formal settlement, such a settlement therefore
usually brings moderates to power.

A second type of ending

is an informal or unofficial negotiated settlement.

An

example of this type is the ending of the Mau Mau Emergency
65 Gurr, "On the Outcomes of Violent Conflict," pp.
266-267.

28

in Kenya.

The challenged regime again prefers to negotiate

with moderate factions or
ment.

leaders of the revolutionary move-

The possibility of such negotiations however depends

on whether the moderate faction holds positions of power within the revolutionary movement or organization.

Even if they

do hold powerful positions, they may not be willing to
negotiate with the regime; willingness to negotiate depends
on whether the regime has managed to redress the grievances
associated with the moderate faction.

A third type of end-

ing consists of a military victory by the revolutionary
movement which, although there are some dramatic examples
of military takeovers, are in fact uncommon.

Here attempts

at settlement -informal or formal - may have been made during
the course of the conflict, but have failed to resolve the
conflict.

Since military victory is often a necessary con-

dition of political takeover, this type of ending favours
the radical factions of the revolutionary movement who usually
have a narrow political support base.

A final type of ending

consists of a regime victory, such as Malaya, with military
d e f ea t avo1"d e d • 66
A final reason for the focus on the state in the
revolutionary process is that the regime's response to
66 Louise Pirouet, "Armed Resistance and Counter-Insurgency: Reflections in the Anya Nya and Mau Mau Experiences"
in Ali A. Mazrui, ed., The W~rrior Tradition in Modern Africa
(Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1977), pp. 205-210.
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revolutionary challenge may initiate political and socioeconomic changes with longlasting effect.
regime initiates
defeat~

chan~es

Although the

to avoid political or military·

its ultimate effect is on society as a whole when the

violent phase of the revolution has ended.

Examples of this

type of change can be found, especially in counterinsurgency
strategies which may include population removal, land reform,
67
economic growth or foreign dependency.
It has indeed been
argued that such changes initiated by regimes during the
revolutionary process in an effort to survive have the effect
of transforming the regime and - to varying degrees - the
society as well.

As such it is one of the important factors
68
affecting revolutionary outcomes.
Although structural analyses thus have not attempted
to develop stage-type

explanations of the revolutionary pro-

cess, they do stipulate three critical factors in the course
of revolutions' development:

A popular uprising coincides

with the incapacitation of the central political machinery,
usually consisting of a peasant revolt in rural areas.

The

peasants do not act as a self-liberating class but enter into
67
For a summary of the basic types of counterinsurgency or counter-revolutionary guerrilla warfare see Eqbal
Ahmad, "Revolutionary Warfare and Counterinsurgency" in Norman
Miller and Roderick Aya, eds., National Liberation (New Ycrk:
The Free Press, 1971), pp. 137-213.
68

.
Gurr, "On the Outcomes of Violent Conflict," p. 255.
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a revolutionary coalition with other societal groups.

This

organizational form of the revolutionary movement usually
reveals an elite, followers and political goals.

Finally,

the response of the existing regime is crucial to the development of the course of revolutionary events.
One implication of this view of the course of revolutions is that it collapses many of the distinctions other
scholars, like Huntington, make between Western and Eastern
revolutions.

As indicated earlier, Huntington argues that

Western revolutions have an urban focus and Eastern ones have
a rural focus.

Skocpol, however states:

Urban workers, whether preindustrial or industrial, have
often played highly visible parts in (failed as well as
successful) revolutions. And their aims and achievements have been linked to those of self-consciously
revolutionary leaderships. Hence insurrectionary urban
workers seem like true revolutionaries compared to
peasants who merely 'rebel' in the countryside, far from
the centers of national-political consciousness and
decision. Nevertheless, peasant revolts have been the
crucial insurrectionary ingredient in virtually all actual
(i.e. successful) revolutions to date, and certainly in
the French, Russian and Chinese £evolutions. This is not
surprising, given that social revolutions have occurred
in agrarian countries where peasants are the major producing class. Without peasant revolts, urban radicalism
in predominantly agrarian countries has not in the end
been able to accomplish social-revolutionary transformations.69
Thus rural occurrences are crucial - although not necessarily
the most visible - parts of even Western revolutions.
69

Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions, pp. 112-113.
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3.3. The Consequences of Revolution
The preceding outline of the structural analysts' conception of the causes and course of revolutions makes it
clear that revolutions do not ensconce willful revolutionaries
or particular classes in positions of total governmental
power.

If this were the case, the consequences of revolu-

tions would not be problematic.

The intentions or ideology

of revolutionaries would be the major influence on outcomes,
or the interests of certain classes would make future
70
.
directions a f oregone cone 1 us1on.
Although the view of outcomes in studies by Skocpol,
Eisenstadt, Paige and Trimberger differ in many respects,
they share one important generalization:

the consequences

of revolutions are determined by the policies followed by
the new political elite. 71

Policy-making in the post-violent

stages of the revolution is, however, subject to a number of
structural constraints.

Perhaps the most important struc-

tural constraint is that the international pressures which
triggered the incapacitation of the central administration
continue to exist.

Although interstate wars and political

conflicts may abate, international economic forces continue
to exert a powerful influence.
70
71
p. 291.

This influence is evident in

Ibid., pp. 6-18.
see also Gurr, "On the Outcomes of Violent Conflict",
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two dimensions.

In the international dimension the state and

its economic organizations encounter the economic organizations, interests and influence of more powerful states.
This structure of inequality, it is argued, is a logical
product of the nature of the capitalist world economy, where
the development of one state's economy, particularly in
North America and Western Europe, is systematically related
to the underdevelopment of agrarian states in Latin America,
Africa and Southeast Asia.

In the domestic dimension there

is also a pattern of inequality between the more developed,
usually urban centers and the underdeveloped hinterland. 72
Together the international and domestic structures of
inequality constrain the actions of the new elite in achieving their goals.

Production, for example, may still be

based on the output of the rural or peasant sectors of the
society, where ·efforts to increase production may arouse
the animosity of both the landed classes and the peasantry.
Even if the production of these sectors could be increased,
however, the products tend to be of an agricultural (or
primary) kind for which the world prices fluctuate.

Per-

petually unsure of its foreign exchange earnings, the new
elite rinds it difficult to engage in longterm planning in
pursuit of its goals.
72

In short, conditions of economic

See Galtung, pp. 81-90.
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dependence and inequality limit the policy-making options
.
73
of the new reg1me.
Another constraint is the political nature, resources
and abilities of the new elite.

One reason for this con-

straining influence is that the new regime also incorporates
members of the old regime.

Revolutions, and particularly

revolutions marked by the use of guerrilla warfare, typically
produce negotiated endings to the violent phase of the revolution.

Consequently members of the old regime may - to vary-

ing degree - retain their positions in executive, legislative,
judicial and bureaucratic bodies.

In addition to actions of

the new (or old revolutionary) elite being subverted from
within governmental areas, the social support base of the
revolutionary elite also constrains its options.

Trimberger,

for example, notes that since revolutions "from above" occur
without the mobilization of mass support the regime relies
on the political support of specific groups in society, such
as the military establishment and landed aristocrats.

Landed

aristocrats then may exercise political veto power over policies that threaten their position or at least may refuse to
cooperate with, for example, a land reform program.
73

74

Skocpol,

see Gunner Myrdal, Rich Lands and Poor: The Road to
World Prosperity (New York: Harper and Row, 1957); and H.W.
Singer, "The Distribution of Gains between Borrowing and InVesting Countries," American Economic Review 40 (May 1950):
473-485.
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similarly, argues that the interests of the new regime's
supporters constrains its actions.

The political support

base of the French National Assembly, for example, was composed of peasants, skilled labourers and small businessmen,
all of whom sought to either acquire or consolidate property.
The French National Assembly then could not follow policies
which denied the principle of private property or redistributed property.

75

While Skocpol and Trimberger stress the political
resources of the new regime, Einsenstadt stresses its nature.
Here the reference is to nature as it is revealed in the
political actions of the revolutionary elite during the causal
and course-stages of the revolution.

Eisenstadt notes that

revolutionary elites that are most isolated from both the
elites of the old regime and other revolutionary groups do not
hesitate to follow policies marked by coercion and centralized
state power.

Isolated revolutionary elites, in other words,

tend to monopolize power.

Revolutionary elites with well-

developed ties with either pre-revolutionary elites or other
revolutionary groups, on the other hand, tend towards consensus and democratic policy directions.

76

Finally the relation of the political and organizational resources of the new regime to the socio-economic base
75 skocpol, States and Social Revolution, pp. 178-179.
76

Eisenstadt, pp. 245-246.
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of the regime may act as a constraint.

In particular, the

direction of economic policies is influenced by the abilities
of the regime to control the activities of the industrial
sectors of the society.

If the pre-revolutionary order witnes-

sed the growth of powerful industries, redistributive economic
policies are unlikely.

If industries do exist but are not

powerful, on the other hand, the new regime may be able to
control their activities through centralization and socialist
policies, 77 or may seek to encourage industrial growth through
state intervention in the economy.

78

The outcomes of revolutions are thus the consequences
of the new regime's policies, but this policy-making is subject to a number of constraints embedded in the structure of
the new regime and the society at large.
tion

The state's posi-

in the international political economy and the pressures

.resulting from it, the political composition of the new regime
and the contradictory pressures contained in it, and the relation of the socio-economic ramants of the old order to the
resources of the new regime act as constraints upon the - not
altogether new - regime.

Indeed, an old regime attempting to

maintain its position in the face of revolutionary challenge
may initiate as many changes as does a "new" regime.
77
78
206-235.

Although

Skocpol, States and Social Revolution, pp. 206-281.
Russia is a good example of this type.

Ibid., pp.

36

qualitative changes thus may emerge, they are not attributable to the willful actions of new regimes nor do t.hey constitute dramatic historical breakpoints in the development of
societies.
4.

Revolutions in Africa
Revol.utions in non-Western settings are often seen

a crises in modernizing societies.

as

Best presented by Hunting-

ton, this perspective argues that revolutions are likely
neither in highly modernized nor in traditional societies, but
in transitional societies that have experienced some exposure
to modern socio-economic and political forces.

Revolution is

an extreme case of the lag of political-institutional development behind socio-economic development.

When a political in-

stitution, like a political party, cannot absorb the popular
participation engendered by socio-economic development, instability results. Revolution is seen as an extreme case of
this instability. 79
Distinctions between revolutions in Western and nonWestern settings are particularly evident as regards their
course. Huntington argues that "Western" 80 revolutions occur
in societies marked by monarchical political rule combined
79
Huntington, passim.
80 The terms Western and Eastern are not used in a
geographic sense. Ibid., p. 266.
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with the political and socio-economic influence of the landed
aristocracy.

One or another crisis then causes the collapse

of the old political order.

"Eastern" revolutions occur

during later historical periods, when previously traditional
societies have been exposed to modernizing influences (mainly
through colonialism).

A "Western" revolution typically

witnesses - in sequence - the collapse of the old regime's
political institutions, the mobilization of new groups into
political life and then the creation of new political insti.

tut1ons.

81

In contrast, an "Eastern" revolution
begins with the mobilization of new groups into politics
and the creation of new political institutions and ends
with the violent overthrow of the political institutions
of the old order ••• In general, the sequence of movement
from one phase to the next is much more clearly demarcated in the Western revolution than in the Eastern type.
In the latter all three phases tend to occur more or
less simultaneously ••• In the Western revolution, political
mobilization is the consequence of the collapse of the old
regime; in the Eastern revolut~~n it is the cause of the
destruction of the old regime.
It must be pointed out that the differences in the course of
Western and Eastern revolutions reveal dramatic differences
in geographic focus and strategy.

The geographic focus of
83
Western revolutions, according to Huntington,
is urban areas
Sllbid., pp. 266-267.
82 Ibid.
83 This view is contested by most structuralist analysts.
See Skocpol, States and Social Revolution. pp. 112-113.
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where governmental collapse creates an arena for political
conflict and provides strategic incentives for competing
groups.

At the outset of Eastern revolutions, however, the

government is strong, forcing contenders to
withdraw from central, urban areas of the country,
establish a base area of control in a remote section,
struggle to win the support of the peasants through terror and propaganda, slowly expand the scope of their
authority, and gradually escalate the level of their
operations from individual terroristic attacks to guerrilla warfare to mobile warfare and regular warfare.
Eventually they are able to defeat the governmental
troops in battle. The last phase of the revolutionary
struggle is the occupation of the capital.84
Thus the geographic focus of Eastern revolutions is the
countryside and their strategic hallmark is revolutionary
guerrilla warfare.
It is obvious that Huntington's views are influenced
by those of Mao.

The writings of Mao on guerrilla warfare,

along with their apparent applications in: revolutions during
the post-1945 period in fact attracted much attention, with
most scholars studying the strategic dimensions of those
revolutions.

Foremost in this genre is

t~e

work of Leites

and Wolf, as well as works by Galula, Pustay, Paret, Thanpsrn,
Shy and others. 85 Much of the work of the strategic theorists
84

Huntington, pp. 271-272.

85
navid Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare, Theory and
Practice (New York: Praeger, 1964); J. S. Pustay, Counterinsurgency Warfare (New York: Free Press, 1965); Peter Paret
and John Shy, Guerrillas in the 1960's (New York: Praeger,
1962); and Sir Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency
The Lessons of Malaya and Vietnam (New York: Praeger, 1967).
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bas been subject to criticism, particularly as to its ten.
1"1ze 86 an d 1•t s 1 ops1"d e dness. 87 p er h aps
dency to overgenera
the most important contribution of these scholars nevertheless is the development of a view - albeit strategic and
biased toward the actions of revolutionaries (that is, exeluding governmental actions) - of how guerrilla warfare progresses in stages.
According to this view guerrilla warfare starts (in
stage 1) as societal penetration by guerrilla cadre.

Socie-

tal penetration embraces a variety of techniques, all of
which are designed to develop and firmly entrench a covert
organization capable of administrative control over the
local population.

The

m~litary

wing of this structure

engages in occasional acts of violence which underline
governmental inefficiency (or revolutionary efficiency) while
providing the revolutionaries with supplies and recruits.

In

Stage li the revolutionaries expand both the administrativepolitical and military wings of their organization.

As an

administrative entity the revolutionary organization attracts
increasing loyalty from greater numbers of the local population, and becomes more open in its operation.

Its increasingly

86
see J. Bowyer Bell, The Myth of the Guerrilla (~ew
York: Knopf, 1971) and Chalmers Johnson, Autopsy on Peoples'
!!! (Berkeley, California: University of California Press,
1973).

87
Theories were lopsided in the sense that they emphasized one or the other side in the revolutionary conflict;
conflict as a dialectic was ignored.

overt nature is due

t~

the fact that the revolutionaries'

military wing has managed to force the withdrawal of government forces to urban areas.

Ensconced in their base areas,

the revolutionaries are in a position to start institutionalizing their notions of governmental and economic efficiency.
During Stage III the administrative capabilities of the
revolutionaries continue to expand.

The most important

change in this phase is that of the military wing, which
becomes conventional in posture and tactics, and engages
governmental forces in conventionally styled battles.

If

the revolutionaries achieve success during Stage III, the
government's defeat is a foregone conclusion.

Stage IV

indeed consists of the revolutionary takeover of the central
governmental machinery and the national institutionalization
.
88
o f th e revo 1 u t 1on.
The history of African states attest to the frequency
of various kinds of violent upheavals.

Traditional soci-

eties in the pre-colonial era, for example, were often
governed by warrior elites, whose existence depended on and
led to the cultivation of martial traditions.

Among others,

the cultivation of martial traditions included the conduct
88
Mao Tse-tung, Guerrilla Warfare, translated by
Samuel B. Griffith (New York: Praeger, 1961). Mao did not
formulate a stage theory in explicit terms; explication has
come from interpretations of Mao's works and military practice. See John J. McCuen, The Art of Counter-Revolutionary
!!! (London: Faber and Faber, 1966), pp. 50-73.
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of military campaigns against neighboring soc1e 1es.

89

The later imposition of colonial rule was frequently met by
violent resistance from these warrior elites and by others
who refused allegiance to European rule.

Although this

resistance did not prevent the imposition of colonial rule,
colonial history was also punctuated by violent episodes
aimed at the overthrow of colonial regimes and pacification
campaigns to counter such attempts. 90 In the period between
1955 and 1965 virtually all African colonies acquired inde-

pendence.

With a few exceptions, the achievement of inde-

pendence however was a relatively peaceful affair, conducted
by political parties.

91

In the period since 1965 the political leaders and
parties of independent African states have been challenged
89

See, for example, Eugene V. Walter, Terror and
Resistance (London: Oxford University Press, 1969); and
Adda B. Bozeman, Conflict in Africa (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1976).
90

opposition to the imposition of colonial rule is
often called "primary resistance". Later attempts to overthrow colonial rule took many forms. See Robert I. Rotberg
and Ali A. Mazrui, eds. Protest and Power in Black Africa
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1970), pp. 3-142.
91

There is growing opposition to using such broad
categories as "Third World", "non-Western world" or even
"African Conflict" because they contain many diverse components despite geographic proximity. When the term African
Revolutions is here used, it refers primarily to sub-Saharan
Africa or Black Africa. Of the Islamic African countries and
revolutions in them, .only Algeria is included, because of its
similarity to the other settler colonies of Africa.
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by the military, leading to a rash of military coups, several
92
of which were marked by violence.
Independent African
states have also been confronted by army mutinies (such as
those in Tanzania and the former Congo-Kinshasa), attempted
secessions

(like that of Katanga from Congo-Kinshasa and

Biafra from Nigeria), civil wars (Chad and the Sudan), violent border disputes (for example, between Somalia and Kenya),
violent clashes over disputed territories (such as Western
Sahara), and interstate wars (between Uganda and Tanzania).

93

Despite the contention that Western social science theory
94
does not apply to African forms of conflict,
this wide
92 on the role of the military establishment in African
politics, see William F. Gutteridge, The Military in African
Politics (London: Methuen, 1969); and J. M. Lee, African
Armies and Civil Order (London: Chatto and Windus, 1969).
On coups, see Samuel Decalo, Coups and Ar·my Rule in Africa:
Studies in Military Style (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1976).
93 see William Eckhardt and Edward Azar, "Major Conflicts and Interventions, 1945-1975," International Interactions 5 (1978): 75-110; Mohammed Ayoob, ed., Conflict and
Intervention in the Third World (London: St. Martin's Press,
1980); Robert F. Gorman Political Conflict in the Horn of
Africa (New York: Praeger Press, 1981); and Aristide Zolberg, "The Structure of Political Conflict in the New States
of Africa," American Political Science Review 62 (March
1968): 70-87.
94 Bozeman, p. 219. While Bozeman's argument is that
Western social science is inapplicable to African conflict
because Africans' mental view and social practice of conflict
is radically un-Western, others have criticized Western social
science theory on the grounds of its counter-revolutionary,
bourgeois, dogmatic, and superficial nature. This has led
many scholars to amend and supplant Western scientific theories
and concepts. For a review, see Peter Waterman, "On Radicalism
In African Studies," Politics and Society 3 (Spring 1973): 261281.
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range of violent phenomena in Africa have been studied from
a variety of scholarly perspectives, including relative
deprivation theory, mobilization theory, class analysis·,
civil-military relations, pluralism, race relations and
culture.

95

Causal questions tend to dominate these theo-

retical explanations, with less attention paid to the course
95

For explanations using concepts related to the study
of civil-military interaction, see Claude Welch, ed., Soldier and State in Africa (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern
University Press, 1970); and Decalo. Class analyses is found
in, for example, Brian Bunting, The Rise of the South African
Reich (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1969) and Samir Amin,
Unequal Development: An Essay in the Social Formations of
Peripheral Capitalism (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1977)
Probably the best use of pluralism is contained in Leo Kuper
and M. G. Smith, eds., Pluralism in Africa (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1969). The relative
deprivation explanation is widely used. For criticism of
this view, see Nkemdirim, who points out that the relation
between relative deprivation and political violence in Africa
is neither close nor consistent. Bernard A. Nkemdirim "Reflections on Political Conflict, Rebellion and Revolution in
Africa" Journal of Modern African Studies 15 (March 1977): 7590. Lofchie stresses the role of organizational forms and
resources, powershifts and the reaction of the regime to challenge as more critical factors.
See Michael F. Lofchie
Zanzibar: Background to Revolution (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1965). In a study of the Mau Mau Emergency
Berman also points to the importance of the regime's response
to challenge, and the structural determinants of that response.
See Bruce J. Berman, "Bureaucracy and Incumbent Violence:
Colonial Administration and the Origins of the 'Mau Mau'
Emergency in Kenya," British Journal of Political Science 6
April 1976): 143-175. The factors of race are usually the
centerpiece of studies on South Africa. Racial factors are
also stressed in countries containing a population of both
black and Arab Africans. See M. 0. Beshir , The Southern Sudan:
Background to Conflict (New York: Praeger, 1968) and Victor
Olorunsola, ed., The Politics of Cultural Sub-Nationalism in
Africa (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1972). For criticism of the view that ethnic diversity is strongly related to
Political instability, see Walter L. Barrows, "Ethnic Diversity and Political Instability in Black Africa," Comparative
~olitical Studies 9 (July 1976): 139-170. For mobilization
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or outcomes of episodes of violent conflict.

A notable ex-

ception in the latter regard is the well-developed debate
about the consequences of military coups.

96

Although various forms of conflict occur in Africa,
few of these violent occurnmces are described as revolutions.
The term revolution is nevertheless often used to describe
events in Algeria, Kenya, Mozambique, Angola, the former
Portugese territory of Guinea, Zanzibar, Namibia, Zimbabwe
and South Africa. 97

Since conditions commonly associated

with violence are prevalent in Africa, this raises the question of why some African societies are revolution-prone while
others are merely conflict-prone.
theory, see Huntington and Raymond Duvall and M. Welfling,
"Social Mobilization, Political Institutionalization and
Conflict in Black Africa," Journal of Conflict Resolution 17
(December 1973): 673-702.
96 F

.
.
. t s 1n
. th.1s regar d , see Henry
or oppos1ng
v1ewpo1n
Bienen, ed., The Military Intervenes: Case Studies in
Political Development (New York: Russel Sage, 1968); R. D.
McKinlay and A. S. Cohan, "A Comparative analysis of the
political and economic performance of military and civilian
regimes," Comparative Politics 8 (1975): 1-10; and Huntington,
pp. 192-263.
97

The inclusion of Namibia and South Africa should be
qualified. In the case of Namibia, the issue of decolonization as an international-legal matter, as well as the geographic concentration of guerrilla attacks and South Africa's
Presence, makes it difficult to view the occurrences there
simply as a revolution-in-progress. In the case of South
Africa, it is widely accepted that the preconditions for
revolution exist, but that the course of the revolution has
not entered a phase of intense and widespread violence. Some
have even argued that it is unlikely to enter such a phase.
See Russel.
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If the term revolution is used in the sense of wide.
. 1 ence, 98 1. t 1s
. easy t o see wh y t h e
sprea d an d 1ntense
v1o
occurrences listed above are described as revolutionary.

All

the societies mentioned share a history of settler colonialism, characterized by the presence of substantial numbers of
whites and by the political self-government exercised by
those whites·in colonial territories.

This monopoly of state

power and influence led to certain socio-economic changes as
we11.

99

Although Zanzibar varies from this pattern in some

respects, it also was governed by an ethnically distinct
.
. t y wh o monopo 1"1ze d s t a t e an d soc1o-econom1c
.
. con t ro 1 . 100
m1nor1
These entrenched minorities
have been formidable adversaries resisting claims for
equality or self-government. Constraints that inhibit
a more powerful metropolitan power's employment of force
are virtually absent in the case of a settler regime.
For settlers, the issue is not whether to fight, but how. 101
Legum indeed has argued that the degree of violent resistance
to majority rule depends on two variables, namely the size of
the white population and their degree of economic and political
98 Gurr, WMR, p. 11.
99 For the development of the idea of settler colonialism, see Kenneth Good, "Settler Colonialism: Economic Development and Class Formation," Journal of -Modern African Studies 14
(December 1976): 59.7-620.
100 See Lofchie.
101 Kenneth w. Grundy, "Black Soldiers in a White_ Military:
Political Change in South Africa," The Journal of Strategic
Studies 4 (September 1981): 296. See also Andrew J.R. Mack,
"Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric
Conflict," World Politics 27 (January 1975): 191.
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control.

102

Yet there are other scholars who argue that change is
the definitive property of revolutions, entailing qualitative
socio-economic and political changes.

The use of these

theories to describe revolutions and potential revolutions
in Africa has led to disagreement.

One school of thought holds

that the requisite causal socio-economic and other changes
have taken place, but that there are several conditions which
discourage concerted action by revolutionaries.
regional animosities are cited, for example.

Tribal and

Here the

existence of primordial attachments in urban and rural areas
make it difficult for revolutionaries to form a united
front.

103

Another critical obstacle to revolutionaries'

concerted action is the repressive capabilities of the regime
in power.

By effectively using the military and police estab-

lishments the regime manages to prevent opposition movements
.
t o revo 1 u t.1onary propor t.1ons. 104
f rom d eve 1 op1ng

Th e ex1s
. t ence

102

colin Legum, "Looking to the Future" in Gwendolen
M. Carter and Patrick O'Meara, eds., Southern Africa in Crisis
(Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1977),
pp. 258-259.
103

Richard Gibson African Liberation Movements (London:
Oxford University Press, 1972).
104

see, for example, B. F. Jundaian, "Resettlement Programs: Counterinsurgency in Mozambique," Comparative Politics 6
(July 1974): 519-540; and Gerald J. Bender, "The Limits of
Counterinsurgency: An African Case," Comparative Politics 4
(April 1972): 331-360. The repressive actions of the regime,
however, are often also seen as causing further violence and
rebelliousness. See Donald Barnett and Karari Njama, Mau Mau
!rom Within: Autobiography and Analysis of Kenya's Peasant
Revolt (London: MacGibbon and Kee, 1968).
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of these domestic obstacles to revolutionary action is complemented by international obstacles.

Pirouet, for example,

notes that the success or failure of revolutions in Africa
is determined not by why and how they occur, but by when.
The historical timing of revolutions is critical, because it
is related to the possibility of outside support.

States

that achieved independence before 1965 are now all members
of the Organization for African Unity which, except for the
case of white minority-ruled states, accords basic regime
legitimacy to the governments of fellow member-states of the
OAU.

Thus opposition movements in black-ruled states are

denied legitimacy and support.

105

Another school of thought holds that the requisite
socio-economic, psycho-cultural political changes to cause
revolutions in most African states have not taken place.
Bozeman stresses the requisite psycho-cultural dispositions,
arguing that a promethean "inner order" is absent.

The form

and frequency of African conflict is in fact not a result of
deprivations, but of resilient traditional perceptions of the
positive value of conflict and war.
paradox.

This results in curious

Africans are comfortable with conflict, even of the

protracted kind, but have thus far failed to adopt views of the
Progressive value of certain forms of change and violence. 106
105p.1roue t , pp. 197-198.
106

Bozeman, p. 371.
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Another explanation states that although there are sufficient
degrees of deprivation, governmental powers have increased.
Since a critical administrative crisis is absent, the regime
manages to at least postpone a revolution.

An example of this

situation is the South African regime's ability to keep its
armed forces intact and under centralized contro1.

107

Marxian analysts stress the absence of the requisite class
development, either with regard to urban classes or to peasants.
With regard to urban classes, scholars argue that a revolution is unlikely until urban workers, particularly those in
heavy industries, have developed the requisite class consciousness.

The absence of industrialization, tribal and

regional animosities, and other factors however discourage
the political ascendance of an urban class-for-itself. 108
The question whether the peasantry of African states
have revolutionary potential is a controversial subject.

On

the one hand, scholars like Chaliand argue that the African
peasantry does not have revolutionary potential.
several reasons for this situation.

There are

With the exception of

West African states, Chaliand argues, there are no land-related
Pressures on peasants.
107
108

The abundance of land, low population

see Russel.

see Kenneth W. Grundy, "The 'Class Struggle' in
Africa: An Examination of Conflicting Theories," Journal of
Modern African Studies 2 (October 1964): 379-393.
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density, the fac.t that the land permits a subsistence economy
and that ownership is allowed, and the absence of plantations
collectively produce few demands for agrarian reform.

Work-

relationships in the agrarian areas, moreover, are paternalistic and hierarchical.

Subjective conditions reinforce this

lack of revolutionary potential.

African peasants' worldview

is characterized by magico-religious beliefs, ignorance, a
passive acceptance of authority, and a lack of self-direction
and initiative.

A new rationality is required, stressing

secular, optimistic and promethean views, but the elites of
Africa have failed to do so.

Leadership is drawn from the

ranks of bourgeois classes and have shown themselves to be
self-indulgent and complacent.

Although the leadership lacks

the appetite for a "real" struggle, they do lead ostensibly
revolutionary movements, which are then characterized by
mechanical strategic thinking, overreliance on foreign aid
and external bases, intra-factional struggles, and abstract
and unrealistic verbalization.

This combination of revolution-

by-exile and liberation-in-speech condemns the movements to
political powerlessness. 109
On the other hand there are those who argue that at
least certain portions of the peasantry in African states do
109
Gerard Chaliand, Armed Struggle in Africa, translated by David Rattray and Robert Leonhardt with an introduction
by Basil Davidson (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969),
Pp. 101-125 and Chaliand, Revolution in the Third World: Myths
lTd Prospects, with an introduction by Immanuel Wallerstein
Hassocks, Sussex: The Harvester Press, 1977).
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have revolutionary potential.

In his study of Algeria, Wolf

states that peasants suffer from the impact of three crises.
First, population increases and the restriction of the available land produces a demographic crisis.

Second, there is an

ecological crisis which threatens the security of peasants,
because the introduction of colonial and capitalist notions
and practices transform the previously secure resources of
peasants into market commodities.

Although such apsects as

private property may increase the opportunities of peasants,
other aspects like taxes, rent and land-seizures and-restrictions threaten peasants' security.
authority produce a crisis.

Third, changed notions of

Whereas previous rural power-

holders exercised substantial power over the distribution of
goods, colonial practices turn them into powerless bureaucrats unable to oppose, for example, the redistribution of
land.

A political gap between the rulers and ruled con-

. t s. 110
sequen tl y ex1s
Although all peasants are subject to these three crises,

it is the middle peasants who are most likely to participate
in uprisings, that is, those with landholdings and some freedom from immediate political control.

Rich or landless

peasants may also come to participate in uprisings, but only
if the particular revolutionary organization can challenge

~ 10 wolf,

"Peasant Rebellion and Revolution" in Miller
and Aya, pp. 49-66.
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the power of local rulers.

Thus virtually all peasants can

participate in popular uprisings; it is simply that middle
peasants are the first to do so.

111

Peasant uprisings, how-

ever, are not always revolutionary events, as witnessed by
the jacqueries of the middle ages.

Here Wolf stresses that

the organizational changes wrought by the three crises also
result in the·adoption of a new worldview, as well as the
role of "middlemen" or marginal elites to cultivate such a
.

112

worldv1ew.

Since the peasantry are not self-led, Wolf notes, their
role ultimately is a tragic one.

They may cause the old

order to collapse, but rarely gain political influence in the
new order.

Yet they are at least capable of playing a key

role in the collapse of the old order.

Tribal and regional

· influences do not prevent this political role; in fact,
ethnic and regional distinctions may contribute to the
solidarity of peasant uprisings. 113
Paige is in broad agreement with Wolf about the revolu~ionary

potential of peasants in Africa, but argues that it

is landless peasants who will participate in revolutionary
movements.

This view is derived from a theory of rural class

conflict which holds that rurally-based movements "are
111

Ibid.' pp. 54:...55.

112
113

Ibid., pp. 59-66.

wolf, Peasant Wars, pp. 293-294.
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fundamentally a result of the interaction between the
political behavior associated with the principal source of
114
income of the upper and lower agricultural classes."
·
Revolutions are likely when the upper agricultural class is
dependent on income from land and the lower agricultural
classes are dependent on wages earned from labor on that land.
A combination·of these income types and the political behaviors
associated with them are found in migratory labor estate
systems, and are characterized by the demands for land redistribution, the tactic of guerrilla war and nationalism as a
dominan t 1.deo 1 ogy. 115
With regard to tfrica, Paige notes that migratory
labor estate systems are found in the settler colonies of
Algeria, Kenya and Angola.

Here the political behavior of

the upper agricultural class (i.e. settlers) was predicated
on the need to secure necessary landownership and the labor
needed to cultivate that land.

In Kenya, for example, these

needs were satisfied:
large-scale land concessions were granted to British
settlers, and members of the indigenous population unfortunate enough to live on the settlers' new lands were
declared to be squatters and moved to 'native reserves'
on inferior land ••• the hut tax, the poll tax, and direct
conscription were all used to satisfy the settlers'
demand for labour ••• the tactics created a disenfranchised,
Politically powerless agricultural labor force which was
paid almost nothing.ll6
ll4p .
a1ge, p. 7D.
115
116

Ibid., p. 71
Ibid., p. 67.
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Since the agricultural labor force migrates between the estate
and the traditional subsistence sector (which has been reserved for the labor force), they are incapable of generating
workers' organization.

The organizational framework and ideo-

logy is provided by traditional elites in the subsistence
sector, who are threatened by the expanding land claims of
the upper agricultural class.

Thus the combination of land-

less migratory labourers and landholding - but threatened traditional elites form the basis of the revolutionary up.
117
ris1ng.
Thus the debate about the revolutionary potential of
the peasantry in African states seems to turn on the question
whether land-related pressures are present or absent.

There

is further agreement that such land-related pressures exist
in West Africa (according to Chaliand) and in the settler
colonies (Wolf and Paige).

There is disagreement, however,

about the nature of land-related pressures and, consequently,
which types of peasants are most likely to engage in revolutionary uprisings.
The preceding discussion illustrates that the resolution
of the question why some African states are revolution-prone
117

Ibid., pp. 66-71 and 211-277. For other contributions to the debate about the political role of the peasantry
in Africa, see Govan Mbeki, The Peasants Revolt (London:
Penguin Books, 1964); Colin Leys, "Politics in Kenya: The
Development of Peasant Society," British Journal of Political
Science 1 (July 1971) and B. P. Singh, "The Philosophic Foundations of Mao's Peasant Communism," Indian Journal of Political
§;udies 1 (1977): 59-70.
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while others are merely conflict-prone depends on the particular conception of revolution.

In turn conceptions result

in particular views and debates about the course and causes
of African revolutions.

With regard to the outcomes of Afri-

can revolutions, the influence of particular conceptions is
also evident.
When conflict is seen as the definitive property of
revolutions, it has been argued that, provided the level of
violence does not become too high, internal war can stimulate
the political development of a developing country. Popper,
for example, states that internal war can have five consequences.

First, it disorganizes traditional structures such

as rural villages, tribes, families, castes and landed classes
which by being uprooted, are compelled to aid developmental
efforts.

If the level of violence is too high and the vil-

lage is destroyed in the process, however, the outcome is
counter-productive.

Second, internal war creates new develop-

mental social structures like cities and urban classes and
compels the centralization of the existing structures.

This

advances the cause of political centralization and the transfer of loyalties to the nation (as opposed to parochial
loyalties to subnational groupings).

Third, internal war may

stimulate new political structures and centralize existing
structures, particularly the civil service, political parties
and security organizations.

Fourth, internal war may add to

the country's technological resources.

Although initially
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used to conduct war, these resources like those in the transportation and communication fields, may later be transferred
to peaceful uses.

Finally, internal war may have secondary

effects in that propaganda, for example, may later allow the
leadership to proselytize the nation.

118

Popper then correlates the use of certain counterinsurgent strategies with the outcomes of internal wars.

A

scorched earth policy, for example, does result in population
displacement and their migration to cities, but this a counterproductive urbanization because the cities cannot accommodate
large numbers of refugees.

Slums are the result.

Strategies

of rural relocation can also be counter-productive, if the
population is forcibly relocated, but may stimulate development if the population participates in the decision-making
on where they should be relocated.

Reprisals by the government

and terrorist tactics by the revolutionaries can also have a
developmental effect:

reprisals create shared suffering which

may aid the cause of nation-building, while selectively used
terror may weaken an unpopular opponent.

119

The critical indicator in this analysis thus is the
level of violence, although some attention is paid to the
creation of groups, and it is clear that the notion of development is used as a synonym for Westernization.
118

Examples of

Frank J. Popper, "Internal War as a Stimulant of
Political Development," Comparative Political Studies 3 (January 1971) 415-417.
119

Ibid., pp. 418-422.
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cases in Africa where the level of violence became too high
120
are the Biafran and Algerian internal wars.
When change is seen as the definitive property of·
revolutions, outcomes again are seen as the consequences of
events during the causal and course-phases of the revolution.
Chaliand, for example, holds that the changes resulting from
most African ..revolutions are superficial or "political", such
as the control over a nation's resources, some industrialization, and the strengthening of the state's bureaucratic component.

Land reform programs, however, are typically neglected.

The reasons for the superficiality of change are that grassroots mobilization of peasants did not take place during the
revolution (leaving peasants with an unchanged and unpromethean
worldview) and that the leadership spawned by the revolution
lacks the self-denying ideological firmness to perform the
necessary tasks.

The leadership was animated largely by

wounded racial and national pride and fought to recapture
racial and national identity, but the exaltation of national
identity and other appeals to the nation's supposed solidarity
do not remove more fundamental socio-economic cleavages. 121
As indicated before, the view that African revolutions
result in more - and unimportant - political changes than in
fundamental socio-economic changes is not uncommon.
120

Ibid.

121 chaliand, Revolution in the Third World:
~respects, pp. 28-30, 70-74 and 109-117.

Myths and
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The reasons tend to be of two varieties:

either the condi-

tions for the ascendance of a particular class are absent, or
the leadership produced by the revolution lacks ideological
firmness (i.e. they lack "will"). This raises two questions:
Are political 122 changes unimportant and Do revolutionary
outcomes depend on class ascendance or willful revolutionaries?
With regard to the importance of political changes,
it has been argued that they at least should not be underestimated.

Kornhauser argues, for example, that revolutions

emanate from certain structures of authority and that their
outcomes change those structures of authority in negative or
positive ways.

Here there are four types:

A revolution

seeking to overthrow an alien or foreign authority may result
in the achievement of political independence and the development of a political community, or it may merely result in the
escape of alien authority.

When a revolution seeks to

strengthen a weak authority (i.e. a state with ineffective
and fragmented administrative machinery) it may result in the
strengthening of that state's administrative machinery or fail
to do so.

Revolutions emanating from the exercise of arbitrary

authority may result in the establishment of constitutional
122
It was pointed out earlier that distinctions between
"political" and "socio-economic" changes should not be overdrawn. When the term political is used in this section, it
refers to formal aspects of political life, such as legal
Stipulations of citizenship, constitutions, the bureaucracy,
the executive-legislative arrangements, the judiciary or formal
relationships between them.
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government or simply redress certain grievances.

Finally, a

revolution which results from exclusive structures of authority
may result in the extension of common political rights or may
merely grant special privileges to select groups.

123

Skocpof also argues that political factors are no less
important than socio-economic factors.

Noting that there are

major socio-economic changes that result from revolutions,
she states:
Equally if not more striking, however, are the changes
that social revolutions make in the structure and function
of states, in the political and administrative processes
by which government leaders relate to groups in society,
and in the tasks that states can successfully undertake
at home and abroad. Nor are such changes in the 'state
order' at all mere by-products of the changes in the
social order.
Indeed, to a significant degree, it is the
other way around.l24
The political changes resulting from the Russian and Chinese
revolutions, for example, led to socio-economic changes.
Here the revolutions brought parties to power which, by using
state administrative power, sanctioned attacks on certain
propertied classes and took over many economic functions previously performed by those classes. 125
123

william Kornhauser, "Rebellion and Political Development" in Eckstein, Internal War, pp. 142-155.
124
125

Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions, p. 164.
Ibid.
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Are revolutionary outcomes the result of class interests
or the will of revolutionary elites?

As indicated earlier,

outcome-oriented analysts contest the importance of clas·s
interests and willful revolutionaries.

Yet they have stressed

that the use of outcome-oriented analysis should not be
mechanical.

In using the analysis in African revolutions,

for example, the analyst should be forewarned that African
states have a history marked by colonialism, are small countries, and are in highly vulnerable positions in the international market economy.

It should also be noted that many

African states have strong military and police establishments
with well-developed repressive capabilities, which make
African revolutions less likely than when the state has
poorly developed coercive instruments.

If revolutionary vio-

lence is initiated, the conflict initially will be highly

. 1 . 126
asymmet.r1ca
5.

Structural Analysis and African Revolutions
The preceding discussion pointed out that, although

there are disagreements about how the term revolution should
be defined, there is agreement among scholars that revolutions
involve conflict and progressive change.

It is common for

analysts to place revolutions under the more general categories
of violence and change, thereby bifurcating revolutionary

126

Ibid., pp. 288-290.
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scholarship, but most analyses view revolution nevertheless
neither as an ''extreme case of violence" or as an "extreme
case of change."

Most analyses- either implicitly or ex-

plicitly - produce a conception of revolution that is multidimensional, thereby casting doubt on the possibility of any
one theory's ability to capture the full meaning of revolution.
With regard to the causes of revolutions, structural
analyses argue

that states contain many elites.

A revolu-

tionary situation is created when a state elite (i.e. elites
attached to the state's central political machinery or its
bureaucracy), typically under the pressure of internal forces
like interstate wars or competition of other states in the
world capitalist economy, encounter opposition from agrarian
elites opposed to the state elite's modernizing efforts.
Normal tensions between a country's elites exist, but when
state elites under the pressure of war want

to modernize

socio-economic practices, centralize the distribution of
societal resources, or increase its share of production, and
these efforts are opposed by rural elites on whose political
support the state elites are dependent, the state's administration

is incapacitated.
A revolutionary situation produced by elite conflict

and resultant bureaucratic incapacitation does not necessarily
lead to revolution.

The state elites may be able to insti-

tute a "revolution from above," i.e. manage to reform the
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state's political machinery and institute changes in its
dominant

socio-economic forms.

Yet even failure to do so

does not necessitate a revolution.

A revolution occurs when

the incapacitation of the state's central political machinery
coincides with a popular, usually rural or peasant revolt.
These rural revolts are unlike the peasant jacqueries of the
medieval period, because of the influence of the forces of
modernity on thought patterns and forms of organization.
There is disagreement, however, on which peasants are most
likely to participate in revolutionary uprisings:

some argue

that peasants' political independence (or at least a degree
of it) is critical, while others argue that landholdings are
critical.

Another school of thought argues that it is the

combination of certain forms of wage labour with certain forms
of ownership that is crucial to determine not only the likelihood of a peasant revolt, but also the type of goals that the
revolutionary movememt will adopt.
Thus the course of revolutions
peasant

revolts.

is

characterized by

The course is also marked by the development

of a revolutionary coalition.

Here most structural analysts

argue that peasants do not constitute a self-liberating class,
but forge political links with marginal elites from which
the revolutionary leadership is drawn.

The links between

followers and elites are most visible in the organizations that
the revolutionary movement generates.

Revolutionary organiza-

tions tend to be of two types, namely the military organization
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(or army) and the para-military party which, moreover, show
different patterns of civil-military interaction within themselves.

Although outcome-oriented analyses note that revolu-

tionary organizations also generate an ideology, which tends
to be a brand of radical nationalism, the role of ideology
generally is de-emphasized.
tional

resou~~e.

Ideology is seen as an organiza-

More important are the organizations that

are generated, because they influence outcomes.
Along with the conditions conducive to peasant revolts,
structural analysts stress the importance of the response by
the state to revolutionary challenge.

Of particular import-

ance is the regime's ability to use coercion effectively and,
equally critical, to maintain cohesion of and centralized
control over its armed forces.

The response of the regime

is also important in two other respects:

although its response

is mainly aimed at maintaining itself (or suppressing the
revolutionary group), that response may initiate long-lasting
socio-economic changes; and regime response determines the
immediate outcome of the conflict.

With regard to the immedi-

ate outcomes, it is pointed out that a redistribution of power
among contending groups occurs, but that clearcut victories
and losses are rare, especially in revolutions marked by the
use of guerrilla warfare.

Most endings of revolutions witness

a "carry over" from the old regime:

old regime personnel are

Still ensconced in bureaucratic and other governmental positions, the state of industrial development may not be
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significantly altered, and rural elites may still be powerful.
In assessing outcomes, the analyst should thus be forewarned not to expect the complete dismantling of the old
regime and the constructing of the new order.

Broadly speak-

ing, outcomes are the product of preceding political and socioeconomic forces during the causal and course-phases of the
revolution.

The influences of these preceding events manifest

themselves as constraints on the policy-making of the "new"
elite.

Here it is important to note the constraining influ-

ence of international pressures; these triggered the revolution in the first place, but continue to constrain the policymaking options of the new regime.

Another constraint is the

remnants of the old regime in respect to bureaucrats, industrial
development, and the political and socio-economic power of
rural elites.

Finally, the regime is constrained by the very

nature of the new elite, which has a particular political
style, organization and organizational resources, and support
groups.
Thus structural analyses have views of the causes,
course and consequences that distinguishes them from analyses
stressing that revolutions are fundamentally the product of
class ascendance or the product of willful revolutionaries
Who want to reorder society in order to remove the conditions
of relative deprivation.

One of the most useful characteris-

tics of structural analyses is that it seeks an understanding
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of all phases of the revolutionary process, particularly in
linking causes and consequences.

Another positive feature is

that it has collapsed the distinctions many scholars established between the "Great" and contemporary revolutions.

Yet

the range of cases included in structural analyses is still
rather limited.
With regard to revolutions in Africa, there is usually
agreement that although there are many conditions causing conflict, revolutions have occurred or are in progress in settler
colonies or areas marked by the substantial presence and selfgovernment of whites.

There is disagreement, however, about

the appropriate theoretical perspective used in order to
explain these revolutions.

Theoretical choices tend to be of

two varieties, namely the relative deprivation thesis and
theories stressing political structures of inequality.

Dis-

agreement also extends to the course of revolutions, particularly when it concerns the revolutionary potential of the
peasantry in Africa.

Even those who argue that this peasantry

does have revolutionary potential disagree on why they do so.
When revolutions do occur in Africa, differences in
the views of why they occur and how they proceed lead to differences in their outcomes.

Here some scholars argue that

African revolutions' outcomes bring about many political
changes, but there is disagreement whether such political
changes are important in the development of societies.
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structural analysts usually argue that political changes
are critical •. Other scholars note that African revolutions do not bring about the more important socio-economic
changes, even if a condition of war may, by itself, produce
certain changes, because the conditions necessary for important socio-economic change (class formation and willful revolutionary elites) are lacking.
Structural analysts warn that the application of their
theoretical conceptions should not be mechanical; they should be
sensitive to debates among analysts themselves, as well as
to disagreements within certain area studies.

In applying

their theoretical conception to an African case the analyses
should therefore be especially concerned with, one, the impact
of a history of colonialism and longstanding position of vulnerability in the international capitalist economy and, two,
the ability of some African states to generate strong coercive
instruments.

Both sets of factors are likely to influence

the causes of African revolutions (i.e. the nature of the
crisis of the regime), its course (the conditions for peasant
revolt and the response of the regime to challenge), and its
consequences (the conditions constraining the new regime).
6.

The Plan of This Study
This study, then, views revolution as a form of change

that simultaneously affects several dimensions of society in
a fundamental and progressi~e manner and which, while it may
last over a period of decades, culminates in a violent
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struggle for political control.

With this working definition

as a point of departure, the subsequent analysis follows the
structural approach.

Several scholars, such as Eisenst•dt,

Paige, Wolf and especially Skocpol were grouped under this
approach.

The structuralists emphasize the patterns of rela-

tionships among groups or societies which, broadly speaking,
consist

of the coincidence of a crisis in the government or

state power with a popular revolt by peasants, here simply
seen as rural dwellers.

In the Zimbabwean case this requires

an examination of the emerging crisis within successive Zimbabwean regimes between 1888 and 1965, the conditions of black
political action in roughly the same period, the subsequent
struggle for power, and a discussion of the ending of the conflict.
With regard to the political crisis, the state primarily is seen as a bureaucratic entity.

This entity may be

closely related to powerful socio-economic groups or may
operate independently of them.

When the state is pressured,

most often from external sources, it may or may not attempt
to institute reforms.

Should the state attempt reforms, the

ability to do so successfully requires financial resources and
political support.

These the state may receive.

However,

the reforms may engender a reaction, most likely from powerful
rural groups; if these groups deny the state of financial
resources and political support, the state is in a crisis
condition.
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The next chapter, chapter 2, examines whether the Zimbabwean government was by 1965 in a condition of crisis.
Zimbabwean history from 1888 to 1965 is explored in an effort
to determine the role of the whites and their relation to the
state and the economy as well as to external pressures.
With regard to the popular revolt of rural dwellers,
the focus of the analysis is on their political awakening
and their willingness to engage in popular action.

Here the

analysis is sensitive to the debate about which peasants are
most prone to revolutionary action, those who have solidarity,
autonomy and are temporarily free from regime repression
(Skocpol), those who have tactical freedom (Wolf's "middle
peasants"),

or

those who are landless.

Popular action is

analyzed not as the spontaneous ascent of a particular class
but as activity that is encouraged and led by elites, who
create organizations and coalitions for that purpose.
focus on popular action is complemented by an

The

analysis of

the state's reaction to it, particularly the state's repressive capabilities.
The political awakening and action of the rural dwellers
(or peasants) in Zimbabwe, and the state's reaction to their
activity, is discussed in chapters 3 and 4.

Chapter 3

examines the black political activity and the conditions of
black political activity in Zimbabwe between 1888 and 1962
to identify emerging elites, organizational forms, the influence of socio-economic considerations, and the effect of state
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repression.

Chapter 4 analyzes the struggle for power

between 1962 and 1979 in order to determine the nature and
effectiveness of black collective action, the organizational
forms generated by the struggle, the key characteristics of
the black nationalist elite, identifies the categories of
rural dwellers most active in the struggle, and the nature
and effectiveness of the state's

reaction.

The discussion of the end of the revolutionary conflict
focuses on the conditions under which the new regime assumed
power.

Of particular importance, the study in chapter 5

seeks to identify the constraints under which the new regime
operates.
Chapter 6 summarizes the study.

Here the analysis

draws conclusions and discusses the theoretical implications
of the Zimbabwean case both for the study of African revolutions in particular and for the study of
general.

revolutions in

Finally, the implications of the Zimbabwean case

for the structural approach is assessed.

CHAPTER II
ZIMBABWE 1888 - 1965:
THE EMERGENCE OF A POLITICAL CRISIS
This chapter examines the history of Zimbabwe since
the granting of the Rudd Concession in 1888.

It seeks to

identify and explain the nature and causes of the political
crisis that beset the Zimbabwean government in the years
prior to the Unilateral Declaration of Independence on
November 11, 1965.

The nature of the political crisis, it

is submitted, was a product of the nature of white Zimbabwean
society and its relation to, on the one hand, the economy
and, on the other hand, the state, as well as to international
pressures.

The subsequent discussion therefore focuses on -

in order - the relation of white society to state power, the
pre-1945 economy, foreign economic and political pressure,
and the 1960-1962 governmental crisis respectively.

Before

turning to these matters, a brief outline of the major geophysical features of Zimbabwe and a short historical overview
is presented.
1.

Major Geo-Physical Data
Zimbabwe is a landlocked state with territory amounting

to 390,608.72 square kilometers.

It borders on Zambia in the

North, Mozambique in the east, South Africa in the south,
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Figure I:
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and Botswana in the west.

The center of Zimbabwe is its

extensive highveld area which averages above 1219.2m elevation,
sloping northward to the Zambezi river and Lake Kariba, and
southward to the Limpopo and Sabi Rivers.

In the southern

border regions, the elevation is about 609.6 meters.

The

highest area in Zimbabwe is in the mountains in the eastern
border region.

The climate is subtropical, with an extensive

dry season in winter (May to August) and a rainy summer season
1
(November to March).
In 1974 the population was estimated at 6 million, with
whites accounting for 4.5 percent, blacks for 95 percent, and
Asians and Coloureds (persons of mixed racial origin) for the
remaining 0.5 percent.

Whites are of South African, British,

or continental European ancestry, while blacks belong to
Shona.group (the Mashona) or the Ndebele group (the Matabele).
The population groups speak English, Afrikaans, Shona,
Ndebele or Fanogalo (a pidgin of black and white languages). 2
Since Zimbabwe is landlocked it depends on Mozambican
and South

AfrL~an

ports and railways.

The railway gauge is

the standard South African width of about 1.1 meter.

Until

1970 the currency was the Rhodesian pound (about US $2.80 in
1970), but since then Rhodesian dollars have been used
\

1

Harold D. Nelson (et al.) Area Handbook for Southern
Rhodesia, first edition (Washington, D.C.: United States
Government Printing Office, 1975), p. vii, see Table I.
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(about US $1.52 after 1971).
2.

3

Historical Overview
Although the area today known as Zimbabwe was not

entirely devoid of population before 300 AD, increasing numbers
of southward-migrating blacks began to enter the area after
this time.

By approximately 1,000 AD a Rozwi group of people

arrived in the area, assimilated with the local population,
and developed into a Shona-speaking dynasty that lasted to
about the mid-fourteenth century.

The Rozwi Empire gave way,

after the arrival of the Karanga group, to the Mutapa Empire
which incorporated various Shona-speaking groups united by
the royal house and the royal-religious cult of the Mwari.
By the time of the

Portu~se

arrival in southeast Africa in

the sixteenth century, the Mutapa Empire had suffered considerable local challenge and disintegration and was geographically reduced to the northeastern part of Zimbabwe.
These remnants were then incorporated in the Changamire or
Rozwi Mambo Empire but by the early 1800s this empire also
declined.

Yet these successive empires established the pre-

dominantly agriculturalist Shona-speaking group as the
2
3

Ibid.
Ibid., p. ix.
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dominant population group in the area.

4

The Mashona's political pre-eminence in Zimbabwe was
challenged in the first half of the nineteenth century by
northward-migrating factions of the Zulu Empire in South
Africa.

Led first by Zwangdaba and later by Mzilikazi, these

Ndebele raiders conquered the declining Changamire Empire and
established a political order centerd in the southwestern
part of Zimbabwe.

The Shona-speaking people were required

to pay tribute to the Matabele king.

The Matabele order was

largely based on Zulu political notions, with military regiments headed by chiefs as the basic administrative structures.
Chiefs owed allegiance (and indeed at first their

appoi~t~ent.

itself) to the king, Mzilikazi at first and later Lobengula,
who in turn allocated cattle and farmland.

Co~pared

to the

decentralized Mashona political order, this focus on the royal
house created a _far more centralized dispensation.
similarity existed with regard to religion.

Greater

The supreme

deity of the Mashona was the Mwari and the Mlimo for the
Matabele.

These supreme deities communicated with the living
~

by way of spirit mediums, such as the spirits of dead rulers,
certain animals or local mediums who were consulted for all
4
Although man~ aspects of Zimbabwe's early history have
been clarified by archeological and other research, many other
aspects remain controversial. See N. Jones, Prehistory of
Southern Rhodesia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1949), G. eaton-Thompson, The Zimbabwe Culture: Ruins and
Reactions (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1931) and A.J~ Hanna, The
~tory of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland (London:
Faber and Faber,
1960).
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important affairs.

5

Besides the Portuguese penetration from Zimbabwe after
l505 and the activities of a small number of traders, hunters,

missionaries and explorers, European interest in the interior
of southern Africa did not exist until the latter half of the
nineteenth century.

At this time the discovery of gold and

diamonds in $puth Africa sparked interest in the discovery of
similar deposits in Zimbabwe, initiating a period when agents
form the two Boer Republics and the Cape Colony attempted to
secure mineral and other concessions from the Matabele king
Lobengula.

In 1888 agents of Cecil Rhodes, Prime Minister of

the Cape Colony, secured a treaty with Lobengula which came
to be viewed

a~

granting mineral and metal concessions in

the area today known as Zimbabwe and Zambia.

Although

thi~·

Rudd Concession was not the only one granted, it became the
basis of Rhodes' request to the British government to grant
a royal charter to a commercial company seeking to
exploit and administer the area.

~rically

In 1889 the British South

Africa Canpany (BSAC), entered Zimbabwe and establisherl a settlement
Pear Present-day Harare (formerly Salisbury).

In 18!11 the

government placed the area under the queen's protectiop (i.e.
a protectorate was estatilished), *ith BSAC-activities resorting
5

see Terence 0. Ranger, Revolt in Southern Rhodesia
1896-97 (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press,
1967)' pp. 1-45.
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under the authority of the British High Commissioner in South
Africa.

6

-1889-1923:

Company Rule

British interest in Zimbabwe was animated by a desire
to thwart the possible northward expansion of the Transvaal
Republic.

Bringing the territory under British influence

would not only block the geographic amibitions of the Transvaal, but "the anticipated discovery of a gold field richer
than that of the Rand was expected to provide the basis for
the building up of a strong, rich and loyal counterweight to
7
the Afrikaner threat."
Despite these ambitions and the declaration of protectorate status, the British were unwilling to engage directly
in the administration of the territory, or to prepare for
closer imperial control.

Such involvement would require heavy

financial expenditure and Britain expected the territory to
be, if not wildly profitable, then at least self-supporting.
Company rule was therefore privately financed and expected
to maintain solvency in its administration of the area.
Executive, legislative and administrative initiative
6

For an excellent discussion of this period in Zimbabwean history and especially race-related views, see
Phillip Mason, The Birth of a Dilemma (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1958).
7Martin Chanock, Britain, Rhodesia and South Africa
1900-45 (Totowa, New Jersey: Frank Ct•ss, 1977), p. 12.
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and authority was placed in company hands.

8

The first ten years of BSAC-rule radically altered
expectations about Zimbabwe's development.

First, explora-

tions in Matabeleland and later Mashonaland dashed hopes of
a second Rand.

Minerals were discovered, but deposits were of

limited quantity and were dispersed in scattered sites that
were difficult to exploit on a profitable basis.

Second, the

conquest of the Mashona and Matabele proved more difficult
than expected.

Economic interest in Matabeleland led to a

Matabele War in 1893 and, although Lobengula's forces were
defeated, a more serious war broke out in 1896 in both
Matabeleland and Mashonaland.

It was only with the help of

imperial troops that separate peace treaties could be
secured.

9

Third, the charter granted to the company was due

to expire in 1914 and could not be renewed without the support
of local settlers.

These settlers expressed disapproval with

company activities, which was matched by British government
disapproval of the financial conditions of the company, as
well as of the political involvement of company officials
8

There is much scholarly agreement on British motives
in Z~mbabwe during the late nineteenth century. See, for
example, Claire Palley, The Constitutional History and Law of
Southern Rhodesia 1888-1965 (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1966)
pp. 3-127.
I
.

f

9

m
For these wars, see Panger, passim. and Robin H. Pal11
(er War and Land in Rhodesia in the 1890s" in Bethwell A. Ogot
War and Society in Africa (Portland, Oregon: Frank Cass,
1 ~d.)
72), pp. 85-107. Hereafter referred to as "War and Land."
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10
.
.
in south Afr1can
po 1.1 t.1ca 1 a ff a1rs.

The result was a redefinition of Zimbabwe's future.
Perhaps the most important redefined goal was the recognition
that mineral exploitation alone would not suffice as the base
of the Zimbabwean economy and that farming should supplement
mineral exploitation.

Agricultural production and the sale

of farmland would not only recoup the company's losses in the
short run, but also complement mineral proceeds in the long
run.

Imperial authorities also effected a constitutional

reconstruction of local politics:

a Southern Rhodesia Order

in Council in 1898 imposed several restrictions on the activities of the BSAC, a legislative council was created with
four elected offices and five company offices presided over
by the BSAC-administrator, and a judicial system was established.

The territory was placed under the executive auth-

ority of a Resident Commissioner as local representative of
the British High Commissioner in South Africa, who in turn
was responsible to

imperial authorities in Britain.

The

civil service was also reformed, particularly with regard to
the administration of the black population.

A Native

Affairs Department was created and it was represented in_
the two provinces of Matabeleland and Mashonaland by a Chief
Native Commissioner, Native and Assistant Native Commissioners,
10

Palley, pp. 128-190.
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Chiefs, Headmen and Messengers.

11

Although it was thus accepted that the BSAC would
still be responsible for the administration of Zimbabwe; the
British government began to assert its imperial control over
a company regarded as less than trustworthy.

The British

government further expected that company rule would be replaced
by local settler self-government and would eventually be in12
corporated into the South African political order.
One of
the first steps in this direction was the increase in the
number of elected (i.e. settler) offices on the legislative
council (to outnumber the BSAC-offices) in 1907, the encouragement of white immigration, and the aid given to land settlement.
For the black population the most important development in the 1890s came in the wake of the two wars with the
introduction of land apportionment and native reserves to
Zimbabwe.

After the 1893 Matabele War, two areas of

land

north of Bulawayo were set apart for exclusive Matabele use.
After the 1896 and 1897 uprisings, imperial authorities were
determined that the BSAC would not further encroach on black
11 rt is important to note that Britain did not implement the indirect mode of colonial administration in Zimbabwe.
It was a form of direct rule through the Native Affairs Department whose personnel held discretionary power. For this
reason it was stressed that NAn-personnel should be "honourable and capable men." Correspondence of Milner to Asquith,
1897, quoted by Pal1ey, p. 140.
12Pal1ey, pp. 132-199.
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land.

To ensure adequate black land, Native Commissioners

were to demarcate reserved black land and in 1908 these demarcations were approved by the imperial authorities.

Hence-

forth land ownership and use in Zimbabwe was determined by
law.

Some land was held by the BSAC,

the remainder by blacks.

some by whites, and

13

The difficulties of the BSAC mounted.
~Privy

In 1918 the

Council ruled that all unalienated land in Zimbabwe

belonged to the Crown, ending company hopes that it could
recover its losses in the failed gold boom by the sale of
land.

The BSAC now hoped for incorporation with South Africa,

for it hoped that South African authorities would compensate
it more generously than the British Treasury, Between 1918
and 1922 negotiations concerning the constitutional future of
Zimbabwe took place, finally reducing the options to responsible

governme~t

South Pfrica.

under Crown authority or amalgamation with

In 1922 Zimbabwean voters rejected the option

~,

of amalgamation and in 1923 received a responsible government constitution.

14

13

The causes, nature and consequences of land apportionment is the subject of many scholarly disagreements. The
effect of land apportionment on black political activity will
be discussed in the next chapter; its relation to the Zimbabwean economy and black poverty is discussed later in this
chapter.
14
10-164.

The best account of this period is in Chanock, pp.
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2. 2

1923-1965:

Responsible Government

Unlike in Zambia, which moved from company rule to
colonial status, the Eouthern Rhodesia Constitution Letters
~

patent of 1923 provided for "the establishment of responsible
15
government subject to certain limitations."
Complete selfgovernment, in other words, was not legally recognized:

there

was partial self-government with the British government reserving powers over the conduct of foreign policy, matters affecting railways, mineral extraction, and native affairs.

The

resident commissioner was replaced by the governor as the
16
Crown's representative in Zimbabwe.
The legislative authority was unicameral and resided
with a Legislative AF;sembly similar to the House of Commons.
The Legislative Aseembly consisted of 30 members, with two
members representing 15 electoral districts, but it could
also elect a non-member Speaker who was entitled to vote.
Franchise was qualified:

a voter was required to have an

annual salary of at least 100 pounds and property valued at

~ 150 pounds, and to be literate in English. 17

Except for the

reserve powers, the Legislative Assembly exercised full
15
Palley, p. 215.
16

Ibid., pp. 236-271.

17
The Voters Qualification and Registration Amendment
Ordinance No. 14 of 1912 and the Women's Enfranchisement
Ordinance of 1919 was the basis of the franchise of the 1923constitution. Minor changes in electoral laws were made in
1928 and 1937.

\
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legislative powers.

The executive authority was exercised

bY a Cabinet headed by a Prime Minister and other Ministers
drawn from the Legislative Assembly.

As in the British ·model

of parliamentary government, the Cabinet was not a creation
of the constitution; it was simply stated that the Governor
as representative of the Crown would select and be advised
by an Executive Council.

In practice this Executive Council

came to be the Cabinet.

As far as the judiciary is concerned,

it was also modelled on the role of the judiciary in Britain
and its political independence was guaranteed. 18
In the 1923-elections the Responsible Government
A~sociation

(RGA) won a majority and, later reconstituted as

Athe Rhodesian Party, maintained this parlimentary majority
until the 1933 elections, when it was defeated by the Reform
Party.

The Reform Party was created in the late 1920s and,

after its electoral victory in 1933, absorbed the Rhodesia
Party to become the United Party.

The United Party was later

renamed the United Federal Party.

This United Party dominated

partisan politics in Zimbabwe between 1933 and 1962, when it
was defeated by the Rhodesian Front. 19
18
several constitutionl changes were later made. The
most important of these was the elimination of the British
reserve powers with regard to the railways and mining industry.
19
(Oxford:

colin Leys, European Politics in Southern Rhodesia
Clarendon Press, 1959), pp. 131-189.
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Although the United Party never lost its parlimentary
majority - its leader Godfrey Huggins was Prime Minister from
1933 to 1953 when he became Prime Minister of the Centra.l ·
African Federation and was succeeded by Garfield Todd and he
in turn by Edgar Whitehead - it did encounter significant
partisan challenges.

One such challenge came in the wake of

the Second World War when the Liberal Party, led by former
Finance Minister Smit, managed to attract support.

Although

the scheduled 1944 elections were postponed to give the United
Party time for additional campaigning, the Liberal Party still
managed to gain twelve seats as opposed to the 13 of the
United Party in the 1946-election.

The Liberal Party, though,

later lost momentum, partly as a result of internal disagreements.

20
Another serious partisan challenge came from the

Dominion Party in the 1958-elections.

Were it indeed not for

the newly introduced preferential voting system, the Dominion
Party would have won the 1958-election, for it won a majority
of first preferences votes.

21

The influence of the Dominion

20

Ibid., pp. 131-143. See also Lewis H. Gann and M.
Gelfand, Huggins of Rhodesia (London: George Allen and Unwin,
1964), pp. 165-191.
21

1n the preferential voting system, voters could rank
their preference of political parties. First preference votes
would then be counted and second preference votes transferred
from the least sucsessful candidate (in terms of votes polled)
to ones more successful. Beyond first preference votes, in
other words, successful candidates had to obtain a majority
of all second preference votes. See Palley, p. 311 and
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PartY declined after 1958 and in 1962 it amalgamated with the
. southern Rhodesia Association and the United Group to form

t
the Rhodesian Front.

The Rhodesian Front was first led by

Winston Field, but he was replaced by Ian Smith, who was
Prime Minister when Zimbabwe unilaterally declared itself

. 22
indepen d en t f rom Br1•t a1n.
While the voting population in Zimbabwe was a small
percentage of the total population, voting turnout since

1933 has always been high.

23

Franchise qualifications were

raised in 1951, increasing annual income requirements to 240

t

pounds annually, property to 500 pounds, and literacy to
24
include the ability to speak and write English.
In 1957 an
Electoral Amendment Act preserved the high qualifications,
but introduced a special roll of voters (besides the existing common roll) with lower qualifications.

Special roll

voters did not, however, have the same voting power as common
.
25
roll voters.
Although some gerrymandering did occur, especially after
F.M.G. Wilson (ed), Source BookofParliamentary Elections and
Referenda in Southern Rhodesia 1989-1962 (Salisbury: University
College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 1963), p. 180.

22

Larry W. Bowman, Politics in Rhodesia: White Power
in an African State (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard
University Press, 1973), pp. 33-37.

23
24

Leys, pp. 195-198.
Palley, p. 246.

25
see Ibid., pp. 308-312 on the complex voting system
Of 1957.
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the 1946 elections, the most conspicuous bias in Zimbabwe
was its rural weight:

before 1951, at least 14 of the

30-member parliament had to represent rural districts.

·This

number was later reduced to eleven, but it still overrepresented rural districts especially in the post-1945 period
when immigration swelled the population of whites in urban
areas.

26
There have been attempts to correlate party support

among white Zimbabweans with factors such as occupation,
language and regional divisions.

27

This is a problematic

enterprise in view of a number of considerations.

First,

the electorate after 1945 was of a continually changing
nature because of rapid white population increase through
immigration.

Between 1946 and 1948, for example, 10,000 new

voters appeared on the voting ro11.

28

Second, the electoral

system of Zimbabwe underwent frequent changes with regard to
the number of districts, types of voting, and the number of
26

Leys, pp. 190-195 and 210-211.

27

For example, Cyril A. Rogers and Charles Frantz,
Racial Themes in Southern Rhodesia: The Attitudes and Behavior of the White Population (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale
University Press, 1962) and A.K.H. Weinrich, Black and White
Elites in Rural Rhodesia (Manchester: Manchester University
Press, 1973), pp. 62-85.
28

Leys, p. 209.
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.
parties con t est1ng
e 1 ec t.1ons. 29

Since there are so many

factors influencing voting results, voting behavior is difficult to assess.
The Central African Federation (1953-1962)

2.2.1.

After the 1923 failure to incorporate Zimbabwe into
a South African political order, efforts to incorporate
Zimbabwe into a larger political unit shifted their focus to
the northern territories of Zambia (then Northern Rhodesia)
and Malawi (then Nyasaland).

The benefits of such a union,

it was argued, would be economic (the creation of a common
market, a central banking system, and the economic develop~

ment of Nyasaland in particular) and political (a union with
imperial sympathies and acceptable race policies acting as a
counter to the nationalist and segregationist race policies
of South Africa). 30
For its part, the Zimbawean government advocated the
amalgamation of Zambia and Zimbabwe.

The discovery of

minerals (copper) in Zambia and the generally complementary
nature of the two economies made closer union economically
29
30

Ibid., pp. 210-211.

see Robert U. Rotberg, "The Federation Movement in
British East and Central Africa," Journal of Commonwealth
Political Studies 2 (1964): 141-160 and also Palley, pp.
322-324.

86

attractive, especially after the lapse of the Customs Agreement with South Africa in 1936.

Even when it was in opera-

tion, this agreement could not prevent South African-imp.osed
tariffs so that northern markets became more attractive after
its lapse.

31

The desire for closer union with Zambia was

indeed a well established part of white politics in Zimbabwe
after 1923;

~t

was simply that events after 1945, especially

events related to the rise of the Afrikaner movement in South
Africa, provided it with an additional impetus.

32

The British government made several prewar inquiries
into the possibilities of a central African political order
but these mainly concluded that, despite the economic,
political and strategic advantages Britain would gain from
such a union,
sible.

33

dissimilar race-policies made a union impos-

British policy toward its African dependencies was

stipulated in the Passfield Memorandum of 1930:

native (or

black) interests and not those of whites (settlers or immigrants) would be considered paramount in the future development of those territories.
31
32
33

Chanock, p. 217,
Ibid., pp. 190-248.
Ibid., pp. 190-210.

Accordingly, race policy in
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Zimbabwe was an illiberal anomaly.

34

Yet by the advent of

the Second World War, the British government's Bledisloe
.
. pr1nc1p
.
. 1 e 35
commission accep t e d th e 1"d ea o f c 1 oser un1on
1n

and, following the commission's recommendations, a Central
African Council was created in 1944 to act as an advisory
board on interterritorial matters.

t

By 1948 British policy

officially adopted the view that a federation between Zambia,
Malawi and Zimbabwe was desirable.

Following negotiations,

the Central African Federation became a reality in July 1953.

36

Under the Constitution of the Federation of Rhodesia
and Nyasaland, the different territorial constitutions of
the constituent territories remained in effect.

In a complex

division of powers, territorial governments retained the right
to legislate on many matters (including race-relations),
while other powers were held concurrently, and others by the
federal government exclusively.

The federal government could

exercise only those powers specifically granted to it, such as
34

see the Report of the Commission on Closer Union of
the Dependencies in Eastern and Central Africa, Cmnd. 3234,
1929 (the Hilton Young Commission) on the criticism of Zimbabwe's race policies. For the statement on the paramountcy
of black interests, see Memorandum on Native Policy in East
Africa, Cmnd. 3573, 1930 (the Passfield Memorandum) and the
earlier Devonshire Memorandum in Indians in Kenya-Memorandum,
Cmnd. 1922, 1923.
35

Rhodesia-Nyasaland Royal Commission Report, Cmnd. 5949,

1939 (the Bledisloe Commission).
36

Palley, pp. 345-409.
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agricultural policy-making.

The federal executive was a

prime minister (Huggins and later Roy Welensky), who presided
over a unicameral Federal Legislative Assembly composed" of a
fixed number of black and white members and a number of
racially unspecified members.

A party-system was called for

and in the 1953 elections the United Federal Party gained a
majority.

A federal court system also came into existence,

as territorial courts were allowed to enforce both federal
and territorial laws.

The Central African Federation (CAF)

was not self-governing:

it exercised qualified self-government
with the Crown represented by a Governor-genera1. 37
The CAF-period in Zimbabwean history lasted nine years.

A:It generated considerable economic benefits for Zimbabwe .

.\

These included the absorption of all its public debt by the
I

1

federal government, the development of joint energy resources
(chiefly the Kariba Dam hydro-electric project), dispropor,tionate federal spending on Zimbabwean affairs, and the
enlargement of the market for Zimbabwean goods. 38
37 Ibid.
38 Arthur Hazlewood, "The Economics of Federation and
Dissolution in Central Africa" in Arthur Hazlewood (ed.),
African Integration and Disintegration: Case Studies in
Economic and Political Union (London: Oxford University Press,
1967), pp. 185-250. See also Bowman, pp. 22-26 and William J.
Barber, "Federation and the Distribution of Economic Benefits"
in Colin Leys and Cranford Pratt (eds.) A New Deal in Central
Africa (London Heine~an, 1960), pp. 81-97.
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As was indicated in the preamble of the CAF-constitution, the British government hoped that the new political
order in Africa would eventually achieve independence -·if
it

desired by the majority of all its inhabitants (i.e.
39
not merely the majority of voters).
This option would be
~ere

considered at the Federal Review Conference in 1960.

In

1957 the British government did upgrade the international
legal status of the federation, but hereafter prospects for
the achievement of federal independence dtmmed.

British

territories elsewhere in Africa began tc• achieve independence and pressures from black African nationalists in Zambia and Malawi for independence for their respective territories increased.

Following upheaval in Malawi in 1959 the

British government sent a commission of inquiry, which con-

1

eluded that the existence of the federation was the chief
cause of the unrest. 40 Subsequently the Monckton Commission,
sent to prepare documents for the Federal Review Conference,
concluded that federation in its present form was unviable
because of black opposition.

Federation should be either dis41
solved or totally restructured.
In Malawi and Zambia negotiations between the Colonial
39Palley, pp. 345-409.

40 Report of the Nyasaland Commission of Inquiry, Cmnd.
814, 1959 (the Devlin Report).
41 Report of the Ad~isory Commission on the Review of
the Constitution of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Cmnd. 1148, 1960
(the Monckton Commission).
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Office and black nationalist leaders led to the formation of
black-dominat.ed governments in, respectively, 1961 and 1962.
Formerly protectorates, they now became independent states.
In Zimbabwe, however, the political situation was more com~plicated.

The territory was not a protectorate nor a colony

proper; it had a white government which, despite the existence of a so-called "multi-racial"-strategy,
/black support.

42

did not attract

Black support, as far as electoral activity

was concerned, focused more on the National Democratic Party
(NDP) of Joshua Nkomo.

43

To resolve the political situation in Zimbabwe, the

A British government convened a constitutional conference to
devise a new constitution for Zimbabwe and invited all the
major political parties to attend.

The outcome of this con-

ference was a new constitution, based on "the concepts of
British parliamentary democracy, the British Cabinet systemf
and constitutional guarantees of civil rights,"

44

and the

deletion of the reserve powers formerly held by Britain.

A

major aim of the new constitution was to increase black
political participation and to express a constitutional
42

This will be discussed more fully in later sections
of this chapter.
43

The National Democratic Party was an outgrowth of the
banned African National Congress.
44

Palley, p. 413.
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commitment to improvements in the material conditions of
blacks.
r

'/'-

45

Despite its participation in the creation of the

new constitution, the NDP and the Dominion Party later
opposed it.

The new constitution was nevertheless ratified

by the Zimbabwean electorate in July 1961, and it came into
effect in November 1962.

46

The UFP's electoral fortunes declined after the 1961referendum.

It claimed that the 1961-constitution amounted

to independence:

the British government had approved the

document as a whole and specifically agreed to rescind its
reserve powers.

47

In reply, the British government stated

that independence required a new set of negotiations; it was
not tantamount to the 1961-constitution.

This led to

charges of electoral deceit on the part of the UFP, who proclaimed the 1961-referendum as an "independence" referendum,
and suspicion and mistrust arose towards the British government.
~created

In the December 1962 elections the Rhodesian Front,
a scant nine months earlier, defeated the UFP.
45

In

see Ibid., pp. 413-628 for the 1961-constitution.

46

York:

James Barbet·, Rhodesia: The Road to Rebellion (New
Oxford University Press, 1967), pp. 79-111.
47

Barber argues that the Zimbabwean electorate were
genuinely confused as to whether the 1961-referendum was on
independence or simply the ratification of the 1961-constitution.
Ibid., pp. 92-98.
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the same month, the CAF was officially dissolved.
2.2.2

48

The Rhodesian Front and Independence
Upon the dissolution of the CAF, the Rhodesian Front

. d f or 1n
. d epen d ence f rom Br1·t a1n,
· 49
governmen t f orma 11 y app 1 1e
marking the start of "protracted and often bitter negotiations"
that would lead to the unilateral declaration of independence
(UDI).

50

In the pre-UDI negotiations, the Rhodesian Front

~government

accepted the 1961-constitution as a basis for

independence, despite its opposition to it in the preceding
elections.

The British government, on the other hand, argued

that further changes were required to ensure expanded black
participation in Zimbabwean political life.
-'f,governm@js~re.qui~eji

Yet neither

a black-dominated government to precede

the granting of independence; a white government could achieve
independence, provided that it did so with constitutional and
other guarantees for increased black political participation.
48

51

Ibid., pp. 147-195.

49cmnd., 2073, March 29, 1963.
50
51

James Barber, p. 178.

This is e~ident in the principles, privately conveyed to the Zimbabwean government, according to which the British
government would grant independence, namely:
(i) The principle and intention of unimpeded progress to
majority rule, already enshrined in the 1961-constitution, would have to be maintained and guaranteed.
(ii) There would have to be guarantees against retrogressive amendments of the constitution.
(iii) There would have to be fmroediate improvements in the

93

After March 1961 several meetings took place between
the Zimbabwean and British governments, as well as meetings
with black leaders in Zimbabwe, but all ended in failure.

In

April 1964 Prime Minister Field became a political casualty
. d epen d ence, 52 an d h e was rep 1 ace d
of the f a1"1 ure to ac h"1eve 1n
by Ian Smith who, unlike Field, had a reputation for vigorous
independence demands.
of UDI,

These demands included the possibility

which Smith viewed as a "three-day-wonder" with no

serious political or economic consequences.

53

In opposition the UFP reconstituted itself as the

<x

Rhodesia National Party (RNP) and later renamed itself the
Rhodesia Party (RP) but it could not match the electoral
appeal of the Rhodesian Front, losing two by-elections during
1963 and 1964.

54

Confident of its parliamentary

political status of the black population.
(iv) There would have to be progress toward the abolition
of racial discrimination
(v) The British government would have to be satisfied
that any proposed basis for independence was acceptable to the people of Zimbabwe as a whole.
See Southern Rhodesia - Documents Relating to the Negotiations
between the United Kingdom and Southern Rhodesian Governments,
November 1963 to November 1965, Cmnd. 2807, 1965. Hereafter
cited as Cmnd. 2807.
52

other criticisms of Field were his autocratic political style and his failure to deal more decisively with
domestic black opposition. James Barber, pp. 192-195.
53

For the differences between Field and Smith on independence, see Ibid., pp. 249-252 and Bowman, pp. 63-90.
54

James Barber, pp. 175-177 and 252-261.
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majority, the Smith government called for a referendum on
independence in May 1964.

In answer to the question "Are

you in favor of independence based on the 1961 constitution?",

89.1 percent of the registered voters (in a 61.6 percent poll)
voted affirmatively.

55

It must be noted that the referendum

was not fashioned as a popular vote on UDI; it simply confirmed
that the majority of registered voters (i.e. whites) desired
independence.
The 1964 referendum outcome was cited by the Smith
government in its negotiations with Britain to show that it
at least had the support of the majority of whites.

Since the

British government stipulated that the granting of independence be acceptable to the Zimbabwean population as a whole,
the Smith government set out to secure the support of the
majority of the blacks and did so by convening
tribal leaders in October 1964.
+leaders gave their
Smith

sup~~rt

governmen~ ~~garded

~

meeting of

At this meeting the tribal

to independence and, since the
the-tribal leaders-as

represen~a

tives for the black population as a whole, it now claimed
- -- ----- - - -- - - - .. -. -- -- --56
support from both black and white maJor1t1es.
The British government rejected both the referendum
and the indaba with tribal leaders as adequate indications of
majoritarian support.

Fa.ced with this opposition from abroad

55
Bowman, p.· 74.
56

This meeting (or indaba) has been criticized for its
Possibly coercive nature. See Ibid., pp. 72-73.
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and a declining white opposition at home, the Smith government called another general election in May 1965.

In this

election the issue of independence was dominant but it again
was not an election about UDI.

Although .the opposition did

charge that the RF was preparing for it, the RF replied that
it would only consider UDI if it were faced with the prospect
of a black-dominated government - which the British government did not demand.

The outcome of this election gave the

RF all A-roll seats (50); of the B-roll seats, the RP won 15
with five independents.

The results clearly were a triumph

for the RF and a personal victory for Smith.

57

Between May and November of 1965 negotiations with the
British government again proved fruitless.

The British govern-

ment of course was opposed to a possible UDI and threatened
~sanctions,

about.

though not military force, if this were to come

To remove the deadlock in negotiations it further

offered the Smith government some concessions, and attempted
to persuade the black nationalist leaders to co-operate on
the basis of the 1961 constitution.

By October 1965, however,

the Smith government decided upon UDI and declared it
officiallv on November 11, 1965.
57
58

58

James Barber, pp. 268-294.
rbid., pp. 295-305.
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2.3. summary
The foregoing discussion shows that the original population of Zimbabwe (the Shona-speaking people) encountered,
first, the arrival and political challenge of the northwardmigrating Matabele and later the arrival, again from the South
of white settlers under BSAC-aegis.

Both of these develop-

ments, as has been the case throughout Zimbabwean history,
were produced by the dynamics of the South African society, in
these cases, the dynamics of the Zulu Empire and the discovery
of the mineral wealth of South Africa.

The initial develop-

ment of Zimbabwe was indeed predicated on the hope that
,~imbabwe

housed a second Rand, that its exploitation would be

a success, and that it would lead to the establishment of a
political order with imperial sympathies.

Events during the

late nineteenth century dashed all of these hopes and by the
end of the First World War it was expected that Zimbabwe
naturally belonged to the Union of South Africa.
This 'expectation·was also to fail.

In 1923 the set-

tlers opted for qualified self-government and acquired a Westminster-style

constitutional government.

Self-government

was not complete, since Britain exercised its reserve powers,·
though in an unobtrusive manner.

Local political activity

was the reserve of whites, and in particular the reserve of
the United Party which held a parliamentary majority for
'almost thirty years.

Yet significant electoral white chal-

lenges did exist, particularly after the Second World War.
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After the Second World War, efforts to incorporate
Zimbabwe into a larger political tmit focused on the territories
to its north, leading to the creation of the CAF.

Like the -early

Zimbabwe itself, the CAF was designed as a counterweight to
south Africa but it contained centrifugal political forces
.that ensured its demise.

It did nevertheless bring con-

.siderable ec.onomic benefits to Zimbabwe in particular.

The

breakup of CAF coincided with the defeat of UFP and its replacement by the Rhodesian Front, which attempted to secure
British consent to its independence demands.

Despite the

fact that the British government did not demand an immediate
government recomposition in Zimbabwe, negotiations were marked by its consistent failure, as well as by mistrust, acrimony,
intransigence, suspicion and genuine misunderstanding.
Finally the Smith government declared UDI.
The fore_going discussion is a brief overview of Zimbabwean history before 1965.
~and

It emphasizes white politics

serves the purpose of identifsing certain landmark events

in_ the

histor~

of

~hfte

politics.

The underlying dynamics

of this historical development is the subject of the remaining sections of this chapter.
3.

A Government in Crisis?
A common interpretation of UDI is to see it as the

racist reaction of whites to black demands and the support of
those demands by the British government.

In the 1950s, so
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the interpretation goes, nationalist movements in Africa
achieved political success, including the nationalist movements in the former territories of CAF.

White leaders in

Zimbabwe, as well as the white population in general, felt
threatened by these developments and the possibility that
similar events could occur in Zimbabwe.

This British-backed

black challenge engendered a racist reaction:

rather than

negotiate with the British government or black leaders, the
~Zimbabwean

government descended into willful political intran-

sigence and prepared to defend white minority rule
against all odds.

59

This study does not contest the importance of increased black political activity in Zimbabwe, nor that the support
that blacks received from abroad was

important.

The nature

and extent of black political activity will be discussed in
the next chapter.

It does argue, however, that the events

that accompanied the dissolution of the CAF, like the RF
electoral victory and UDI, cannot be understood exclusively
59

For examples of this view, see Martin Loney,
Rhodesia: White Racism and Imperial Response (Baltimore,
Maryland: Penguin Books, 1975), pp. 127-133; Bowman, pp. 3361 and 154-155; James Barber, pp. 268-294; and B. Vulindlela
Mtshali, Rhodesia: Background to Conflict (New York: Hawthorn Books, 1967), pp. 120-132. These views are a logical
extension of Leys' view of racism as the "inner law" of white
Zimbabwean politics.
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as a racist reaction by whites.

60

The remainder of this

chapter is thus an examination of the question whether successive pre-UDI governments, on encountering foreign economic
and political challenge, attempted political and socioeconomic reforms, and whether rural based opposition to those
reforms resulted in a governmental crisis in the early 1960s.
3.1.

White Society and the State
That the state (or government) was the executive com-

mittee of Zimawwean whites in pre-UDI politics is, as stated,
a common interpretation.

This view raises two questions:

How was public policy-making in this period actually conducted?
and What was the relation of public policy-makers to the white
community?
How was public-policy making conducted in pre-UDI
Zimbabwe?

The institutional context of policy-making was at

first derivative of colonial rule:

a legislative council

with elected and appointed officials was presided over by the
~

BSAC administrator who in turn was responsible to the High
Commissioner of South Africa and he, in turn, to the British
60
Arrighi criticizes the racism thesis for its ignorance of the economic roots of UDI. See Giovanni Arrighi,
"The Political Economy of Rhodesia" in Giovanni Arrighi and
John Saul, Essays in the Political Economy of Africa (New
York: Monthly Review Press, 1973), pp. 366-367.
Murray criticizes the thesis because it overlooks serious white divisions; it was the existence of those divisions
and attempts to overcome them that was the animating factor
~n white politics.
See D.J. Murray, The Governmental System
!._n Southern Rhodesia (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), pp. ixXxi.
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government.

Later, responsible government established a uni-

cameral legislature wherein the dominant party produced the
executive.

Responsible government in general and a West-

minster-style

institutional context in particular is usually

associated with party government.

Political parties come

into existence, win a majority in the legislature and by convention compose the executive.

The mode of governing then is

in essence party-government, with policy-making located in
the party's parliamentary caucus, the cabinet (as senior party
members), or even an "inner" cabinet of the most senior party
members.

Yet under neither company rule nor later self-

government did Zimbabwean policy-making and political initiative reside with the legislatures or with the political
parties that controlled them.

The center of gravity of policy-

making was the chief executive, working in close harmony not
with the cabinet but with the bureaucracy.
The absence of strong political parties, in the sense
of nation-wide and hierarchically structured organizations,
and by implication the relative weakness of the legislature
is the subject of several studies of pre-UDI politics.

One

interpretation holds that strong political parties did not
exist because a partisan impetus was absent from white politics.

The white population constituted a "white island in

a black sea", that is; a possible partisan division resulting
from occupational, ideological, regional and other white
Cleavages were negated by common perceptions with regard to
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the race-issue.

Political cohesion resulted from the need

to unite against the black threat; Leys indeed

su~sts

that

this racially motivated political cohesion was the "inner
law" of white politics and, since there could be no authentic
divisions among whites, a "one-party-system" existed.

In

support of this thesis, be cites the long dominance of the
United Party, while the existence of opposition parties is
explained by the fact that they often consisted of disaffected
former members of the UP.

61

White consensus thus turned

politics into public administration with minor partisan
squabbles over the means of the implementation of white
dominance.

This accounts for the dominance of the chief

executive and the importance of the bureaucracy.
Another interpretation holds that it was exactly
because serious divisions

existed within the white community

(for example, agricultural versus manufacturing interests)
that a strong executive was called for.

Mediation between

interest groups was the main function of the chief executive,
which under the long reign of Huggins led to an essentially
oligarchical mode of governing known as the "Hugginsbureau"
of the "Establishment".
61

This "no-party-system" view of

Leys, pp. 131-177.

102
Murray 62 is further developed by Bowman:
The Rhodesian Front is the first Rhodesian party to
mobilize whites into an effective political organization
and involve them in public policy decisions. Huggins,
Welensky, Whitehead, Todd - none of these prime ministers
ever built (or even tried to build) a party organization
that lasted more than a month or two before and after
elections. Once elected, all (to somewhat differing
degrees) felt free to make nearly any political decision
without reference to anyone except perhaps a few senior
colleagues .•. [the RF party organization] far more than
the political party shift in the 1962-elections, constituted the real internal revolution in white Rhodesian
politics. Decision-making within the white community
became more complex and more inflexible.63
Thus policy-making resided with the executive and, within it,
with the chief executive more than with other members of the
62 Murray, pp. 344-358. The term oligarchy is used by
Clements, who comments:
Rhodesian settlers invoked the democratic traditions of
the Motherland to support their claim for 'Responsible
Government' •.• (but having) established the principles
which entitled them to control of their own affairs,
their immediate task was to abandon them in the exercise
of that control ••• Rhodesian democracy, in fact, most
closely resembled the British eighteenth-century oligarchy in its political manifestations •••• there was no
strong party system; personalities counted for more than
policies---Conflicts of interest were settled by bargaining and compromise, and never allowed to become as sharp
as to threaten the structure of society. Maize prices,
railway rates, cattle marketing, tobacco exports, rural
roads and telephones, state lotteries, mineral rights,
hospitals and school facilities - such were the issues
which won or lost elections. Frank Clements, Rhodesia
A Study of the Deterioration of a White Society (New York:
Frederick A. Praeger, 1969), pp. 44-45.
63

Bowman, p. 91. Gann and Gelfand attribute the
absence of a party system to the smallness and instability of
the electorate. See Gann and Gelfand, pp. 88-89.
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cabinet.

64

In the absence of a strong populist democratic tradition in white politics, the public or civil service bureaucracy also became a powerful political actor.

The public ser-

vice in Zimbabwe was first established under BSAC-rule,
partly to demonstrate that it was not merely interested in
commercial profits but was a public-spirited, responsible
representative of the Crown interested in the development of
the area.

65

Accordingly a public service was created,

organized on a departmental basis and governed by regulations
with regard to the terms of service, appointments and internal
discipline.

This foundation of the public service was closely

modelled after and largely staffed by bureaucrats from the
public service of the Cape Colony, which was a highly professionalized bureaucracy.

66

64

on the· absence of an "inner cabinet" and the consistently authoritarian political style of Zimbabwean prime
ministers, see Palley, pp. 458-460. Leys similarly describes
cabinet government as feeble.
Leys, p. 60. See also Barber,
who states:
Because political activity was confined mainly to a
minority distinguished by its race and economic strength,
the ebb and flow of politics was based on attempts to
balance the interests and groups within that minority ••.
The ruling group in government and politics was a tight
circle of men who knew each other intimately. James
Barber, p. 9.
65

Correspondence of Milner to Chamberlain quoted in
Palley, p. 137.
66

The notion that the civil service should be staffed
by career civil servants was a reaction to "amateurish"
bureaucrats of the BSAC. See Palley, pp. 137-138.
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Except for the Native Affairs Department

67

(one of

the reserve powers of the British government), the public
service departments were constitutionally responsible t"o the
BSAC-administration and later to the executive.

By 1923 the

political influence of the public service increased beyond
political advice and expertise offered through the advisory
committees to the cabinet.

A Rhodesia Civil Service Council

became an official advisory body to the cabinet, uniting the
various public service spokesmen of the advisory committees.
The latter committees were reconstituted.

In addition to the

access that the Civil Service Council offered to political
influence, several public service associations like the
Rhodesia Post and Telegraph Association, the Rhodesia Teachers
Association and the Public Service Association were created
that engaged in political activities beyond the supply of
specialized advice.

This activity included partisan politics;

in the 1923 elections, for example, they opposed incorporation with South Africa. 68
Another reason for the political influence of the
bureaucracy was its size.

Even under BSAC-rule, the size of

the public service in relation to the size of the population

67

The NAD was known as the "government within the
government". See Murray, pp. 271-343.
68

Ib1"d., pp. 20 - 35 •
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was large,

69

and after the 1923 elections there were pres-

sures - expressed in the legislature - to decrease its size.
In response, the different public service associations and
the Civil Service Council set out to subvert the efforts of
individual ministers to exert cabinet control over the different departments, while seeking to establish its influence
with the chief executive.

By 1933 the public service effec-

tively circumvented the imposition of legislative control
and by individual ministers' control over the public service
departments, and also established close links with the chief
executive, mainly through the Public Service Board (which
controlled public service appointments and promotions) and
the various public service associations.

Henceforth it

exercised "unparalelled control over their own affairs." 70
Between 1933 and 1965 the public service continued to
grow in size, administrative capacity and public responsibility.

This growth is related to three developments:

First,

the depression of the early 1930s invested the public service with responsibility concerning the supply of goods,
69

Ibid. and Michael Bratton, "The Public Service in
Zimbabwe", Political Science Quarterly 95 (Fall 1980): 445.
The size of the public service in 1923, Bratton states,
"seemed small and simple, employing just over 2,000 settlers
and comprising only six administrative departments. Yet
compared with the settler population of 33,620 at that time,
or with the 1500 administrators responsible for Nigeria at
the peak of British rule, the early administrative presence
Was substantial." (p. 445)
70

Murray, p. 39. The Public Service Association was
dominated by senior civil servants.
Ibid., p. 49.
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services and employment.

71

Second, World War II and the

economic growth that is associated with it made resource
mobilization a public responsibility.

Third, the creat1on

of the CAF established a large and complex bureaucracy,
prompted the development of public work projects, and led to
an increase in public investment in the private sector.

72

The extent of public service growth can be illustrated
by the following figures:

In 1921 the public service

employed 15 percent of the white population, 25 percent of
a substantially larger population by 1951, and 27 percent
of an even larger population by 1961.

If the number of

public transportation employees is added to these figures,
the public service in 1951 employed 33 percent of the white
population, and 38 percent by 1961.

73

The extent of admin-

istrative capacity is partly revealed in employment figures,
but also in the increase in specialization (six departments
in 1923 as against 32 in 1957),

74

public ownership (for

example, energy resources like electricity, transportation,

71 Bratton, p. 445.
72

The nature of the Zimbabwean economy and its historical development will be discussed in the following section
of this chapter.

73 Murray, pp. 16-19.
74 Leys, pp. 62-64.
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communication, and even some industries like cotton and
sugar),75 public regulation (production and marketing control
boards like the Tobacco, Dairy and Maize Control Boards"), as
76
well as tariffs, quotas and export and import controls.
Even before the Second World War the Zimbabwean public
service thus had the administrative capacity and was invested with responsibility to intervene in the social, economic
and other dimensions of Zimbabwean society.

This interven-

tionist posture stood at the direction of the executive and
specifically the prime minister:

it had defeated the imposi-

tion of popular-legislative control even before the 1930s
and was consequently largely divorced from the legislature
and the party that controlled it.

Since public policy-

making thus emanated from an executive-bureaucratic alliance,
it raises the question of how autonomously this alliance
operated from either metropolitan influences or local
interests expressed through non-parliamentary avenues.
The extent to which Britain exercised its reserve
powers is a subject surrounded by much disagreement.

The

debate is almost exclusively centered on race-related matters.
75
The Zimbabwean government bought the railway companies in 1947 and negotiated a repeal of the reserve clause
With Britain. The later purchase of sugar- and cotton-industries aroused considerable criticism; government assistance,
it appears, was acceptable to whites, but only a limited
degree of public ownership. See Murray, pp. 162-197.
76
For the most part, government regulation was a product of the Depression in the 1930s.
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Here scholars like Palley argue that Britain did exercise
its reserve powers but, since it did so in an unobtrusive
manner, British influence on Zimbabwean public policy was
not noticeable. 77

Others contend that the constitutional

reserve powers were in practice rarely exercised and that
78
complete policy-making freedom existed.
In pre-UDI
negotiations the Zimbabwean government also claimed that a
79
practice of complete self-government existed.
British influence on Zimbabwean public policy, it is
submitted, did not take the form of public policy directives
delivered to the Zimbabwean executive or its legislature.
It consisted, rather, of a sustained and broad agreement
between the two governments on the nature of British imperial
policy in southern Africa and Zimbabwe's part in those
imperial designs.

Except for a brief period in which incor-

poration with·South Africa was considered, British policy
toward Zimbabwe was grounded in the desire to develop an
economic and political counterweight to South Africa.

This

imperial aim was the major cause of British support for the
establishment of a white settlement in Zimbabwe and was
sustained after 1923 and especially after 1945 with the
77
78
79

Palley, pp. 236-271.
s~e,

for example, Bowman, pp. 6-8.

Palley, pp. 738-746.
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creation of the CAF.

Had the British government imposed

its desire to create a pro-British unit in southern Africa
bY coercive means, i t probably would have encountered
resistance, but·there never was a need to do so for the
Zimbabwean government and white population alike were
80
. t.1c suppor t ers o f 1mper1a
.
. 1 a1ms.
.
enthus1as
The voluntary Zimbabwean participation in imperial
designs in southern Africa created a self-imposed constraint
on Zimbabwean public policy-making, including race-related
policy.

There are several manifestatious of this influence.

With regard to the native reserves, the British government
du~ing

the period of BSAC-rule accepted it as a means of

"protecting African possession of land, of defining rights
81
and increasing security"
against white encroachment. Yet
i t resisted attempts to finalize the reserves in a legal

form, as well as attempts to limit the amount of land avail82
able for future black use.
By 1918, however, the British

soChanock,
81
82

passim.

Ibid., p. 137.

Thus the creation of the reserves was a defensive
measure. The problem is not that the British government
attempted to defend black interests, but that they entrusted
the selection of suitable areas to local Native Commissioners
who were susceptible to locaJ white political pressures and
largely ignorant of population-land-ratios and possible soil
depletion, as well as of black methods of cultivation. See
Palmer, "War and Land", pp. 85-107. Others argue that the
reserves were created with the deliberate intention of
impoverishing blacks and consequently forcing them into wagelabor. Eee Giovanni Arrighi, "Labor Supplies in Historical
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government accepted the report of the Rhodesian Land Commission to reduce and consolidate the 104 reserves.

The reason

for this retreat, Chanock states, was that imperial policy
now favored incorporation with f!outh Africa and that this
would cause an influx of fouth African whites (particularly
Afrikaners), which would increase and radicalize white land
demands in Zimbabwe.

The future South African government

that would administer the area would, moreover, demand a
political concession from Britain to lower the land demands,
possibly the total removal of black participation in white
politics (i.e. the establishment of a racially exclusive
franchise).

This fear of the possibility of disenfranchised

and landless blacks led the British government to seek legal
guarantees for "what it regarded as a reasonable minimum of
African land."

83

In this manner the British government con-

tributed to creating the centerpiece of the future Zimbabwe's
economy and society.
Although the situation is somewhat different, similar
dynamics are exhibited in the attempt to create the CAF.

In

this case, Zimbabwe was seen as the more "illiberal" unit
and, at least initially, the British government exerted pressure on Zimbabwe to "liberalize" its race policies. 84
Perspective: A Study of the Proletarianization of the African Peasantry in Rhodesia" in Giovanni Arrighi and John s. Saul
pp. 180-234. Hereafter cited as "Labor Supplies'J.
83
84

Chanock, p. 137.
Ibid., pp. 214-228.

ll.l

British imperialism is also evident in Zimbabwe's immigration policies, which always aimed at ensuring the presence
of a large number of "loyal British subjects" in Zimbabwe.

85

This led to the discouragement of immigration from South
African sources, as South African immigrants would include
Afrikaners with questionable imperial sympathies.

Even

public policy with regard to the franchise was influenced by
imperial designs,

for the literacy requirements barred

Afrikaners who, though perhaps literate in Afrikaans, did not
have full command of the English language.

86

Thus the executive-bureaucratic alliance was, largely
by its own volition, subject to influences from the British
government.

British policy in southern Africa was an

imperial one, for it attempted to seek a counter to the
segregationist and, most importantly, nationalist directions
of South African public policy.

Zimbabwe therefore became

the nucleus of a pro-British and, hopefully, a liberal counterweight to South Africa - and consented to its role by incorporating these aims into its public policies.
In the absence of a populist political tradition in
white politics, was the executive-bureaucratic alliance more
closely connected with some whites than with others?
85

Clements, pp. 40-94.

86 Jbid. See also Chanock, pp. 141-164 and Palley,
pp. 206-211 and 322-344.
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Some scholars, like Arrighi, argue that the white
ksociety was characterized by class divisions, derivative of
economic considerations.

Prior to the

S~cond Wo~-Wa~

-

there were four classes, namely the rural bourgeoisie (white
minners and agriculturalists), large-scale capitalists
engaged in controlling transport- and power-industries, primary production and land speculation, a white wage-earning
class (administrative employees, clerical workers, foremen,
artisans and semi-skilled workers) essentially engaged in
service industries, and a petty bourgeoisie (shopkeepers,
small employees and tradesmen).

Although the interests of

these classes were not identical, they were compatible.

This

compatibility of interests led to a class coalition opposed
to the interests of the large-scale capitalists on the one
hand and the black class on the other hand.

Pre-1945 white

politics was thus characterized by the ability of the white
class coalition to capture state power and to use it to limit
the competition of the black underclass and international
capital. 87
Instead of the formal class divisions suggested by
Arrighi, Murray argues that divisions were more informal and
87

Arrighi, "The Political Economy of Rhodesia", pp.
336-348. For modified versions of this thesis, see Kenneth
Good, "Settler Colonialism: Economic Development and Class
Formation", Journal of Modern African Studies 14 (December
1976): 597-620; Kenneth Good, "Settler Colonialism in
Rhodesia" African Affairs 73 (January 1974): 10-36; and
Loney, pp. 51-58.
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included non-economic groups.

The most important of these

groups centered on the public service (the Public Service
A~sociation),

white agriculture (first the Rhodesia Agricul-

tural Union and later the Rhodesia National Farmers Union),
mining (the union of small working miners and the major
companies), commerce (the local chambers of commerce and the
national Associated Chamber of Commerce) and industry (the
Federation of Rhodesian Industry).

All these groups found

formal incorporation in the government control boards.

In

the Pre-1945 era, the interests of agriculture and mining
usually prevailed over that of commerce and industry.

The

reason, Murray suggests, was that commerce and industry were
locally organized groups with demands that could be satisfied on a local or municipal level.

Lacking a strong national

organization and focus, they could not prevail over the wellorganized agricultural, mining and public service associa88
.
t 1ons.
As the preceding discussion indicates, there is wide
agreement

89

that mining and agricultural interests in pre-

1945 Zimbabwe have leverage within the executive-bureaucratic
88
89

Murray, pp. 344-352.

See also, Leys, pp. 98-105; and Robin Palmer, "The
Agricultural History of Rhodesia" in Robin Palmer and Neil
Parsons (eds.) The Roots of Rural Poverty in Central and
Southern Africa (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1977), pp. 239-243.
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alliance.

Disagreement about this leverage does exist, and

focuses on the conceptualization of the powerful

intere~ts

(classes or interest groups), the considerations that animate
their activity (economic self-interest or the satisfaction
of group interests), and on the formality or informality of
these groups' access to state power.
3.2. The Pre-1945 Economy
As stated before, Zimbabwe was opened to white settlement in the hope of discovering great mineral wealth, but
although deposits were found, they did not lead to the creation of a second Rand.

The BSAC had, in anticipation of a

gold rush, acquired land and sold it at inflated prices to
incoming settlers.

To then offset BSAC capital losses,

+agricultural development was encouraged.
The ecological environment for farming in Zimbabwe is,
as in most parts of southern Africa, harsh: most suited to
farming in Zimbabwe is the flat, high, cool and well-watered
highveld running diagonally - northeast to southwest - across
the interior; from this highveld the middleveld slopes east
and westward, and is less conducive to crop farming; and the
lowveld is infested with the tsetse fly and virtually waterless.

For most of the year, in fact, there is no rain in

Zimbabwe.

After 1900 there were other obstacles: a lack of ~

capital, equipment, infrastructure and a small domestic
market (mainly the

mi~es).

Yet the BSAC encouraged farming

115

Farming Potential of Zimbabwean Land (1962)
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bY developing land settlement schemes, created a Department
of Agriculture that offered extension services, and created
(

a Land Bank with lending and credit facilities.

Settling on

the fertile highveld, the new white farmers selected maize
90
and tobacco as their main crops.
Like the mining industry, agriculture was labor-intensive and for a while competed with the mines for black labor. 91
Another source of competition was black farmers, who also supplied maize to the mines, and it is indeed argued that they
were more successful suppliers of mine-needs than white
farmers. 92 The initiation of white cattle ranching further
exacerbated the competition between black and white farmers.
White agricultural production nevertheless rose and by the
First World War "was firmly established as a central sector
of the Rhodesian economy." 93
90
Palmer, "Agricultural History of Rhodesia", pp.
221-230.
91

see Arrighi, "Labor Supplies", pp. 180-206.

92
Palmer, "Agricultural History of Rhodesia", pp. 228230; Ian Phimister, "Peasant Production and Underdevelopment
in Southern Rhodesia, 1890-1914, with Particular Reference
to the Victoria District" in Palmer and Parsons, pp. 255-267
and Barry Kosmin, "The Inyoka Tobacco Industry of the Shangwe
People: The Displacement of a Pre-Colonial Economy in
Southern Rhodesia, 1898-1938" in Palmer and Parsons, pp. 268288.
93
p. 237.

Palmer, "The Agricultural History of Rhodesia",
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Agricultural production, however, suffered from extreme
fluctuations:
After the collapse of tobacco through overproduction in
1913-1914, the industry slowly recovered and production
rose from 426, 423 lb in 1914-15 to a record 5,659,809 lb
in 1925-6 ••• Tobacco enjoyed another brief boom, following
an increase in imperial preference, and production soared ...
(to) 24,943,044 lb in 1927-8. But once again, as in 191314, Rhodesian growers had over-reached themselves, for the
overseas market was saturated, vast unsaleable stocks
accumulated in British warehouses, the order books were
closed and a great many tobacco farms were abandoned, with
some 700 producers, three-quarters of the total, eliminated.94
With regard to maize:
A similar pattern can be observed in regard to the maize
industry, where production rose from 1,393,654 (203 lb)
bags in 1925-6 to 1,985,848 bags in 1935-6, and exports
rose from 434,592 (200 lb) bags in 1926 to 745,010 in
1930. But by the beginning of 1931, with the export
price falling from lls to 3s 4d~ most European maizegrowers were facing bankruptcy. 5
Cattle farmers also became geared to meat exports after the
introduction of refrigeration in the Rhodesian Railways and
government bounty, but .suffered an immediate setback with the
outbreak of foot-and-mouth-disease.

This outbreak led to a

two-year suspension of all agricultural products except citrus
and tobacco.

96

The generally unstable agricultural production led to
government intervention.
94
95
96

In 1931 and 1934 the government

Ibid., pp. 236 and 239.
Ibid., p. 240.
Ibid.
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promulgated the Maize Control Acts, designed to stabilize
maize prices and to provide protection to white farmers
against black farming competition in the higher-priced
domestic market.

The Tobacco and rairy Control Boards simi-

larly protected white agricultural production against overproduction and falling prices.
further

decl~red

In 1933 the government

a moratorium on farmers' payments for land

purchases, enacted a Farmers Debts Adjustment Act that provided loans to farmers, and provided subsidies for road97
building and conservation efforts.
The white agricultural economy was also of a generally
static nature.

Whites owned land under the provisions of the

initial land apportionment that was enshrined in the 1923constitution.

Hereby land was divided into native reserves

(approximately 22 percent of the total land), white land
(about 31 percent) and unassigned land (about 47 percent).
Unassigned land formerly belonged to the BSAC, but after 1923
it could be purchased by either blacks or whites.

By 1925 a

new land commission (the Morris Carter Commission) recommended
readjustments, since few blacks bought land in unassigned
areas and since whites then bought the best farmland.

The

result was the Land Apportionment Act of 1931, which extended
White land ownership to about 51 percent of the total land
While preserving nati_ve reserve land at about 22 percent.
------~~-----------

97Loney, p. 57. ·
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Unassigned land was divided into African Purchase Land (about
8

percent), while 19 percent remained unassigned.

This land

division remained in place until 1969, when it was replaced
bY the Land Tenure Act.

White land was almost entirely

situated in the fertile highveld close to railroad links.
Despite the extensive and fertile land held

. t s,
agricultura 1 1s

99

~Y

98

white

on 1 y a sma 11 propor t.1on o f th e 1 an d was

actually cultivated before the Second World War.

White

agricultural production's twin pillars were maize and tobacco,
as well as some cattle ranching, which used large amounts
of land to produce a relatively small yield of crops or grazing.

Land ownership clearly did not equal land cultivation.

Land cultivation, moreover, was semi-primitive:

extensive

rather than intensive black labor was used in conjunction
with rudimentary tools (like hand hoes) and a lack of mechanization (single disc ox plows rather than tractors).

Lack

of adequate soil conservation measures and resulting soil
depletion

100 further added to the generally uneconomic nature

98

George Kay, Rhodesia: A Human Geography (London:
University of London Press, 1970), pp. 37-58.

99

The number of farmers was 2042 in 1914, and rose to
3052 by 1932 and to 3640 by 1944. D.G. Clarke, Agricultural
and Plantation Workers in Rhodesia (Gwelo, Zimbabwe: Mambo
Press, 1977), p. 21.

100

soil depletion in white areas was mainly due to the
lack of rotational cultivation and fertilizer. Palmer,
"Agricultural History of Rhodesia", p. 240.
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of white agricultural production.

101

The absence of modern agricultural methods in pre-1945
Zimbabwe is directly attributable to the lack of capital
(either foreign capital or local profits) and the small size
of the domestic market.

The initial market in Zimbabwe con-

sisted of urban areas and mines, but these needs were met largely by black farmers - before the First World

W~r.

Further expansion of the domestic market did not occur until
the Second World War.

The export market was, as shown,

highly unreliable and the overproduction it encouraged led to
boom-bust periods in white agricultural production, which led
to increasing government regulation of marketing and production.
The mining industry was more explicitly geared to the
export market.

Minerals were exploited by large companies

and smallworking miners, who concentrated on the exploitation
of gold in about 1,750 workings.

By the late 1930s, minerals

contributed approximately 25 percent of the national income
. b a b we. 102
Of Z 1m
Before 1945 the Zimbabwean economy thus resembled
colonial economies of the export-type:

it had a mining in-

dustry almost totally geared to exports and a white-dominated
101

rbid., pp. 239-243; Loney, pp. 53-58 and Arrighi,
"Labor Supplies", pp. 191-198.
102

Arrighi, "Political Economy of Rhodesia", p. 354.
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agricultural industry.

Few secondary industries existed,

largely because of the small size of the domestic market;
secondary needs were largely met by South African and
103
British manufacturers.
3.3. Foreign Pressure
As the preceding discussion shows, pre-1945 Zimbabwe
was vulnerable to foreign pressures in at least two major
respects:

First, it was vulnerable to British imperial

actions in the southern African region.

s~ccnd,

given the

nature of its economy, it was vulnerable to developments in
the world economy.

The latter vulnerability indeed prompted

a government inquiry (the Danziger Memorandum of 1943), which
questioned Zimbabwe's future as an export-oriented economy
and suggested the development of secondary industries instead.104
3.3.L

Economic Pressure
Zimbabwe entered the Second World Wr.r as a Common-

wealth component of the Allied war effort.
war on the Zimbabwean economy was explosive.

The effect of the
As Arrighi

states:
The lack of internal demand represented a brake on industrialization and development, and the progressive decrease
103
British trade with Zimbabwe was a result of Commonwealth preference. Trade between Zimbabwe and South Africa
Proceeded under several customs agreements. Zimbabwe also
relied on South African ports and railroads for the export
of its goods.
104 Gann and Gelfand, pp. 175-176.
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of overall peasant productivity worsened this obstacle.
World War II was the external stimulant which more than
offset the hindrance and started economic growth in
105
Southern Rhodesia after the stagnation of the 1930s. ·
;Z· The

Second World

w~r

created a virtually insatiable demand

for Zimbabwean goods, as the Allied war effort required
manufactured goods, agricultural products, and minerals like
chrome, gold and asbestos.

106

The Zimbabwean economy, however, given its structure,
was ill-equipped to meet rapid increases in demand.

There

were few secondary industries and the agricultural economy
was, as shown, static.

The boom conditions of the Second

World War were, moreover, sustained after 1945 as the shortage
of raw materials and United States currency continued.
European states did not wish to spend United States capital
by buying American-made goods, like tobacco.
The Zimbabwean government responded to these foreign
pressures by encouraging the development of secondary industries within Zimbabwe • . It set up anti-inflationary devices
and publicly financed the creation of iron- and steelindustries.

The government's efforts were complemented by

a sudden and unexpected influx of Eritish capital.
105
106

Whereas

Arrighi, "Political Economy of Rhodesia", p. 350.

In its most direct form the increase in demand
came from the placement of an allied air training scheme in
Zimbabwe, resulting in an influx of allied capital and a
demand for Zimbabwean supplies to air stations, quarters,
land, and buildings.
Ibid.

123

a considerable amount of British capital was previously
invested in South Africa, the rising tide of Afrikaner
nationalism in South Africa made Zimbabwe, with its imperial
sympathies a more politically suitable investment area.
Foreign investment, which amounted to 13.5 million pounds in
1947, was more than double that in 1949 and reached 50.7
million pounds in 1951. 107

The result was the development of

a manufacturing industry in Zimbabwe, as can be gauged from
the following figures:
The contribution of manufacturing to national income rose
from 9 percent in the late 1930s to about 15 percent in
the early 1950s to over 18 percent in the early 1960s •..
the industry passed from the small family-shop stage to
the large-scale, mechanized, corporate-owned factory.l08
This rise of secondary industry in Zimbabwe was to
have several economic and political consequences.

One was

the transformation of the white population structure in Zimbabwe.

In 1921, for example, 25 Percent of white Zimbaweans

were farmers, eleven percent were employed in the mining
industry, 26 percent were public service employees (11 percent
of which were railway workers) and 17 percent were employees
of commercial and industrial enterprises.

By 1951, however,

only 12 percent were farmers, mining employees were reduced
to five percent, while public service employees rose to 33
percent (including transportation workers) and commercial and
107
108

Ibid., p. 351.
rbid., p. 353.
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industrial employees rose to 49 percent.
patterns were further accentuated.

By 1961 these

Farmers declined to five

percent and mining employment to three percent, while the
public service rose to 38 percent (including transportation
workers) and commercial and industrial employees to 54
percent.

109

In summary, the pre-1945 population structure was
characterized by the numeric preponderance of farmers andf.
public service employees.

In post-1945 Zimbabwe, public

service continued to account for a high proportion of white
employment, but it was first rivalled and then surpassed by
commercial and industrial employment.

Farmers were numeri-

cally eclipsed.
Since these figures are given as percentages, it is
important to note that there was spectacular white population growth after 1945.

As a result of slow economic growth

and a selective immigration policy, the white population grew
from 33,600 in 1921 to 69,000 by 1941.

Five years later,

however, the population of whites grew to 82,400 and reached
135,600 by 1951, reaching 177,100 by 1956 and 221,500 by
1961.110
An immediate political consequence of this population increase was the expansion of the white voting roll.
109
These figures are adapted from Murray, pp. 16-19.
110
Bowman, p. 13.
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Although not all immigrants registered as voters, immigrants
did emerge as an electoral force, particularly since most
did not settle as farmers, but entered public service,
manufacturing and industrial employment.

The number of far-

mers actually remained stable; it is as a percentage of the
total population that they declined.

111

Besides its efforts to stimulate the development of
secondary industries, the Zimbabwean government also acted
to stimulate agricultural production.

These efforts fell

into two categories, namely efforts to promote the productive
capacities of black farmers and efforts to promote white
agricultural production.

Black agriculture itself fell into

two categories, namely production in the African Purchase
Land and in the Native Reserves.
As indicated before, black agriculturalists had
responded well to the market- and cash-economy (centered on
the mines) during the 1890-1910 period.

Subsequently the

productive capacities of black farmers declined progressively,
. fl y b ecause o f so1'1 d ep 1 e t.10n 1n
. th e reserve d areas, 112
Ch 1e

.j~

111

see Clements, pp. 40-95 and William G. Kuepper,
G. Lynne Lackey and E. Nelson Swinerton, "The European Departure from Rhodesia: Migration in a Crisis-Situation", paper
Presented at the Third World Conference, Chicago, Illinois,
March 29, 1979, pp. 2-5.
112

since the soil in the reserves was less fertile
than in white areas, more land would be required for blacks even without population pressure. Nelson, pp. 272-276.

12~

traditionalist cultivation methods,
sure in the reserves.
reserves,
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113

and population pres-

Apart from the hard-pressed

some blacks lived on purchased land, bought in

competition with whites in the unassigned areas before 1931
/

or allocated as African Purchase Land.

Although these far-

mers occupied larger farms and employed non-family labor,
their methods of cultivation were similar to that of farmers
in the reserves, that is, nonmechanized labor-intensive
cultivation and cattle-holding.
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Initially political interest in the productive capacities of black agriculturalists were confined to the creation of a Native Education Department (later renamed the
Native Development Department), but the promotion of black
agriculture consisted of the inspection of mission schools
and the encouragement of local, traditionalist industries
(like weaving and woodcarving).

The Native Development

Department was later absorbed by the Native Affairs Department in 1933.

Up to the Second World War, the objective of

113

Ibid., p. 294. Agriculturalists in the reserves
occupied small plots, cultivated crops with family and nonmechanized labor, or tended to small herds of cattle.
114

The annual reports of Chief Native Commissioners
regularly mentioned "overcrowding", "general overstocking"
and a "vicious and expanding circle of destruction." Quoted
by Arrighi, "Labor Supplies", p. 207.
115

Nelson, p. 294.
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the Native Affairs Department was to preserve law and order
in the black rural areas, to collect taxes and to support
the "traditional way of life . .,ll 6
During the Eecond World War, government policy toward
the development of the black areas changed.

One of the first

indications of this change was Huggins' Statement on Native
Policy in 1941, which expressed interest in increasing black
agricultural output.

Subsequently, government policy was

characterized by efforts to increase black agricultural production.
In 1943 a survey of the reserves by the Department of
Native Agriculture estimated that out of the 98 Reserves, 62
were overpopulated) (19 were more than 100 percent overpopulated) and 50 were overstocked."

117

With regard to

overpopulation, the government's responsewas to appoint
the Mcilwaine Commission to investigate soil conservation
under the recently enacted Natural Resources Act of 1941,
who recommended that soil conservation measures should be
implemented through a Natural Resources Board and through
local Native Commissioners.

In addition to these measures

the government appointed the Ds.nziger Commission in 1948,
with responsibility to investigate land allocation.

While

116on the history of the Native Affairs Department and
the general administrative machinery for black affairs, see
J. F. Holleman,. Chief, Council and Commissioner, Some Problems
of Government in Rhodesia (Assen, the Netherlands: Royal
VanGorum, 1969) pp. 3-43.
117Arrighi, "Labor Supplies", p. 208.
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the native reserves and the African Purchase Land had not
increased since the Land Apportionment Act of 1931, the
bl~popu1ation

by 1941 had increased by 40 percent.

Con-

sequently a 1950 Amendment to the Land Apportionment Act
designated four million acres of unassigned land as Special
Native Areas.

These areas, which were later somewhat en-

larged, were·to relieve the population pressure of the native
reserves.

However, these areas were also to absorb "unproduc118
tive" squatters on white farms.
In 1944 the Zimbabwean government appointed another
commission to investigate black agriculture and trade.

This

Godlonton Commission produced a report that used the categories of developed and undeveloped rather than the familiar
black-white categories in describing Zimbabwean agriculture,
and criticized black production, marketing and trade.

The

principal causes of poor black production, the report argued,
were bad animal husbandry practices and the failure of local
leadership (i.e. traditional chiefs) to promote
tices.

such prac-

The Godlonton Commission's "Report of the Corr.mission

on Native Production and Trade" led to the enactment of the
Native Development Fund Act and the Native Production and
Marketing revelopment Act in 1948; it created government funds
118

Kay, Rhodesia:

A Human Geography, pp. 37-58.
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for the support ·of black agricultural initiatives, attempted
to improve black marketing conditions and also created an
administrative machinery designed to centralize all efforts
to promote black agriculture.

Efforts to promote black

production were to be compulsory which, in a local context,
placed much of the executive burden on traditional chiefs,
119 Perhaps
.
.
local blac k counc1·1 s, an d Na t..
1ve Comm1ss1oners.
the most radical measure to promote black agriculture came
with the enactment of the African Land Husbandry Act of 1951,
designed to secure individual black farming and grazing
rights to destock black cattle holdings.

In 1956 all these

efforts were capped by a "Five Year Plan", incorporating many
·of the previous marketing, prO<;luction and trade reforms .·

120

Government efforts to promote black agricultural
production had little, if any, economic effect and was con121
firmed by government reports.
Although very little

119
Murray, pp. 303-312 and Holleman, pp. 44-76.
120
Holleman, pp. 45-54. See also the What the Native
Land Husbandry Act Means to the Rural African and to Southern
Rhodesia: A Five Year Plan That Will Revolutionize African
Agriculture (Salisbury: Government Printer, 1955}. ·Government expenditure on black agriculture in. the 1941-1949 period
was about 2.5 million; it rose to 15.8 million in the following nine years. Mcmta·gue Yudelman, Africans on the Land
(Cambridge: Harvard Ur.iversity Press, 1964), p. 159.
121

First and Second Report of the Select Committee on
the Resettlement of Natives (Salisbury: Government Printer,
~959 and 1960); A Note on the Economics of African Development
.!_n Southern Rhodesia with Special Rfderence to Agriculture
(~alisbury: Government Printer, 1960); Report of the CommisS1on of Inquiry into Alleged Discontent in the Mangwende
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statistical information about black agriculture is available,
it is estimated that cash sales of black producers after 1957
. 122 There was a modest increase in black
remaine d s t a t 1c.
agricultural production overall, but a possible surplus-effect
was negated by population increases in the reserves.

There

are other reasons for the economic failure of the government's
reform efforts.

One reason was the shallow and self-righteous

government views on the reason for the limited black production, namely that it was caused by lack of commitment to the
industrialized way of life.

Another cause for the failure

of rural black reform was the government's overestimation of
its administrative capacity in rural areas.

Although the

government's administrative presence in the rural areas
increased, it added responsibility to the already overburdened Native Commissioners.

The government attempted to ease

this burden by creating local black councils by the African
Councils Act of 1957.

These councils were composed of local

chiefs and other local blacks, but they suffered from a lack
of local support.

The government also miscalculated the size

of black holdings that would be suitable to intense cultivation.

Black farmers on average were allocated six acres,

Reserve (Salisbury: Government Printer, 1961); and Report of
the Advisory Committee: The Development of the Resources of
Southern Rhodesia with Particular Reference to the Role of
African Agriculture (Salisbury: Government Printer, 1962).
122

Most figures consist of estimates. Only cash sales
through official marketing agencies are recorded. Nelson,
p. 293.

lTI
compared to the white farm size minimum of 750 acres of
already deteriorated land.

The result was that cultivation
123
caused further soil depletion.
Perhaps the most important reason for the failure of
the government's reforms in general and the African Land
Husbandry Act in particular was political opposition.

The:

government attempted to secure individual black farming rights,
but this aim conflicted with the customary basis of black
society.

By custom the allocation of black farmland took

place within the context of tribal wards, where chiefs parcelled out communally-held land to individual use.

Individual

farming rights undermined the security of rural tenure (it
indeed did not even recognize tribal ward distinctions) and
undermined the tribal structure and authority.
was also controversial:

Destocking

by custom cattle-holdings are

indicators of rural black status and wealth and the slaughter
or sale of cattle could not be accomplished by voluntary
means.

124
Given that the government's efforts to improve

black

agricultural production adversely affected all blacks'
security in rural communal land, undercut the authority of
local traditional leaders, and was implemented in a coercive
manner, it is not surprising that these efforts
123
124

Holleman, pp. 56-72.
Ibid.
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encountered sustained black opposition from both the rural
and urban areas.

A nationalist leader indeed remarked that

the African Land Husbandry Act was the best recruiter the
.
125
nationalists ever had.
The lack of political support and faulty economic
reasoning thus undermined government efforts to effect a
capitalist breakthrough in black agricultural production.
Already overstrained by the 1950s, the structure of black
agriculture could not absorb the population increases in
rural areas.

This resulted in the absence of young men from
126
the reserves,
who sought wage labor opportunities else-

where, and a reliance of rural dwellers on cash gifts from
f r1en
.
d s an d re l a t.1ves. 127 By the early 1960s
.
wage- l a b or1ng
it was indeed calculated that the reserves could not meet
their own subsistence needs:

the reserves then became net
importers of subsistence food needs. 128

125
George Nyandoro as quoted by Ken f.rown, Land In
Southern Rhodesia (London: Africa Bureau, 1959), p. 2.
l26w e1nr1c
. . h , pp. 21-22.
127The transfer of funds from urban wage-laborers to
rural friends and relatives is known as a "remittance nexus"
and is expected to constitute a considerable proportion of
rural dwellers' income. Clarke, pp. 44-51.
128
Bratton remarks that this "destruction over time of
the capacity of African agriculture to produce a surplus sets
Rhodesia apart from Kenya ••• A reconstruction of African agriculture and a successful incorporation of African cultivators
into a capitalist 'peasant' mode was undertaken after the Mau
Mau rebellion by means of the spread of cash-cropping."
Michael Bratton, "Structural Transformation in Zimbabwe:
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As previously discussed, white agricultural technology
before 1945 was similar to black agricultural technology;
the differences between the two agricultures derived more
from differential access to state aid and different farm
size. 129

Large portions of legally reserved white farmland

was also unoccupied (and hence uncultivated) and even large
portions of occupied land were uncultivated.

130

The initial

response to demand-pressures generated by the Second World
war was thus poor:

increases in production did occur but

they fell short of demands and food rationing and imports
. d • 131
were requ1re

The government's response to these pressures was, first,
to change its policy with regard to immigration.

Although

still selective as far as the origins of immigrants was concerned (i.e. "loyal British subjects"), a more vigorous
immigration policy was adopted to attract potential farmers.
Land acquisition was easiest for veterans of the Eecond World
War, but acquisition was more difficult for younger immigrants who were required to first work on existing farms
Comparative Notes from the Neo-Colonisation of Kenya", Journal
of Modern African Studies 15 (December 1977): 604-605. Hereafter cited as "Structural Transformation".
129

Poverty:

Robin Palmer and Neil Parsons, "The Roots of Rural
Historical Background" in Palmer and Parsons, pp. 8-9.

130

Before 1945 less than three percent of the arable
land in white farming areas was under cultivation. Nelson,
p. 283.
131
1952.

Ibid., p. 285.

Maize imports were required until

134
.
f or 1 an d -owners h"1p. 132
before qua l 1.f y1ng

The results of

the farming-oriented immigration policy were generally disappointing, as most immigrants preferred to settle in towns
as wage-labourers.

While the number of farmers did increase,
133
. d uncu lt.·
much of t h e b est f arm 1 an d rema1ne
1va t e d .
Second, the government encouraged better cultivation
on existing farmland.

White soil depletion was, like that of

black farmers, criticized and similarly encouraged by the
Natural Resources Board and extension officers of the Department of Agriculture.

At the National Farmers Union Congress

in 1946 Huggins switched public criticism of white farmers
to their production techniques and stated that government
policy henceforth would encourage more intense cultivation
of holdings not exceeding 1,000 acres.

In order to guarantee

reasonable prices for increased production, the government
would continue its support of rational marketing practices
and also maintain export controls.

134

In terms of output and value, agricultural production
by white farmers did increase:

between 1937 and 1958 the

volume of production·increased by 259 percent, and its value

132

Ibid.

133
The number of farmers in 1944 was 3640 and by 1965
it rose to 6266. Some of these white farmers owned more than
one farm. Clarke, pp. 21-22.
134

Gann and Gelfand, pp. 193-195.

135

bY 1,000 percent. 135

Before 1945 maize and tobacco were the

twin pillars of agricultural production.

Between 1944 and

1954 the volume of maize and other non-tobacco products·

increased by an average of 60 percent.

In this period there

was thus some agricultural diversification, as the sugar
. t 1on
.
.
d , 136 b u t ma1ze
.
and cotton cu 1 t1va
1ncrease
an d t o b acco

nevertheless remained the chief products: maize accounted for
39 percent of the total cropland, and tobacco accounted for
19 percent.

137

Much of the increase

in white agricultural production

can be attributed to improved production techniques.

With

regard to tobacco, producers switched from burley and turkish
tobacco to a flue-cured virginia-type, and increased their
use of pesti- and herbicides and fertilizer.

The two pro-

vinces of Mashonaland, which came to produce more than 80
percent of all white maize and tobacco production, 138 for
135

Palmer, "The Agricultural liistory of Rhodesia",

p. 244.

136

Nelson, p. 285.

137

Bratton, "Structural Transformation" p. 602.

138

Most of the crop production in Zimbabwe is geographically concentrated in Mashonaland North and South. In
1965, for example, these two provinces "produced 87 percent
of all white-grown maize, 84 percent of the Virginia tobacco,
and 58 percent of the milk". Nelson, pp. 288-289. The lowest crop yields are found in the Midlands, Victoria and Matabeleland provinces, where cattle ranching is the white agricultural pre-occupation. This is in large part a reflection
of the ecological conditions: the more fertile Mashonaland

136
example uses 80 .percent of all white use of fertilizer.

139

With regard to maize there were similar improvements as
farmers adopted a locally developed hybrid maize type, _and

140
icnreased t h e use o f f er t 1.l.1zer an d h erb.1- an d pes t•1c1.d es.
The period between 1945 and 1965 also witnessed the
increase of large-scale commercial farming.
domestic-owned plantation (or estate)

Foreign and

farming increased

especially in the southwestern and -eastern provinces
(Matabeleland North and South, Victoria and Manicaland),
where sugar, cotton, tobacco, tea and citrus are also locally
processed.

These vast estates of companies like the Lonrho

Group, Liebig Corporation, Huletts and Anglo-American
operated as competitors to individually and locally-owned

~ixed

farms.

141

Despite the increases in agricultural pro-

duction, white farming remained vulnerable in at least three
respects.
First; white agriculture remained a labor-intensive
industry.

In the period between 1946 and 1974 the number of

black farmworkers in fact·increased by 252 percent, casting
doubt on the use of improved managerial and production techniques as the sole explanations of improved production.

The

bas an average farm size of 3,000 acres while the more arid
other provinces with its cattle ranching and mixed farms have
an average farm size of 6,000 acres. Bratton, "StructlU'al
Transformation ... p. 602.

139Nelson, p·. 288.
140

Ibid., p. 289.

141 Bratton, "Structural Transformation" pp.. 602-603.
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number of black farmworkers rose from 142,000 to 272,000
between 1946 and 1961.

The two Mashonaland provinces, where

. production is particularly high, employ 60.5 percent of all
142
permanent black farmworkers.
Under these conditions it
is not surprising that white farming organizations lobbied
l43
to secure an a d equa t e supp 1 y Of black laborers.
Second, since the domestic and the CAF-created market
remained small and tobacco especially enjoyed high world
market prices, agricultural production became thoroughly
geared to the export market.

This shift is in large part

due to the emergence of tobacco as the main agricultural
crop; in 1945 the value of tobacco sales, for example, was
144
3.9 million pounds but by 1960 it rose to 29.5 million
pounds.

This five-fold increase in value, coupled with the

increase in tobacco production, made white agriculture the
chief earner of Zimbabwean foreign exchange by the early
1960s.

145

This reliance on exports of a few agricultural

primary products rendered Zimbabwe's economy vulnerable to
142

Clarke, pp. 24-26.

143

Loney, pp. 69-73 and Arrighi, "Political Economy
of Rhodesia," pp. 353-255.
144

Palmer, "Agricultural History of Rhodesia," p.
244 (fn. 155).
145

Tobacco accounted for 47 percent of the total value
of agricultural production in 1965. Nelson, p. 286.

138
fluctuations in the world market economy.
Third, although cultivation was more extensive in 1965
than in the pre-1945 era, less than one-sixth of the total
arable land in white farmland was under cultivation.

The

reason, the government reported, was that many white farmers
preferred to increase but then maintain production at certain
"target-income"-levels.

This resulted in artificial land

scarcity, uncultivated land and agricultural inefficiency.

146

Thus white agricultural production under the impact
of government pressure did increase dramatically after the
Second World War.

White agriculture became more capital-

intensive and adopted improved production techniques.
remained vulnerable.

Yet it

Compared to volume increases, value

increases were disproportionately high, reflecting the high
world market prices for tobacco.

Farmers also continued to

rely on increasing numbers of black farmworkers.

The result,

as confirmed by government reports, was that white agriculture
not only QPerated

at less-than-full-potential, but that it

was also vulnerable in its lack of mechanization (or overreliance on black labor) and the fluctuations of the world
market economy.
146

Ibid., pp. 280-281.
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3. 3 • 2 . Political Pressure and Reform?

During and after the Second World War efforts to
incorporate Zimbabwe with the northern territories

gain~d

momentum, as the strategic, political and economic arguments
for the creation of a central African union became more
forceful.

Zimbabwe desired a close form of such a union, in

the form of amalgamation with copper-rich Zambia. 147

The

British government investigated this possibility by way of
the Bledisloe Commission"in 1938 but concluded that although
the socio-economic position of blacks in Zimbabwe was better
than"in the northern territories Zimbabwe's race policies
were apparently set on a course more similar to South African
race policy.

The then existing and anticipated future

direction of Zimbabwe's race policy made a close form of
union impossible.

The British government, as indica ted before,

hoped for a liberal-counterweight in race policy in central
Africa and hoped that Zimbabwe would "liberalize" its race
policy so as to overcome its divergence from northern race
148
.
po 1 1cy.

Zimbabwe's race policy between 1923 and 1945 has been
described as a "dual", "two-pyramid"- or "gradual"-policy.
147chanock, pp. 190-248
148

Ibid.

140

Race policy was rooted in the principle and practice of land
apportionment, which created separate and legally specified
land areas where land ownership was exclusive to one or the
·other race.

The black population was seen as being naturally

at home in the native reserves and the government had a
pastoral view of the nature of rural black society.

Govern-

ment policy aimed at the preservation of the traditional
political, social and economic way of life in rural areas.
By implication politically active blacks in non-traditional
ways and in non-traditional areas were viewed in a
light. 149

negative

This pastoral view of rural society also implied

that blacks did not naturally belong to the urban areas which was reflected in poor urban housing conditions, poverty
and other unsatisfactory living conditions and the introduction of pass laws in 1936.
British policy between the Bledisloe Commission and the
creation of the CAF witnessed the demise of the liberal
counterpoise-idea.

To a certain extent the Eledisloe Commis-

sion's findings about the socio-economic conditions of blacks
in its northern protectorates already embarrassed the British
government, who wished to contrast it with more illiberal
conditions in Zimbabwe.
149

Huggins nevertheless protested the

For a full discussion of pre-1945 race policy in
Zimbabwe, see L~ys, pp. 258-270, who argues that racial ideas
Permeated but did not dominate white political thought. See
also Richard Gray, The Two Nations (New York: Oxford University Press, 1960), pp. 3-194.
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commission's findings, which led to a one-man commission of
inquirY of central African race policies by Lord Haley.

In

1941 the confidential report of Lord Haley still maintained

that divergent race policies existed, but argued that they
were not conclusive differences and that there was

increas-

ing public and private recognition in Zimbabwe that blacks
were an integral part of Zimbabwean society.

There was also

promise of improvement in the socio-economic conditions of
blacks.

At the same time the British High Commissioner in

south Africa reported on the increase of anti-imperial and
'segregationist sentiments among Afrikaners.

By comparison

white Zimbabweans were more acceptable as imperial and,
hopefully, racial allies.

Such an alliance should not be

precluded because of the "alleged errors" in racial affairs;
in fact, white Zimbabweans should be given greater self. rac1a
. 1 rna tt ers. 150
governmen t 1n
The generally favorable tone of government inquiries
between 1938 and 1945 about Zimbabwe's racial affairs diluted
British pressures for race reforms.

The hope of a harmonized,

liberal and British-supported race policy for the CAF disappeared.

By 1951 the conference negotiating CAF stated that

the timing and method of the constituent territories' race
Policies still differed and that the new race policy of the
150

chanock, pp. 230-238 and Palley, pp. 331-336.

142
CAF would simply be one dedicated to the economic, social and
151
political advancement of blacks in partnership with whites.
Zimbabwe's race policy of this period reflected the
relaxation of British demands for racial concessions.

Faced

with electoral challenge from the Liberal Party in the postwar election, Huggins campaigned for a raise in voting qualifications, which would further restrict the number of black
voters, while proposing to have black interests in parliament
represented by two white members.

In 1950 the government

dropped the latter proposal, but it did raise the voting
. t.1ons 1n
. 1951 , 152 1 ea d.1ng t o a d ecrease 1n
. th e numqualif1ca
153
ber of black voters.
The 1951 increase in voting qualifications was the high
point of Zimbabwean governments' efforts to limit black
political participation.

In 1956 the commission on electoral

reform (the Tredgold Commission) recommended another increase
in voting qualifications, but suggested the creation of a
"special roll" of voters with lower qualifications.

Special

roll voters could not, however, count for more than half

151

Palley, pp. 333-336.

152

Ibid., p. 308. Property qualifications were raised
to 500 pounds and annual income to 120 pounds as well as the
ability to read and speak English. Citizenship was also now
required.

153

Leys, p. 192. Leys reports that more blacks could
have participated, based on government reports on the number
of blacks who met the voting qualifications.
Ibid., p. 197.

143

of common roll votes.

154

While the Electoral Amendment Act

of 1957 did not follow all the Tredgold Commission's recommendations, it did introduce a second preference voting
system and did create a special voting role which could not
count for more than 20 percent of common roll votes.

By the

end of 1960 the total number of black voters increased to
3,129 (out of a total electorate of 75,061) and by 1961 to
5,177 (out of a total electorate of 88,820).

155

Government

policy to increase the number of black voters was part of the
"liberal", "inter-racial", or "middle class" or "partnership"
strategy.

This middle class policy was largely prompted

because the UFP faced electoral challenge and wanted to
extend its support base.

This extension would take the form

of creating and then enfranchising a black middle class.
sequence of this policy was·important:

The

socio-economic improve-

ment would precede black enfranchisement.
The government's middle class policy of the 1950s, it
is submitted, can best be understood as a response to the
loss of white political support the government experienced
in the wake of its post-1945 reforms.

These reform efforts

included, among other things, the encouragement of black
agriculture and secondary industries.
154

Palley, pp. 308-312.

155
Leys, pp. 270-277.

With regard to black

144

agriculture, this entailed an increase in government aid and
services.

With regard to secondary industries, its develop-

ment implied far-reaching changes in race policy.

Unlike

white agriculture, secondary industries required a stable and
skilled labour-supply, coupled with the need to provide
adequate housing and other socio-economic opportunities for
blacks·in urban areas, which were judged as unacceptable by
a government report in 1944. 156 A wave of strikes and urban
labor problems accentuated the need for government-induced
reforms of labor and living conditions. 157
~To

stabilize and secure a skilled labor force, the

government introduced a Native Urban Act, focusing specificially on better housing conditions and adequate wages.
These reforms encountered significant white opposition
emanating primarily from rural employers of cheap, seasonal
156 see the Report on the Question of Native Housing
and Implementation of the Land Apportionment Act in the
Urban Areas of the Colony (Salisbury: Government Printer,
1944).
157see Report of the Commission to Investigate the
Grievances Which Gave Rise to the Strike amongst the African
Employees of the Rhodesia Railways and Certain Other Matters
Affecting Africans Employed in Industry (Salisbury: Government Printer, 1946) and the Report of the Commission Appointed
to Inquire into and Report upon All Matters Concerning Recent
Disturbances in the Colony (Salisbury: Government Printer,
1946). For a more complete discussion of the government's
industrialization policy, see the Report of the Committee of
Inquiry into the Protection of Secondary Industries in
Southern Rhodesia (Salisbury: Government Printer, 1946)
The government moved to secure white labor stability - after
several white strikes - with the Industrial Conciliation Act
of 1934. It facilitated the mediation of white labor problems,
but excluded black workers.

145
and unskilled labor.

White farmers resisted the imposition

of rural minimum wages and complained (with smallworking
miners) of the shortages caused by labourers leaving for
better-paid urban wage labor.

General shortages of black

labor did indeed exist, leading to a national conference in
November 1950 on labor shortages.

In response the government

introduced Labor Boards to regulate the supply of black
laborers, but labor problems continued.

White rural-based

opposition thus remained strong and, finding expression in
the Liberal Party, they waged a two-year battle over the
imposition of the Native Urban Areas Act.
became law in 1946.

The bill finally

158

Thus the Zimbabwean government did attempt certain
race-related reforms in the 1950s.

The policy changes were

prompted not by direct pressures from the British governmentif anything, British pressure abated--but by the indirect
consequences of foreign economic pressure.

Policy-changes

also did not take the form of increasing formal black political opportunities, but rather aimed at improving urban
black labor and living conditions.

These latter improve-

ments were the supposed roots of a black middle class.

The

government's reforms, however, generated significant rural
opposition.

Rural blacks opposed it because it threatened

tribal structure, custom and authority and white farmers
opposed it because it threatened their supply of cheap black
labor.
158Gray, pp. 209-314.
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3 .4. 1960-1962:

A Government in Crisis

By the early 1960s government reform efforts had been
in operation for more than 15 years.

These efforts, as shown,

encompassed a wide range of measures, extending the government's interventionist capacity and aims.

The results of this

intervention were, however, mixed.
The most promising development was the diversification
of the Zimbabwean economy.

A manufacturing industry developed

from a 5.8 percent share of the value of Gross Domestic
Product in 1960 to a 16.9 percent share in 1960.

Manufactur-

ing was still surpassed, however, by the share (in terms of
value) of agriculture (18.8 percent) mining (6.7 percent),
construction (7.3 percent), electricity and water (3.3 percent), and commercial and service industries like hotels and
restaurants (47.9 percent) accounted for the remaining
shares of the GDP value.

159

Yet the economy continued to be vulnerable.

One vul-

nerability was its reliance on exports of a few primary
products to the world market.

The mining industry was

virtually excluded from modernizing efforts and its contribution to the national income declined from about ten percent
in the early 1950s to approximately five percent in the early
1960s.

Part of this decline can be attributed to the inabil-

ity to increase output, which was hampered by obsolete
159
Nelson, pp. 250-251.
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equipment and the limited amount of foreign capital available.
Thoroughly geared to the world market prices, Zimbabwean gold
miners saw the price of gold remain stable in relation to
production costs.

Lacking profits from gold sales, the govern-

ment encouraged the increased exploitation of low value
minerals like asbestos, copper, coal and chrome, but these
minerals could neither be mined nor exported in bulk.

The

result was that the mining industry came to be dominated by
a few large foreign-owned companies, smallworking miners
were eliminated, and there was an increasing interest in the
bulk production and export of low-grade and low-value minerals.

This mining inclination was facilitated by improving
rail access to South African and Mozambican ports. 160
The manufacturing industry itself was also vulnerable.
The Zimbabwean market remained small and was only slightly
and temporarily enlarged by the creation of the CAF.

Domes-

tic consumers consisted of a small number of whites with
sophisticated buying habits and substantial buying power, and
a large number of blacks with limited buying power, and demands
for low-quality consumer goods.

For a period after the Second

World War domestic manufacturing opportunities were created
by the post-war difficulties of foreign and especially
EuroPean manufacturers.

As the export capabilities of the

European manufacturers increased while the buying power of
160
Ibid., pp. 309-310 and Arrighi, "Political Economy
of Rhodesia," p. 354.
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the blacks did not (i.e. there failed to develop
middle class),

161

a black

the Zimbabwean manufacturers faced chal-

lenge from imports of high quality goods.

The result was

that the Zimbabwean manufacturing industry by 1960 was geared
to the production of a limited range of low quality consumer
goods.

162
The afrility to import high-quality consumer goods and

industrial equipment depended on the ability of agricultural
and mining exports to earn foreign exchange.

Both were sub-

ject, however, to fluctuations in the world market.

Although

some agricultural diversification did occur, tobacco remained
the main crop and the chief earner of foreign exchange.
Efforts to increase the productive capacities of black farmers were perhaps the most dismal failure.

While capital

investments in black agriculture increased, efforts were
plagued by shallow reasoning, administrative overextension,
local black opposition, population pressure and resulting
soil depletion.

The contribution of black agriculture to the

GDP indeed declined:

in 1954 it contributed an 8.7 percent

share, declining by 1958 to 6.7 percent, and by 1964 even
f urther to 6.4 percent. 163

161
Black buying power declined in the 1945-1965 period.
See Arrighi, "Labor Supplies" pp. 215-217.
162

Nelson, pp •. 312-315.

163w e1.nr1.c
.
. h , p. 23.
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The government itself was also vulnerable, for it had failed
to create, enfranchise and attract the support of a black
middle class.

Political support was still confined to whites

but, among them, a rural-based opposition was generated by
the government's reform efforts.

A rural-based black opposi-

tion also existed in response to the government's reforms.
3.4.1· Foreign Pressure
The dissolution of the CAF brought renewed foreign
economic and especially political pressure on the Zimbabwean
government.

The breakup of the CAF, as stated before, was

due to the conflicting political forces it contained, and its
dissolution would have economic and political consequences
for Zimbabwe in particular.

With regard to the political

consequences, the breakup of the CAF implied --for the first
time in Zimbabwean history since the early settlement--the
existence of Zimbabwe as an independent or autonomous political
unit.

The achievement of such a status, according to British

policy, would require some race-related political changes
within Zimbabwe.

With regard to economic consequences, the

dissolution of the CAF would deprive the Zimbabwean economy
in general of economic benefits and, in particular, create
economic difficulties for the Zimbabwean government.

It was

the government's response to these pressures that led to the
Rhodesian Front's electoral victory in 1962.

150

The Zimbabwean government's policy towards blacks was
challenged by the British government in two major respects.
First, the British government stated that the post-CAF
territorial constitution of Zimbabwe should contain a commitment to improvements in the political and socio-economic conditions of blacks.

This was not a demand for a black-dominated

government, which would require the total reconstitution of
the government of Zimbabwe, nor was there a demand that such
a black-dominated government should precede the granting of
independence.

The British government simply wished to extract

a public commitment from the existing government to increase
the opportunities for black political participation and improve the material conditions of blacks.

Second, the

1

British government demanded that the constitutional expression of such a commitment should, like the constitution itself,
be supported by the majority of Zimbabweans (i.e. not only
the voters and especially not only the voting blacks). 164
The Zimbabwean government's response to these pressures constituted a break with past race-related·policy. 165
164
James Barber, pp. 20-90 and Bowman, pp. 37-43.
165
James Barber, p. 89 states:
For the first time black and white had negotiated together
about the future of their country. For the first time
there was a clear acceptance that Africans would sit in
the Legislative Assembl·y. For the first time the franchise was entrenched in the Constitution. For the first
time there was a legal acknowledgement that all races
should enjoy individual equal rights.
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At the constitutional conference to develop the new constitution, the UFP (representing the Zimbabwean government) expressed its broad agreement with British policy that blacks
should play a more important role in Zimbabwean affairs.
The proposed constitution consequently contained a declaration of rights, as well as a constitutional council to review
future legislation for violation of these rights.

As far

as the franchise is concerned, it introduced an A-roll of
voters with high qualifications who elected 50 members of
the parliament, and a B-roll of voters with lower qualifications who would elect 15 members.

In exchange, the British

.
governmen t wou ld cease t o exerc1se
1. t s reserve powers. 166
There was some white criticism of the proposed 1961
constitution from all sides of the political spectrum.

The

'Dominion Party led by Winston Field argued that it was a "sellout" to black interests.

v

Ian Smith resigned from the UFP

because of the introduction of a "racist" franchise and
opposed the UFP as an independent member of parliament.
Others, like Garfield Todd, argued that restrictions on black
Political activity were still too high.
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Yet in a referen-

dum on the constitution 41,949 voted affirmatively and only
21,846 against its implementation.

White electoral opposi-

tion was clearly weak, leading some observers to remark
166

Palley, pp. 413-628 contains a full discussion of
the 1961-constitution.
167
James Barber, pp. 89-103.
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that the UFP would face no white opposition in the next

.
168
elect1ons.
Despite its apparent success with the white electorate,
the new constitution met with strong black opposition.

At

the constitutional conference blacks were represented by the
{National Democratic Party of Joshua Nkomo, who initially
endorsed the·new constitution and, to express its disapproval,
boycotted the constitutional referendum.

This set the seal

of failure on the government's "middle class"-policy, for
blacks were also to oppose and boycott later elections.
Anticipating no significant white opposition, the
government made a more determined attempt to attract the
black support the British government demanded for the
acceptance of the 1961 constitution and the achievement of
independence.

Foreign economic pressure was now coupled with

political pressure.

The CAF was being dismantled - it was

\officially dissolved in December 1962 - and this would again
restrict the market for Zimbabwean goods and, in particular,
deprive the Zimbabwean government of the disproportionate
share of public revenues it received from the CAF.

Public

debt in Zimbabwe indeed rose significantly during the 1960169
1965 period, amounting to US $416 million in 1965.
The
dire economic consequences anticipated from the breakup

168

Ibid., p. 148.

169
Nelson, pp. 260-261.
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of the CAF coincided with government reports of the steadily
diminishing capacities of black farmers.
To satisfy British demands for black support and to
counter the present and expected economic difficulties, the
UFP set out to demonstrate its commitment to black socioeconomic and political advancement.

It endorsed the aboli-

f tion of racial discrimination, refashioned its administra•·
tive machinery for black affairs, and campaigned for the
direct representation of blacks in the Legislative Assembly.
Appearing at a United Nations conference in October 1961,
Whitehead even claimed that the 1961 constitution and government action would result in black majority rule within 15
years.

Finally, at its Congress in November 1962 the UFP

announced its intention to abolish the Land Apportionment
Act of 1931.

In future the only reserved land, it proposed,

would be black reserves and national land.

Reserve land

for whites, in other words, would be abolished. 170

k

The UFP (the Zimbabwean government) entered the 1962
elections with a commitment to the 1961 constitution and an
intent to abolish the Land Apportionment Act of 1931.

Of

these two commitments, the latter was by far the most radical.
As observers point out, the race-related changes of the 1961
constitution contained several loopholes, leading to the conclusion that black advancement was still not guaranteed but
170
The campaign to attract black support was known as
the "Build-A-Nation-Campaign." See James Barber, pp. 112-146.
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would proceed at the discretion of whites.

171

The repeal of

the Land Apportionment Act, however, would transform Zimbab' wean society.
following:

This transformation could have included the

white farmers would have no guaranteed access to

the best farmland, white farmers would have no guaranteed
access to black labor supplies, black farmers could become
economic competitors, and white urban wage-workers would
face economic competition from blacks from the reserves and
, urban blacks released from the restrictions of racial job
restrictions.
lie employment.

The latter would include competition for pubThus urban but especially rural Zimbabwe

would be transformed.
Given these prospects, the white opposition underwent
a rapid recuperation.

In March 1962 the Rhodesian Front was

created and by December 1962 developed a potent nation-wide,
172
mass-based party organization.
Scholars agree that the
RF's political support base consisted almost entirely of
rural whites and urban wage-workers before 1962 and, even
. t e d th e par t y organ1za
. t"1on. 173
aft er 1962 rura 1 dwe 11 ers d om1na
By contrast the UFP lacked a strong party organization to
extend its support base beyond senior bureaucrats and
171
172

Bowman, p. 40 and Palley, pp. 564-628.
Bowman, pp. 92-97.

173
on the RF's base of political support, see Ibid.,
pp. 97-105; Nelson, pp. 168-170; and Arrighi, "Political
Economy of Rhodesia," pp. 364-367.

155
self-employed manufacturers.

174

In the 1962 elections the

UFP, with its radical reform program and narrow political base
base, was defeated by the RF ·which, equally, had a racially
restricted support base but a reactionary political program.
As the preceding discussion shows, the rFP-government
(the "Establishment" or executive-bureaucratic alliance)
encountered increasing foreign economic and political pressure during the 1960-1962 period.

Its response to these

pressures, coupled with the apparent demise of the ruralbased opposition, led to the radicalization of its reform
program.

Although legitimate doubt can be cast on the

sincerity or genuineness of some political reforms, the proposed repeal of the Land Apportionment Act and its implications resurrected the rural-based white opposition.

Faced

with a black boycott and diminishing white support, the
government's reform program and its mode of governing was
defeated.

f

3.4.2. 1962-1965:

Rhodesian Front Government

The RF after 1962 changed the mode of governing in
Zimbabwe, suspended the reform program, and sought to win
independence from Britain, even by means of a unilateral
declaration of independence--all on the basis of a parliamentary majority that initially consisted of only six seats.
174

Bowman, pp. 33-37 and James Barber, pp. 154-168.
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With regard to the mode of governing, the RF introduced
party government into white Zimbabwean politics.

At the low-

est level of its party organization members belonged to·party
branches headed by committees with non-parliamentary leaders.
These branches were the focal points of RF-activity, for they
financed their own activities, acted as a sounding board
for local grievances and kept their own membership lists.
Most importantly, local branch leaders had access to national
party committees.

At the national level this populist, non-

parliamentary impetus was somewhat balanced.

There was a

national congress of ten parliamentary members and nominated
branch delegates who met annually and had the power to effect
organizational changes and to develop party principles (which
served as the guidelines for government policy).

The congress

appointed a national executive, again only partly composed
of members of parliament (ten).

Five office-holders and 50

representatives from A-roll constituencies accounted for the
remainder of the executive.

There were also other national

committees, like the National Standing Committee (a practical
version of the executive), a Party Finance Committee, a
secretariat and several other subcommittees.

175

With this party-organization as the backbone of the
RF's parliamentary majority, the RF moved to impose legislative control over the Zimbabwean public service.
175
Bowman, pp. 92-97.

The
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legislature appointed select committees to investigate the
public service, whose reports were largely critical of

·
· · 1 servan t s. l 76
"corrupt " sen1or
c1v1

To ensure RF -con t ro. 1 ,

the party placed its own supporters on the Public Service
Board, which oversaw public service appointments and promotions.

The RF also moved to sever the public service's ties

to organized.interest groups.

This not only included

. 1nteres
.
t groups, 1 1. k e m1n1ng
. .
. t eres t s, 177 b u t a 1 so
econom1c
1n
rural groups like the Rhodesia Farmers Union.

The RFU

henceforth existed solely as a commodity co-ordinating
b 0 d y.

178

The RF clearly was opposed to a bureaucracy with

independent sources of political power.
The other source of reform, an independent executive,
was also brought under party-discipline.

The leader of the

RF was made directly responsible to the party-executive and
indirectly to the party-congress, where non-members of parliament held majorities.

These restrictions on the political

initiative of the prime minister were.evident in the ouster
of Winston Field and in the later criticism of Smith.

Thus

176

see the Legislative Estimates Committee (Sub-Committee on the Public Service), Evidence and Proceedings,
September to October 1964 (Salisbury: Government Printer, 1964)
and the Legislative Assembly, The Third Report of the Estimates
Committee (Salisbury: Government Printer, 1964).

177see the First and Second Reports
of the eelect Committee on the Mining Industry (Salisbury: Government Printer,
1963 and 1964).
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political decision-making came to be located, not so much
in the parliamentary caucus, but in the "closed confines of
the Rhodesian Front."

179

Finally, the RF extended its reach

into local, rural politics by introducing partisan political
.
t o t h e 1 oca 1 an d mun1c1pa
. . 1 1 eve
. 1 s. 180
activ1ty

With regard to public policy, the RF was a staunch /
defender of .the preservation of the Land Apportionment Act
of 1931.

Yet it abandoned its campaign opposition to the 1961

constitution.

In its negotiations with the British govern-

ment on independence it indeed claimed independence on the
basis of the 1961 constitution but, like its predecessor, was
rebuffed because it lacked the support of the majority of
Zimbabweans.

Unlike the UFP who sought to secure that sup-

port by a "middle class"-strategy, the RF then sought the
vsupport of traditional black leaders whom they regarded as
the representatives of all blacks - part of a pastoral and
conservationist view of rural society once more in vogue.
When the support of these leaders was rejected, the RF prepared for UDI.

Despite opposition from manufacturing and

industrial interests on the grounds that UDI would have

178
109.

Murray, pp. 365-367 and Bowman, pp. 67-69 and 105-

179
Bowman, p. 109.
180

See also pp. 67-69 and 105-109.

Murray, pp. 361-367.
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severe adverse economic effects
and even a lack of unani182
mitY within the cabinet,
UDI was officially announced in
Nc,vember 1965.
Except for the continued commitment to achieving independence (though by radical means), the RF thus fundamentally
altered the mode of governing and the public policy directions
in Zimbabwe.
~to

These reversals were not accompanied by attempts

broaden the RF-support base beyond whites.

For political

support it relied on a highly disciplined party-organization_
open to populist influences; when it dealt with the blacks,
it was through the traditional leaders in rural areas.
4.

Summary and Conclusion
As the preceding discussion illustrates, the composi-

tion of the population in Zimbabwe is largely the result of
the dynamics of South African society.

South Africa housed

the Zulu Empire, from which a breakaway faction (the Matabele)
arrived in Zimbabwe and conquered the original black population (the Mashona).

Later the discovery of gold and the

181 Bowman notes that these reports were not requested
by the government and were "virtually forced upon it by concerned business groups." (p. 181). Only the report of the
group representing office workers was supportive of UDI. The
reports of the Rhodesia Tobacco Association, the Rhodesia
Institute of Directors, the Associated Chamber of Commerce
of Rhodesia and the Association of Rhodesian Industries all
expected UDI to have adverse economic consequences. See Bowman, p. 79. See also the Economic Aspects of a Declaration
of Independence (Salisbury: Government Printing Office, 1965)
by the Office of Prime Minister Smith.
182Bowman, p. 89.
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resulting gold boom in South Africa inspired hopes of similar
wealth in Zimbabwe, leading to the arrival of whites and their
conquest of both the Mashona and Matabele.

Despite their

links to South Africa, Zimbabwean whites consistently opposed
the establishment of close political ties with South Africa,
preferring to maintain close links with the British imperial
presence in southern Africa.

Thus they first chose qualified

self-government with links to Britain, as opposed to incorporation with South Africa, and later chose to establish political
and economic links with northern territories in the Central
African Federation.
Politics in pre-1965 Zimbabwe was almost exclusively
the preserve of whites.

Yet the whites did not form a mono-

lithic mass, nor was there a vigorous tradition of popular
control over public affairs.

Politics and public policy-

making in particular was characterized by the dominance of
the executive (especially the chief executive or prime minister) and the public bureaucracy, and the weakness of political
parties and the legislature.

The

p~blic

bureaucracy indeed

developed into a powerful political actor with an interventionist posture even before the

~econd

World

w~r.

With the

prime minister, it madeand executed public policy in Zimbabwe
and this public policy reflected the influence of white farmers and mining interests, as well as Zimbabwe's cooperation
With British aims in southern Africa.

The political leverage

of white farmers and mining interests was largely a reflection

16 1

of Zimbabwean society prior to the Second World War, while
the imperial leverage was a result of Zimbabwean whites'
agreement with British aims in southern Africa.
Apart from the Zimbabwean government's obviously
narrow support base, it was also economically vulnerable.
The gold boom had failed to materialize, as did economic
benefits of gold's replacement, namely agriculture.

With

its reliance on the export of a few primary products (gold,
tobacco and maize) arid the absence of secondary industries,
the pre-1945 Zimbabwean economy resembled that of a colonial
economy of the export-type.
- During and after the Second World War Zimbabwe experienced strong pressure from the world market economy and
political pressure from the British government to implement
racial reform.

The political pressure was quickly diluted

and disappeared, but economic pressure was sustained.

Given

its powerful bureaucracy and its interventionist posture,
the Zimbabwean government introduced and maintained economic
modernization policies during the post-war era, particularly
with regard to agriculture and the development of manufacturing industries in Zimbabwe.

Although the government main-

tained its commitment to modernization, the results of its
Policies, by 1960, were mixed.

Some economic diversifica-

tion did occur, but each of the economic sectors were still
vulnerable.

With regard to agriculture, the productive

capacities of black farmers were steadily diminishing,
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reflecting political opposition to the government's reforms
as well as questionable economic reasoning in effecting the
desired capitalist breakthrough in black agriculture.

While

white agriculture did increase its output in volume, the
value of this output was largely determined by world market
conditions, but as world market prices for tobacco rose,
white agriculture became thoroughly geared to the export
market.

With regard to manufacturing, its contribution to

the GDP increased, but it concentrated on the production of
a limited range of low quality goods (for the black market)
and still faced competition from high quality imports.
The Zimbabwean government's reforms generated considerable political opposition from both blacks and whites.
This opposition emanated primarily from the rural areas where
reforms threatened black rural custom, structures and authority
and threatened white farmers' supply of black labor.

For the

government, the loss of white support was more important in an
immediate political sense and it attempted to adjust by
adopting an inter-racial electoral strategy.

This, however,

met with black disinterest and opposition- with the result
that the government's support base remained narrow.
The breakup of the CAF brought renewed pressure from
foreign sources.

In contrast with the foreign pressure of

the Second World ~ar and its aftermath (which was primarily
economic), the foreign pressure of the 1960-1962 period
was primarily political.

The form of this pressure came in
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British demands for political reforms in the development of
a post-CAF constitution for Zimbabwe, as well as demands for
political reforms for the achievement of independence •. Under
these pressures the Zimbabwean government's reform program
radicalized, moving from some formal increases in black
political participation to the proposed repeal of the Land
Apportionment Act and the abolition of guaranteed white access
to farmland.
Faced with the prospect of a rural economic and political transformation in Zimbabwe, the rural based opposition
grew rapidly.

As a proportion of the electorate, white far-

mers alone could not defeat the government, but opponents
of the government developed a potent party-organization that
could incorporate other opponents like urban wage workers.
This party organization not only defeated the UFP, it transformed white politics in Zimbabwe by fundamentally altering
the mode of government, the direction of public policies,
and the way by which independence could be achieved.
As the preceding discussion indicates, the historical
development of white politics, including the events leading up to the declaration of UDI, was not simply animated
by a fear of the black threat or racism.

The historical

development indeed shows that the Zimbabwean government as
an executive-bureaucratic alliance first attempted economic
reforms and only then attempted political reforms.

These

164

reforms were not prompted by domestic pressure, but by
foreign pressure, and were to be defeated by a rural based
opposition who felt threatened by those reforms.

Black.

political activity did exist; its nature and possible threat
to the government is the subject of the next chapter.

CHAPTER III
BLACK ZIMBABWE 1888 - 1962:
THE CONDITIONS OF POLITICAL ACTION
This chapter examines black political action in Zimbabwe between 1888 and 1962.

This period is divided into

three periods, namely the 1888-1900 period which witnessed
black resistance to the imposition of white rule; the 19001945 period; and the post-1945 period which culminated in
the emergence of the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU)
and the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) before UDI.
In each of these periods discussion is focused on (a) the
organizational attributes of black political action,
especially the emergence of an elite that seeks to ally itself with or encourage mass political action; and (b) the
general conditions under which political action took place,
particularly the conditions that prevailed when ZAPU and
ZANU emerged.
Before turning to the discussion, one point needs to
be clarified.

The question why black Zimbabweans after 1888

felt themselves unfairly or unjustly treated, either as
individuals or collectively, plays a minor part in the following discussion.

Since successive Zimbabwean regimes after

1888 were expressly and implicitly committed to racial, political and other forms of inequality, they inevitably created

165

166
reinforcing layers of hardship, deprivation and subservience for black Zimbabweans.

Much of the existing literature

on Zimbabwe deals with these questions, often stressing the
point that the blacks' experience of land shortage, racial
discrimination, wage gaps, and socio-economic cleavages
between blacks and whites eventually led to political anger
and violence.

1

On the basis of the above, blacks' perception

of their subservient position and political anger is thus presumed.

The focus of this chapter, rather, is on the nature

of black collective action and is therefore unconcerned with
socio-economic, cultural and political structures except insofar as they affect the likelihood and nature of black collective action.
1.1. 1888-1900:

White Arrival and Black Response

At the time of the white arrival, the number of blacks
in Zimbabwe was conservatively estimated at 500,000,

2

most

of whom were incorporated in the Mashona and Matabele political orders.

Although the Matabele king Lobengula had by

this time signed the Rudd Concession, which was interpreted
to open Matabeleland to whites, Rhodes' party entered Mashonaland, where the supposed mineral wealth of Zimbabwe lay.
1

.
See, for example, Reginald Austin, Racism and Apartheiu
1n Southern Africa: Rhodesia (Paris: UNESCO Press, 1965);
Eshamel Mlambo, Rhodesia: TheStrugg1e for a Birthright (London: C. Hurst, 1972); and Montague Yudelman, Africans on
the Land (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964).

2Nelson, p. 40.
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The Mashona political order of the 1890s had long
outlivec its glorious days.

The Mashona were now a predomi-

nantly agricultural people who were required to pay tribute to the Matabele king but

since the late 1880s the

Mashona acquired firearms and a number of chiefs of the northeastern areas entered into alliances with the neighbouring
Portuguese in order to resist Matabele power.

However, the

Mashona lacked a central political authority; they lived in
small chiefdoms scattered mainly in the hilly northern and
eastern areas and this political-geographical independence of
groups resulted in intra-Mashona rivalries.

While there was

a degree of unity on account of linguistic and religious
similarities, the lack of political cohesion made the Mashona
vulnerable to attacks by the Matabele and the whites (such
as the Portuguese warlords or prazeros and South Africans).
Indeed, the location of Mashona settlements, in high, rugged
areas, suggests a desire to offset the vulnerability created
by the absence of political unity.

3

By contrast, the Matabele order was smaller but highly
centralized.

Geographically all the major centers of the

Matabele were situated within approximately 60 miles from
Bulawayo, which was the seat of the royal house.

The Mata-

+ bele king ruled as an absolute monarch, advised by a council
3

Robin H. Palmer, "War and Land", p. 86.
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of elders, and dependent on military figures (commanders
and chiefs) to carry out his wishes.

Less important or

menial duties were performed by former captives who swore
allegiance to the king.
rigid
~butive

In effect the Matabele order was a

political and social hierarchy.

The king's distri-

power over cattle and other goods was the key to his

absolutism, and warriors of the military regiments would
establish their claims to cattle and other rewards by their
warmaking skills.

Thus cattle was a measure of social and~

political power, wealth and prestige, and warmaking the
major means of acquiring cattle, as was reflected in the size
of the Matabele army in 1890 (16,000 men),

4

the size of the

cattle herd (250,000) and the location of Matabele settlements on the disease-free highveld of Zimbabwe.

5

Prior to 1888, European contact with both the Mashona
and Matabele was limited.

The Matabele allowed few intru-

sions by traders and missionaries in their own society and
also limited the contact of these individuals with the Mashona
as a device to keep them

isolated.

6

The arrival of Rhodes'

4

Lewis H. Gann and Thomas H. Henrikson,The Struggle for
Zimbabwe (New York: Praeger, 1981), p. 4.
5
6

Palmer, "War and Land", p. 87.

Restrictions on missionary activity by the Matabele,
such as their banishment from Mashonaland and the exile of
Matabele (from Bulawayo) who took an interest in missionary
activity, is often taken as the cause of the missionaries'
ambiguous advice to Lobengula in his dealings with whites.
See Nelson, pp. 16-17.
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Pioneer Column in Salisbury met with little resistance from
,the Mashona.

This apparent acceptance of white rule has been

explained in two ways.

The first of these is that, while

the 200 men of the Pioneer Column were entitled to land (farms
of 3,175 acres), few actually claimed farms as they preferred
to search for minerals.

By October 1892 only 300 farms in

the area were occupied and even these did not result in the
displacement of the Mashona who lived on them.

Since the

Mashona's "immediate tenure was very largely undisturbed",
they thus accepted the whites.

7

The second explanation is

that the Mashona were disturbed by land seizures, but that
their decentralized political structures and their geographic
dispersal prevented a quick and unified response.

8

Moreover,

white interest in Mashonaland waned as the promise of the
mineral wealth remained unfulfilled and as white farmers encountered cultivating difficulties with the shallow and sandy
soil of the area.

White interest thus shifted to Matabeleland.

1.1. The Matabele Uprising of 1893
During 1892 relations between the BSAC and the Matabele deteriorated, not because the whites intruded on Matabele
land but because Matabele raiding parties disrupted mining
4

· operations in Mashonaland.

An incident at Fort Victoria in

7 Palmer, "War and Land", pp. 90-91.
8

Loney, p. 39.
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JulY 1893 prompted the BSAC to send a delegation to Lobengula,
but they were shot and the BSAC wanted to punish the Matabele.

The whites of Fort Victoria, however, refused to. take

up arms for the BSAC and their cooperation could only be gained
by the Victoria agreement of August 1893, which entitled
those who fought for the BSAC to a farm in Matabeleland and
a share of the cattle captured.

With the additional help of

500 British volunteer troops, the BSAC invaded Matabeleland
when Lobengula declared war and, within a month, scored an
easy victory over Lobengula's forces.

9

This easy victory is

usually attributed to the BSAC's superior military technology
an d th e

II

. bl y
a b om1na

b a d 1 ' Ma t a b e 1 e genera 1 s h.1p. lO

to the 670 men of the BSAC, all of whom

As compare d

were armed and most

(400) mounted, the Vatabele army of 16,000 was largely unmounted and armed with spears.

Instead of opting for a war of

attrition against the advancing BSAC columns, the Matabele
generals chose to fight set battles and were decisively
defeated.

11

The war of 1893 had calamitous consequences for the
Matabele.

The most immediate of these was the crisis in

political authority as Lobengula died in retreat and the Matabele could·not agree on his successor.
9

1

Eventually the void

Nelson, p. 20.

°Frederick Selous as quoted by Gann and Henrikson, p. 5.

11

Ibid.' pp. 2-6
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was filled by the Matabele high priest Umlugulu but, since
his power did not include the right to allocate cattle, his
position was more tenuous.

The political, social and

economic order was also altered by the loss of four-fifths of
the cattle herd by way of war booty and an outbreak of cattle
disease.

12

Furthermore, the shaken Matabele order was still

subject to punitive actions by the BSAC's military police.
In 1894 the BSAC replaced rule by its military police with a
regular system of administration by way of the Southern
Rhodesia Native Department

13

which, in the first years of its

existence, was kept busy by the changes wrought by the arrival
of the whites.

In Matabeleland

the Native Commissioners

"were kept busy registering, branding and distributing cattle", while the Mashonaland commissioners were preoccupied
14
with the collection of the newly-instituted hut tax.
In addition, the Native Commissioners were kept busy
with the resettlement of blacks in reserves.

As argued before,

the creation of reserves (or land apportionment) was a defensive measure, designed to guarantee blacks a minimum of land
against white encroachments.

12Terence 0.
97, pp. 105-116.

Fange~

In the area around Bulawayo

Revolt in Southern Rhodesia 1896-

13Palley, pp. 138-141.
14

Ibl.·d., Ranger, p. 116 •
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more than 900 farm grants had been given by 1894, and a Land
commission was appointed to settle matters.

The result was

the creation of the Gwai and Shangani reserves.

In Mashona-

land the whites also claimed land around major centers, like
Salisbury, Umtali, Fort Victoria and ME,•lsetter, but as yet no
reserves were created.

Much of the initial effect of land

alienation was cushioned by the fact that, although many
whites claimed land, few farms were immediately pegged out
or occupied.

Most blacks in Mashona and W.atabeleland were

thus not immediately displaced, nor were they forced into
the reserves; white farmers needed the labor of blacks in
close proximity and the mining operations also required labor
and the food produced by black farmers.

15

Yet the manner in which the reserves were allocated
boded ill for their long-term consequences.

One problem was

the ignorance of desirable population-soil ratios.

The Native

Commissioners could not accurately assess the size of the
black population, did not conduct thorough examinations of
the ecological conditions of land allocated to blacks, and
knew little about black methods of cultivation or how they
were suited to the soil in the reserves.

Another problem

was the introduction of wage labor to meet the demands of
miners and farmers.

Although this was also to have far-

reaching consequences, its immediate impact was also

15Palmer,"War and Land", pp 91-92.
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cushioned as black participation in the labor market was of a
"discretionary" nature, i.e. it was not essential to the sub16
sistence needs of the black population.
Indeed, blacks
initially played an important role not as laborers but as
producers of agricultural goods sold on the small, local
cash markets created by white settlements.

17

The Mashona and Matabele orders thus changed under the
impact of the white arrival.

Most changes took place in the

Matabele order, especially those that were due to the 1893 war;
by comparison, Mashona life was largely undisturbed and they
were inhibited by their political and geographic structures
from rising up against the whites.

When the Matabeles

launched a second attack on the white settlers, however, they
were joined by the Mashona.
1.2. The Chimurenga
In March

18

of 1896-1897

1896 the Matabele army started a march toward

Bulawayo and, after killing most of the whites in Matabeleland on the way, besieged the town by mid-April.
of June the Mashona joined the uprising.

By the end

The whites responded

by scoring a number of victories over the Matabele, whereupon
16

Arrighi, "Labour Supplies", pp. 191-193.

17
There is some disagreement over blacks' familiarity
With market opportunities, but there is general agreement
that blacks were initially successful participants in the
cash market.
See Ibid., pp. 183-198; Kosmin, pp. 268-288;
and Phimister, pp. 255-267.
18 chimurenga means uprising.
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theY concluded a peace treaty with senior Matabele chiefs.
Mashona resistance continued, though they were forced to
retreat to the caves in the eastern mountain regions and their
19
resistance also eventually disintegrated.
The causes and organizational form of the uprisings of
~896-1897

are a subject of considerable scholarly dispute.

With regard to its causes, Ranger, after reviewing the pressures unleashed by the white arrival, argues that the causes
of the uprising "can hardly seem much of a mystery." 20 Both
Mashona and Matabele suffered l.,and_alJen::tJ;ion,

tl:.l~ir

self-

esteem collapsed, they were disarmed and forced to work, and
.their cattle were seized. 21 While Ranger's broad correlation
between pressures caused by the white arrival and the uprisings has remained essentially unchallenged, the crucial correlation between land seizures and resistance has been
questioned.

According to Palmer:

no direct correlation can be drawn between the extent of
land alienated and the outbreak of resistance in 1896,
since some paramounts who had suffered great loss of land
did not join the rising, while others who had lost no
land came out in revolt. In Melsetter, surprisingly,
there was no rising; in Fc•rt Victoria Chiefs Zimuto and
Chikwanda, whose lands had been alienated, did not rise;
19The most extensive accounts of the risings can be
found in Ranger, RE~olt in Southern Rhodesia 1896-1897,
pp. 127-310.
20 Ibid., p. 132.
21 Ibid., p. 141.
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while at Enkeldoorn Chief Chirumanzu, who bad lost land,
stayed out, and Chief Mutekedza, who bad not, became a
leading "rebel"22
Instead of land grievances, Palmer suggests that more potent
pressures to resist were supplied by the .tlJlt.

_t_a~,

forced

labor, indiscriminate floggings of employees by employers,
the general ill-treatment of the W.atabele as a conquered
people, and -the brutality of the military police.

Moreover,

the opportunity for the uprising was provided by the lessening of repressive forces; most of the military police left
Zimbabwe towards the end of 1895 to participate in the
Jameson Raid aimed at toppling the Kruger regime in the
Transvaa1.

23

With regard to the organization of the uprising, Ranger
argues that the leadership element was provided by religious
vfigures, particularly the Mwari cult and spirit mediums, and
since religious influences cut across tribal lines

the

religious figures created unity and a combination of forces
between the Mashona and Matabele.

As mass, supra-tribal

action, the risings are thus the precursors of modern
1·1sm 1n
·
.
na t 1ona

z·1mb a b we. 24

Ranger • s 1n
· t erpre t a t·1on h as b een

22

Palmer "War and Land", p. 92. See also David N.
Beach, "'Cbimurenga' The Sbona Rising of 1896-1897", The
Journal of African History 20 (1970): 395-420.
23

Tbe military police bad a black component who "paid
off a number of old scores." Palmer,"War and Land", pp. 92-93.
24
345-386.

Ranger, Revolt in Southern Rhodesia 1896-1897, pp.

176

challenged by other scholars.

A study by Beach on colla-

boration showed that not all blacks resisted; in fact,
blacks who cooperated with the whites played a crucial role
in the defeat of the risings, as well as in the early
development of Zimbabwe.

25

More recently a study by Cobbing

argues that there is no evidence of supra-tribal organization, nor evidence that the Mwari cult had planned and coordinated the risings.

Rather, the scale, organization and
26
leadership of the risings were subject to local factors.
While there thus is agreement that the pressures

generated by the white arrival were the causes of the uprisings, there is little agreement as to who participated in
them (and why), how widespread they were or by whom they
were led·

Ranger's argument that all blacks were involved

seems strained, while the view that local factors influenced
the actions of blacks and their leaders seem more persuasive.
A clear picture of the conditions conducive to collective
actions thus does not emerge.

It is nevertheless clear that

the scattered Mashona communities of Mashonaland were more
immune to BSAC's counteractions; as compared to the Matabele,
their

resistance could only be crushed by lengthy, difficult
25 Beach, passim.

26 Ibid. , and Julian Cobbing, "The Absent Priesthood:
Another Look at the Rhodesian Risings of 1896-1897'~ The Journal of African History 18 (1977), especially pp. 82-84.
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.

and bruta 1 counterac t 1ons.

27

As in the case of the 1893 war, the uprisings of

1896-1897 had several consequences for blacks.

Angered ·by

the role of BSAC officials in the Jameson Raid, the British
government took a more active interest in Zimbabwe, appointed
a permanent resident, reformed the public service, strengthened the Native Department, and kept the BSAC officials under
close rein.

Of particular importance, the British govern-

ment believed the uprisings to be connected to land grievances and therefore wished to have adequate

r~se!ves

created,

and to have blacks not living in them protected against local
whites.

With regard to blacks living on white land, a High

Commissioner's Proclamation No. 19 of 1896 required that
blacks enter into agreemepts with white farmers, fixing the
rents owed by the tenant farmers, and limiting the number of
tenants on a single farm.

These agreements were approved by

the Chief Native Commissioner, who was to arbitrate disputes.
After a two-year period, white farmers could thus demand
rent from blacks living on their property.

In Matabeleland

a large number of blacks lived on white farms, and by 1907
approximately 40,000 were required to enter into formal
agreements with their landlords and to pay a hut tax.

In

Mashonaland a much smaller number of blacks lived on white
27

.
The BSAC forces eventually dynamited the caves.
The leading Mashona spirit mediums were executed for their
role in the uprisings.
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farms and only about 750 were affected by the proclamation.
When agreements were made, they tended to be informal or
verbal.

Although there was a possibility that landlords

could violate these agreements, there was a strong incentive
not to do so, for the Mashona tenant farmers could retaliate
by moving to the larger and more accessible (because they
were scattered) reserves.

28

With regard to the reserves, their creation was now
more difficult than before.

There was still a desire to

guarantee blacks a certain amount of land, but the amount
of land available was lessened as a result of white influx,
there now was a strategic consideration of not concentrating
blacks in impregnable areas, nor could the reserves be in
areas where minerals had been found.
were also uncertain as to

wher~

Native Commissioners

blacks' traditional homes

were, as the uprisings and previous land alienation displaced blacks.

Bureaucratic factors added to the already

complex picture, for while white land assignment was the
responsibility of the Survey Department, black land assignments were handled by the Native Department.

In short, the

reserves were essentially an ad hoc arrangement made by local
officials under the direction of the British government, who
regarded them as a provisional measure subject to future
changes.
28

Yet, for reasons earlier discussed, the British
Palmer, "War and Land", pp. 96-97.
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government later accepted land apportionment in a somewhat
revised form as permanent.

In Matabeleland, most of the tra-

ditional areas of the Bulawayo region were now white farms,
while the reserves, constituting about 17 percent of the
Matabeleland area, were located in the arid regions to the
north and northwest of Bulawayo.

In Mashonaland, the reserves

were larger,.constituting 37 percent of the area, but the
29
quality of the land was in most cases also questionable.
The risings and their aftermath thus accentuated the
changes in the black orders:

The Fative Department adminis-

tered black affairs under a somewhat reformed system; the head
tax, previously imposed only in Mashonaland, was extended to
Matabeleland; the reserves, previously confined to Matabeleland,

became a reality in Mashonaland; and blacks living

outside the reserves on white land were now regarded as
tenant farmers and required to pay rent.

Together, these

factors strengthened the disruptions of the old black orders.
2.

1900-1945:

White Rule and Black Political Action

After 1897 neither the Mashona nor the Matabele made
.
. t.1ng wh.1 t e ru 1 e. 30
any co 11 ec t 1ve,
arme d a tt emp t s a t res1s
29 Ibid., pp. 97-102.
30There were acts of local defiance. In Mashonaland,
for example, Chief Mapondera refused to levy taxes and harrassed local officials. His resistance, like that of another
Mashona leader, Chief Kunzwi-Nyandoro, eventually declined.
Mtshali, pp. 77-78. Loney states that there were repeated
rumors of impending black revolt till after the First World
War. Loney, p. 91.
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Blacks were forced to accept the political reality of white
rule and, since they operated under progressively different
societal conditions, black political action changed in form.
With the increasing white land acquisition and the
weakening of tribal society, a movement developed among the
Matabele to create a national .homeland, to be governed by a
restored Matabele king.

This Matabele National Home Move-

ment31 was, for the most part, led by one of the pretenders
to the throne, Nyamanda, and focused most of its appeals on
the British monarchy, especially after the British Privy
Council began its hearings on the question of unalienated
land in Zimbabwe.

Nyamanda's claims were supported by the

Fingo community, a 8outh African group which had settled in
Zimbabwe in the 1890s and whose attempts at buying land were
frustrated.

The Fingoes enlisted the services of a

black~

South African lawyer and also gained the support of the
Ethiopian religious movement of southern African.

South

Africa's African National Congress also supported the land
claims of black Zimbabweans and expressed their concerns in
their petitions to British authorities.

32

South Africans,

however, were thereafter barred from any political activity
31

Also known as the Matabele Horne Society.

32There was considerable migration, particularly
among the southern Matabele, to and from South Africa.
In
South Africa Matabele activity for a while centered on the
Ndebele Rhodesia Society and the Rhodesia Native National
Congress. Nelson, pp. 24-25.
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in Zimbabwe.

Nyamanda then pressed for concerted but non-

violent action from Matabeles, but after the Privy Council
ruled that all unalienated land belonged to the Crown and
the coming of responsible government, the activities of the
Matabele Home Movement declined.

33

The political maneuvering surrounding the introduction
of responsible government in Zimbabwe gave rise to several
organizations seeking to advance black interests.

In 1911

a black named Chirimuhuta founded a Southern Rhodesian
Native Association to protest arbitrary behavior against
blacks, and in 1919 Jerry Sobantu organized an African Voters
League to unite black voters.

In 1923 a Rhodesia Bantu

Voters Association was created to offer white political
parties electoral support in exchange for legislation favoring black interests.

This RBVA drew its support mainly from

the Matabele, as did welfare associations like the Gwelo
Native

W~lfare

Association and the Southern Rhodesia Native

Welfare Association.

In Mashonaland a Rhodesia Native

Association was created in 1920, focusing its activities
on the rural areas.

There was also an attempt to create

an African National Congress of Southern Rhodesia in 1919,
but this was unsuccessful; an African National Congress of
Southern Rhodesia (initially called the Bantu Congress) was
33

Ibid., pp. 25-26 and Mtshali, pp. 80-82.

182
finally created in 1930 by Aaron Jacha.

34

The African National Congress (ANC) and the other
organizations mentioned above were the first black organizations that tried to enter electoral politics in Zimbabwe.
As such they were disinterested in the mass of black Zimbabweans who could not vote; they
tended to be run by and appeal to the new African elite
who were greatly concerned to gain from the whites social
recognition as "advanced natives" in contrast to the
"uneducated masses." The aims and attitudes of these
early associations clearly imply that they were resigned
to white rule and had committed themselves to mans
aspects of a new, European-modelled way of life.3
While some black leaders, like W.artha Ngano of the Rhodesia
Bantu Voters Association, made efforts to overcome the selfconscious elitism, organizations remained focused on the
emerging urban elite.

In addition, their activities were

primarily focused on the Matabele in general and the Bula-

. par t.1cu 1 ar. 36
wayo area 1n
In the urban areas black workers found a voice in the
Rhodesian Industrial and Commercial Workers Union (RICO).
Like many black organizations, RICO was founded by South
34

The dates of the creation of the ANC vary, but most
agree that it was towards the late 1920s as opposition to the
Land Apportionment Act.
35

J. van Velsen,"Trends in African Nationalism in
Southern Rhodesia", Kroniek van Afrika 4 (June 1964): 141.
36

Ibid. See also Terence 0. Range~The African Voice
in Southern Rhodesia, 1898-1930 (Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1970), pp. 64-137.

183
African activists and by 1929 had branches in Bulawayo and
Salisbury.

RICO's attempt to create an economically-based,

supra-tribal organization was disrupted by government repression, mainly by having its leaders imprisoned or South
African activists deported, and by 1939 this crippled the
organization.

RICO was nevertheless significant in that it

was the first black organization to seek mass support.

While

it did not engage in strikes, RICO abandoned the moralChristian appeals of the previous organizations and attacked
their elite, established churches and the missionaries for
collaboration with the white power structure.

In this regard

RICO and other union activity (like the railway union of
black employees) became an important training ground for
. . t s. 37
f u t ure ac t 1v1s
Black political activity in the rural areas often
focused on religious organizations.

Although the established

churches (Anglican, Methodist and Roman Catholic) did sometimes voice black grievances,

38

blacks were frustrated by

their sympathy with white political interests and therefore
sought refuge in religious cults (like the Mwari cult) or
joined independent African churches, all of which had a strong
37

Range~ The African Voice in Southern Rhodesia, 18981930, pp. 138-193.
38Missionary activity resorted under the authority of
the Southern Rhodesia Missionary Conference, created in 1906
by 15 church bodies.
It controlled the Southern Rhodesia
Missionary Conference of Christian Natives, established in
1928.
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millenarian appeal.

The Mwari cult, for example, advocated

food-hoarding as preparation for a cataclysmic
battle.

intra-wh~te

The first significant independent church to develop

was the Kitawala cult, led by Romo Nyirenda, who developed
a black version of the Watch Tower Bible and Tract Society
(the Jehovah's Witnesses).

When Nyirenda was executed in

Zimbabwe in 1926, the "halo of martyrdom increased the
39
cult's attractiveness to many Africans."
While it rarely
engaged in overt political activity, 40 the Kitawala cult
spread during the 1930s and they (like many other millenarian
movements such as the Zionist Church and the Vapostori Movement) were particularly influential in Mashonaland. 41
There were thus several types of black political
activity between 1900 and 1945.
observations can be made.

Of these organizations, two

First, only one organization (RICO)

managed to gener·a te a secular, mass appeal; the others were
more narrowly based on tribal, regional or self-conscious
39
Richard Gibson, African Liberation Movements (London:
Oxford University Press, 1972), p. 152.
400 ne excep t•1on was 1ts
.
role during a strike at the

Shamva mine in 1928. S~e Ranger, The African Voice in Southern Rhodesia 1898-1930, pp. 147-153.
41
For an account of the Mwari cult and the independent
African churches, see M.L. Daneel,The God of the Matopo Hills:
An Essay on the Mwari Cult in F.hodesia (The Hague: Mouton,
1972) and M. L. Daneel, Independent Churches in Rhodesia (The
Hague·: Mouton, 1970).
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class goals.

S~cond,

by 1945 most of the secular organiza-

tions were dormant, in contrast to the millenarian movements,
which flourished in the 1930s.

The limited nature of.the

secular organizations, especially when compared to the
vibrant South African organizations which often acted as
patrons of the Zimbabwean organizations, raises the question
concerning .the conditions under which they operated.
By 1945 the changes set in motion by the white
arrival had fundamentally altered black life.

First, the

process of land alienation and taxation continued.

With

regard to land alienation, the initial rather haphazard
creation of the reserves was legally entrenched by the 1920
British order-in-council, assigning black$ to live on about
25 percent of the total land.

Blacks could purchase land

outside the reserves (i.e. purchase unassigned Crown land)
but most were too poor to do so.
of the Morris

Later, after the findings

Carter Land Commission, a Land Apportionment

Act was passed which limited the land available to blacks
outside the reserves by creating the African Purchase Areas
of about 8 percent of the total land area.

42

This land

division remained in effect until 1969.
As stated before, the ecological quality of the land
assigned to blacks was in most cases questionable, although
42

Kay, Rhodesia:

A Human Geography, pp. 37-58.

186
the reserves of Mashonaland were larger and more scattered
than the small, consolidated reserves of Matabeleland.
Government policy in no way intended for these reserves to
be a basis for agricultural or any other development; they
were regarded as a refuge for blacks against white encroachments, but even this refuge was regarded as temporary.
Government policy was characterized by a doctrine of assimilation and progress:

blacks would become detribalized,

assimilate into the white work force, and therefore enter
into the spiral of socio-economic progress.

43

For this

reason there was initially no attempt to force blacks into
the reserves, although the government took a dim view of
blacks who lived outside of the reserves and did not work.
For these blacks, taxes were introduced as a work incentive.
The result of land alienation and taxation was a demographic
crisis.

After an initial period of black farming prosperity,

the combined effect of taxation and the limited productive
capacities of remote and generally infertile land forced
many blacks into wage labor on white farms and in urban
areas.

For those unwilling to enter wage labor the reserves

became the only and, in view of the population increase, the
increasingly impoverished refuge of blacks.
policy of "proletarianizing"
43
44

44

The government's

the blacks was thus achieved

Mason, pp. 255-294 and 313-315.

Black's delayed entry into wage labor (or "delayed
proletarianization") is best treated by Arrighi, "Labour
Supplies" pp. 183-222.
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at the cost of introducing a cycle of over-population and
under-production in the reserves.

There were still labor

shortages, forcing the government and employers to rely on
foreign migrant labor and labor regulation by the Rhodesian
Native Labour Bureau.

Matabeleland was most exposed to the

pressures of wage labor, since its economic order was
thoroughly disrupted by the risings of 1896-1897 and because
Bulawayo and its surrounding area developed faster as an
industrial and commercial center than Salisbury.

This pro-

duced relatively high wages as an attraction, which in turn
led to considerable labor migration among the southern
Matabele.

By comparison Mashonaland with its larger and

more fertile soil and the reserves' access to railways and
other market opportunities preserved, at least for a while,
the productive capacities of black farmers.

Hence their

entry into wage labor came later than the Matabele.

45

Second, the crisis in political authority continued.
As stated before, the death of Lobengula created a void in
Matabele political order and they were later incorporated
in the administration of the BSAC's Native Department.

In

1898 a Native Regulations Act was passed, which outlined
the reforms in the administration of blacks.

According to

this system, direct administration by white commissioners
45
228-230.

Palmer, "The Agricultural History of Rhodesia", pp.
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was made necessary by the "decaying force" of tribalism:

46

tribal customs would become progressively weaker as blacks
entered wage labor and as tribal organization was weakened
by the loss of land and cattle.

Therefore direct rule by

commissioners, who blended central bureaucratic rule with
local hierarchies and who exercised power in a paternal way,
was necessary.

By the early 1920s the overwhelming majority

of blacks (90 percent) fell under the authority of these
.
.
47
comm1ss1oners.
In the 1920s, however, the view that tribal life and
organizations was "beyond recall"

48

was reversed.

Following

testimony of the native commissioners before the Morris
Carter Land Commission, government policy switched to a view
which regarded the reserves as the permanent homes of blacks,
approved of tribal customs and tried to preserve it, and
restored the "authority" of the tribal chiefs.

49

Thus the

initial policy of assimilation was replaced by a pastoral
view of black rural society.

Black society as it existed

before the arrival of the whites was indeed still beyond
recall, but government policy simply "restored" it in the
46

Mason, pp. 313-315.

47 The commissioners were never a law unto themselves,
but they did exercise considerable bureaucratic autonomy.
Holleman, pp. 19-30.
48 Gray, pp. 31-38.
49

Ibid., pp. 150-168.
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form that it was understood and desired by whites.

50

The

result was that approximately 50,000 blacks were moved to
the reserves during the 1930s.

51

Third, tribal leadership emerged from its hiatus at
a time when an educated elite had emerged in the urban areas.
In the rural areas, black education was the responsibility
of missionaries who, under the Native Education Ordinance
of 1907, offered a maximum of four years primary education.
From a figure of 4,000 in 1907, black educational enrollment increased to 40,000 in 1918, to 100,000 in 1929, and
to 164,000 in 1945.

52

Since there were no secondary black

educational facilities in Zimbabwe, many students who wished
to pursue further studies were sent to South Africa.

This

combination of a Zimbabwean missionary school education and
a South African secondary and tertiary education remained
a prominent feature of the emerging elite's background till
well into the 1970s.
How did these changes affect black political activity?
Perhaps most important, there was an elite group but one
that did not seek to ally itself with or encourage mass
50

This point is often made by D.G. Clarke.
Murray, pp. 279-280.
51

See also

The division of Zimbabwe into one sector capable of
industrialization and one a pastoral non-productive sector
is known as the two-stream policy. Gray, pp. 151-152.
52

Nelson, pp. 138-139.
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political action by blacks.

Traditional elites tried to

restore themselves, but this attempt failed as the Mashona
and Matabele tribal leaders weakened under the impact of
direct white rule in which they, however involuntarily, were
incorporated.

While the decline of the tribal leadership

created a vacuum, it was not filled by the emerging urban
elite, who were consciously elitist and exhibited little
desire to act as spokesmen for the mass of rural blacks.
Yet, even if there were an elite seeking to ally itself with
rural blacks, the conditions under which blacks lived were
hardly conducive to mass political action.
lective action

First, col-

was djscouraged by the number of regulations

governing black life.

Black tenant farmers worked under con-

tract which, if broken, could lead to expulsion.

To enter

urban areas, blacks were required to obtain passes and when
they did so and entered urban (or rural) employment, they
fell under the authority of the Master Servant Act of 1901
which provided for a number of penalties (including imprisonment) for blacks who did not perform satisfactorily.

Clearly,

blacks lived under the easy reach of employer and landlord
punishment, as well as within the reach of the native commissioners and the collection of officials {chiefs, headmen
and messengers) they commanded.

Thirdly, black politics

was still influenced by a loss of morale brought on by the
brutality of the repression of the 1896-1897 uprisings.

This
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loss of morale was particularly evident among the Mashona.
3.

1945-1962:

53

The Challenge to White Rule

After 1945 many of the organizations of the pre-war
era continued their existence.

The Matabeleland Home Move-

ment, for example, still existed as a defender of traditional
values, and .the millenarian movements in Mashonaland expand-

ed .

54

The Second World War did not have the "immediate

galvanizing effect that it had in many other parts of
Africa"

55

in Zimbabwe; yet it did contain the roots of sub-

sequent activity when the government policy started to
stress industrialization and the modernization of black agriculture.
In the urban areas government policy was to create a
stable and skilled black labor force and, to this end,
adopted the Native (Urban Areas) Accomodation and Registration Act of 1946.

This act gave blacks some voice in urban

townships by creating elected black advisory boards, and
many urban leaders concentrated their efforts on getting
elected to them.

One group successful at this electoral

activity was the union leaders of RICO, now renamed the
Reformed Industrial and Commercial Workers Union and led by
Charles Mzingeli Moyo, and the Rhodesia Railways African
53
~,

Ranger, The African Voice in Southern Rhodesia, 1898-

pp. 1-2.
54

Nelson, p. 32.

55 Gibson, p. 154.
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Employees' Association, created in 1944 and led by Joshua
Nkomo.

While RICO and the Railways Association flirted with

the notion of multi-racial, class-based politics during the
war years, they became more militant and pro-black after the
war.

In October 1945 a strike occurred among the 2,400

railway workers in the Bulawayo area, which was the center
of the Railways Association's activities, and over the next
two weeks gained momentum among all black railways employees.
In April 1948 a second major strike occurred, with Bulawayo
again as focal point, but which now included employees from
mining, municipal and other sectors.

Alarmed by these

strikes, the government appointed a commission of inquiry
into urban blacks' grievances and then incorporated some of
. . ' s proposa 1 s 1n
. t o 1•t s ur b an po 1.1cy. 56
th e comm1ss1on
The post-war strikes and electioneering for the
advisory boards rejuvenated black organizations like RICO,
the ANC and the British African Voice Association (the
latter created in 1947 and centered on the Bulawayo area),
but in the years leading to the creation of the Central
African Federation (CAF) their support and organizational
activity again declined. 57

The Voice ARsociation was banned

56Gray, pp. 291-302.
57The black organizations of Malawi (then Nyasaland)

and Zambia (then Northern Rhodesia) opposed the creation of
the CAF and, with the support of RICO, the British African
Voice Association and the ANC of Zimbabwe, founded an AllAfrican Convention. After the creation of the CAF in 1953
the All-African Convention disintegrated. Gibson, p. 154.
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in 1952, although its leader Benjamin Burumbo remained a
highly effective and symbolic spokesman, while the ANC under
the leadership of Thompson Samkango and later Stanlake
Samkango remained an elitist organization whose activities
consisted mainly of appeals to the government for favorable
legislation for blacks.

58

By 1955 the ANC in fact dwindled

to one branch in Bulawayo under the leadership of Joshua
Nkomo, and it was further weakened in 1956 when Dunduza
Chisiza, a leader of the ANC of Malawi (then Nyasaland) who
had encouraged and advised the Zimbabwean ANC, was expelled
from Zimbabwe.

59

Yet, prior to his expulsion, Chisiza's work with the
younger ANC members resulted in the creation of a City Youth
League in Salisbury, led by George Nyandoro and James
Chikerema.

The Youth League's young and militant membership

presented a challenge to the moderate remnants of the ANC
who were sympathetic to the government's attempt to foster
a black middle class.

60

Moreover, the Youth League attracted

58

Thompson Samkange was also a leading figure in the
Southern Rhodesia Missionary Conference.
59

Gibson, pp. 154-155.

The-~outh League's opposition to parliamentary-style
politics was reflected in their publications, Mukayi Africa
(Wake-Up Africa) and Chapupu (Witness) Bowman, p. 50.
60
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considerable political support and all of its candidates
were elected to the advisory boards in elections in Salisbury,
and it was successful in organizing a bus boycott.

To pool

their resources the ANC and the City Youth r.eague thus
amalgamated in September 1957 to form a new (or reconstituted) ANC under the leadership of Nkomo as president.
Nyandoro and Chikerema were included in the top leadership
pos1"t.1ons. 61
The new ANC presented a breakthrough in black organiza tional activity.

Af; previously indicated, most black

organizations (with the exception of some leaders of RICO)
were elitist and made little attempt to associate with the
mass or rural or uneducated blacks.

To a degree, the new

ANC still epitomized this approach by participating in the
elections for the black members of the federal parliament of
the CAF, but the elite clustered around the ANC also
encouraged mass black action as a means to pressure the government within Zimbabwe.

In acting as spokesmen for blacks

as a whole, the ANC had an automatic constituency in the
urban areas, as they inherited the constituencies of moribund

organizations, but they also acquired a rural consti-

tuency.

In the rural areas the government's measures to

increase black agricultural production emphasized soil
61

Loney, p. 101.
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conservation measures, destocking and the granting of individual farm rights, encountered black opposition.

Destock-

ing, for example, amounted to the self-destruction of black
status and wealth, individual tenure undermined the security
of communal tenure, and black chiefs' power was undermined
by eliminating their power to allocate land.

Thus the

measures aimed at increasing black agricultural production
could only be implemented in a coercive manner, which in
turn h ar d ene d bl ac k s ' oppos1·t·1on to them. 62
The ANC's appeal to blacks as a whole was facilitated
by the fact that most urban blacks remained tied to the
structure and security of rural tenure.

Urban conditions

and government policy discouraged the migration of families
to urban areas and thus few black families resided in towns.
The remainder of the urban population consisted of young
male migrants who came to the towns to supplement their rural
income.

Upon accomplishing their target objectives, these

males rejoined their families in the rural areas and hence
had an interest in the security of rural tenure.

By in-

eluding rural issues in their platform the ANC therefore
appealed to the vast majority of blacks, both urban and
rural.

The ANC nevertheless was not a strident organization;

instead it "deliberately projected a moderate image ••• because
62

For a full discussion, see chapter 2.
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they did not wish to alarm the whites.

The ANC's statement
63
of principles was almost deferential in tone."
The promise of an urban elite that seeks to ally itself with rural discontent was shortlived, not because the
ANC bungled its opportunities, but because of events elsewhere in the CAF.

During the first half of 1959, a wave of

violence swept through Malawi as its ANC demanded majority
rule.

This violence led to the declaration of a state of

emergency in the CAF and the banning of the respective ANCs,
including the one in Zimbabwe.

In February nearly 500 ANC

members in Zimbabwe were arrested or detained, including
Nyandoro and Chikerema.

These arrests and detentions were

made possible by a new Preventitive Detention Act, which
empowered the government to detain any person who had - even
as a spectator - been involved in the violence of 1959, and
the Unlawful Organizations Act.

In the rural areas, organi-

zational black activity under the Native Affairs Amendment,
Act could now only take place with the permission of the
64
.
.
1 oca 1 comm1ss1oner.

63 Ibid., p. 51. For support of this view, see the
statement of principles, policy and program and the presidential address of the first annual congress in Christopher
Nyangoni and Gideon Nyandoro (edsh Zimbabwe Independence
Movements: Select Documents (New York: Barnes and Noble,
1979), pp. 3-20.
64

For the Zimbabwean government's view of the ANC at
this time, see the General Report of the Review Tribunal on
the Preventitive Detention Act (Temporary Provisions), (Salisbury: Government Printer, 1959), also known as the Beadle
Report.
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The result was a devastation of organizational black
activity in Zimbabwe.

The leadership of the ANC was deci-

mated and, even if they were intact, their access to the
.
.b e d . 65
rura 1 areas was severe1 y c1rcumscr1

Furthermore, the

restrictions and the international-legal ramifications of
the breakup of the CAF led many of the remaining black
leaders to believe that they could only-be successful if
they could enlist the aid of the British government and
international organizations and opinion.

Their focus of

actions shifted, in other words, from the rural areas to an
66
international context.
In January 1960 the few remaining leaders met to form
a new organization, the National Democratic Party (NDP). 67
The NDP was an urban-oriented party aiming mainly at the
creation of universal franchise ("one man, one vote") in
Zimbabwe through the intervention of the British government.
Initially the urban focus of the ANC seemed to be effective,
for in July and October 1960 a series of riots occurred in
Salisbury, Bulawayo and Gwelo, which could only be quelled
by the intervention of the Zimbabwean army.

However, as in

65 For the effects of this legislation, see Phillip
Mason, Year of DHcision (London: Oxford University Press,
1960), pp. 218-223 and Bowman, p. 5~ who states that the
nationalists never recovered from this stunning blow.
66 John Day, International Nationalism (London:
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1967), pp. 14-16.
67 Among these leaders were Nkomo (who was abroad at
the time of the banning of the ANC and who did not return to
Zimbabwe until October 1960), Enos Nkala (a Matabele laborer),
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the case of the violence of the previous year, the urban
unrest resulted in the government's adoption of repressive
measures:

the Vagrancy Act empowered the government to

arrest any unemployed blacks,

68

the Emergency Powers Act

empowered the government to rule by decree in

six~month

emergency periods and, according to the sweeping measures
of the Law

~~d

Order (Maintenance)

Act the government could

restrict public meetings, censor black and other publications, arrest blacks without a warrant, and overrule the
judicial system in matters affecting the public security.

69

With its earlier measures, the government now had a vast
array of repressive measures that could and were used
.
bl ac k s ' organ1za
. t.1ona 1 ac t.1v1. t y. 70
aga1nst
Herbert Chitepo (a lawyer), Ndabaningi Sithole (a minister,
teacher and author) and Leopold Takawira (a Mashona teacher).
Bowman, p. 52.
68

This law was aimed at the increasing number of blacks
who had been rendered landless by the reforms of the 1950s,
sought refuge in the urban areas or roamed the countryside,
and who became enthusiastic supporters of the ANC and NDP.
69
70

Barber, pp. 54-56.

urban collective action was also inhibited by the
realities of urban geography in Zimbabwe. Bla.cks lived in
townships that housed few consumer and other facilities
necessary for day-to-day living. When urban unrest occurred,
it was relatively easy for the government to eventually
isolate most blacks in the townships and prevent their access
to, for example, food and employment. Prolonged periods of
urban collective action was thus difficult if not impossible
to sustain. See Francis Nehwati "The Social and Communal
Background to 'Zhii': The African Riots in Bulawayo, Southern Rhodesia in 1960'~ African Affairs 69 (July 1970): 250254.
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The NDP'sremaining tactical options now focused on
international action and, in particular, the possible intervention of the British under the authority that they claimed
as guardians of black affairs in Zimbabwe.

Thus Nkomo led

the NDP-delegation to the constitutional conference which
was to devise a post-CAF constitution for Zimbabwe.

The re-

sulting 1961 constitution was initially endorsed by the NDP
delegation.

According to its provisions, a multi-racial

constitutional council was created to monitor violations of
the declaration of rights included in the constitution and
blacks acquired 15 seats in an expanded legislative assembly.
In exchange, Britain would suspend its reserve clauses con71
cerning black affairs.
When these provisions were made
public, the other members of the NDP urged a "total rejection" of the constitution and, during the remaining months
of 1961, the NDP continued to attack the constitutional
arrangements and

ur~ed

black voters not to participate in the

referendum on it or indeed in any other electoral activity.
In December 1961 the government then banned the NDP.

Almost

immediately (on December 17, 1961) the black leaders regrouped
and formed the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union. 72
Thus the post-war era and particularly the late 1950s
Witnessed the emergence of a black Zimbabwean elite and
71
72

See chapter 2.
Gibson, p. 157.
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organizations that initially sought to ally itself with and
encourage rural (and other) political action.

The elite in

its successive organizations, however, came under increasing
government scrutiny, resulting in the banning of organizations and the arrest and detentions of the leader- and membership.

The government also restricted the access of the

elite to the. rural and urban areas.

The result was thenar-

rowing of the tactical scope of the elite and its organizations.

On the domestic scene, the elite made one attempt to

participate in electoral-constitutional type politics, but
this attempt was aborted when other members of the elite
objected.

This left only one option, namely to try to per-

suade the British government or other international organizations to intervene in Zimbabwe on behalf of the blacks.
The emergence of ZAPU by the beginning of 1962 (and
its rival ZANU shortly afterwards) marked the beginning of
a struggle that would include the unilateral declaration of
independence by the Smith regime, the UDI-period, and a
period marked by the beginning of guerrilla warfare.

Since

guerrilla warfare as a collective black action was announced
in 1965 and only seriously began in the 1970s (as will be
discussed in the following chapters), this raises the question of the conditions under which ZAPU and ZANU operated
at the time of their founding.
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3.1. The Conditions of Black Political Activity
Studies of the black population structure of Zimbabwe
have convincingly shown that the structure is derivative of
land apportionment.

73

Thus the black population can be

divided into blacks living on the Tribal Trust Lands (TTLs
or native reserves), the black farmers of the African Furchase Areas (APAs), the black tenant farmers and laborers
who live on white farms, and urban blacks.

The focus of the

remaining part of this chapter is on the conditions under
which these groups lived and what those conditions implied
for the struggle of ZAPU and ZANU.
3.1.1.

The Tribal Trust Lands·
Much has already been said about the creation of the

reserves, their subsequent entrenchment and then diminishing
productive capacities.

By 1961 approximately 34 percent of

the total land area was designated as reserves, and approximately 60 percent of the total black population of 3,550,000
were listed as the permanent (de jure) residents.

74

73

The standard reference of the distribution and density of the black population is Ka~ Rhodesia: A Human Geography. See also Gecrge Kay,"Towards a Population Policy for
Zimbabwe-Rhodesia" African Affairs 79 (January 1980): 95-114
and George Kay, The Distribution of African Population in
Southern Rhodesia: Some Preliminary Notes (Lusaka: RhodesLivingston Institute, 1964).
74 The only reliable census for Zimbabwe was the one
in 1961/62.
It sets the number of black farmers in the
reserves at 600,000.
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There is considerable variation among the reserves,
such as different size, local customs, ecological capacity,
and _proximity to towns, railways and market opportunities·.
There are also differences in local organizational features,
with the main divisions falling along Mashona and ¥atabele lines.

Mashona reserves are divided into chiefdoms,

wards and villages (or kraals), with the population of kraals
ranging from twelve to 200.
apart.

These kraals tend to be far

Matabele reserves are also subdivided into chiefdoms,

headmen

in charge of a smaller unit, and kraalheads, but

they tend to live in larger, more concentrated settlements.

75

Differences, however, are overshadowed by similarities.
F.eserves all have agricultural subsistence economies, a high
and skewed population density, socio-cultural attributes
that stress conformity and cohesion, and all administratively
incorporated with the white governmental machinery.
The local agricultural economy consists of small plots,
cultivated by blacks by non-mechanized, labor-intensive techniques, ·and/ or blacks tending to their small herds of cattle.
The proceeds of cultivation and herding are consumed locally.
With the dwindling of the ecological capacities of the land,
many blacks were forced into wage labor, and thus a large
portion of the adult male population is
from the reserves.
75

perpetually absent

This skews the population:

Palmer, "War and Land", pp. 86-87.

45-50 percent
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of the adult males are absent at any one time, leaving a
high proportion of children, old people and women.

These

absences have not relieved the population pressure.

Between

1941 and 1961 the black population of Zimbabwe rose from
1,400,000 to 3,550,000;

76

in terms of population density,

blacks increased from 10 per square mile

in 1941 to 15 per

square mile .. in 1951 and finally to 25 per square mile
1961. 77

in

Thus, by 1959 approximately 30 percent of the blacks

who were entitled to land were in effect landless.

78

The

unavailability of land exacerbates cultural strains and
rural vagrancy, but these are mediated by the conformity and
cohesion of tribal life.

79

With regard to the political-administrative position
of the reserves, the government's policy moved from one
stating that traditional-tribal life was "beyond recall" to
one upholding tribal life as the Native
understood it.

~ffairs

Department

Accordingly, the authority of the tribal

leadership was upheld, but they were incorporated in the
government's system of black (or native) administration.
76

Nelson, p. 61.

77 weinrich, pp. 18-22.
78Yudelman, p. 123.
79
See Michael Gelfand, African Crucible: An EthnoReligious Study With Special Reference to the Shona-Speaking
People (Cape Town: Juta, 1968) and Hilda Kuper, A.J.B. Hughes
and J. van Velsen, The Shona and the Ndebele of Southern
Rhodesia (London:
International African Institute, 1955).

204
This administration was organized on a territorial basis,
with native commissioners as heads of districts, assistant
native commissioners as heads of subdistricts, and chiefs,
headmen and kraalheads as paid employees and heads of smaller
localities.

Prior to the Second World War the general goals

of the black administration were to maintain law and order,
collect taxes, and uphold the "traditional way of life."

80

After the Second World War the effort to increase black agricultural output in the reserves strained the administrative
capacities of the rural officials, and therefore the Native
Department was reorganized and expanded.

Commissioners now

were assisted by officials of the Department of Agriculture,
but this failed to solve the problem as the extension officers of the Department of Agriculture and the commissioners
clashed over how and at what speed the reforms should be
implemented, and as black opposition to the reforms mounted.
To overcome these problems the government launched an
investigation and then passed the African Councils Act of
1957.

This act was intended to solve the problan by increasing

the responsibility of tribal leaders and thus the number of
chiefs were reduced and councils were created, partly elected
and partly appointed, to assist the chiefs in their duties.
These black councils would insulate local black politics from
the "political ferment" of national black politics, provide
80

Murray, pp. 279-300; Holleman, pp. 19-30 and Gray,
pp. 3-194.
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an avenue 6f expression and provide a political-administrative training ground for blacks.

81

Although some blacks did

use the black councils as an avenue of expression, they ·also
failed to solve the problem as the overburdened commissioners
had difficulty in adjusting to indirect rule after the long
experience of direct rule and as black opposition to the
agricultural reforms was sustained.

In response the govern-

ment launched further investigations, one on the effects of
the Native Animal Land Husbandry Act and the other on the
bureaucratic problems resulting from it.

82

The reports of

these investigations deepened the trend toward black local
self-government, now named "community development."

Under

this approach the number of black councils was increased,
councils were held responsible for many of the local efforts
to increase black production (like soil conservation measures),
and were held responsible for the maintenance of the local
roads and bridges, and for primary education.

To finance

these activities, the chiefs were to have limited powers of
taxation.

When the Rhodesian Front came to power it enthu-

siastically embraced the idea of community development,

81
82

Earlier chiefs were assisted by native boards.

see the Report of the Commission of Inquiry into
Alleged Discontent in the Mangwende Reserve·(salisbury:
Government Printer, 1961) and the Report of the Commission of
Inquiry into and Report on Administrative and Judicial Functions in the Native Affairs and District Court Departments
(Salisbury: Government Printer, 1961), the Robinson Commission.
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although it abandoned the notion that it would be the vehicle
to increase black agricultural production.

83

Bureaucratically

the Native DHpartment was renamed the Department of Int·ernal
Affairs and some internal reforms took place.

84

By 1962 the position of blacks in the reserves was
thus as follows:·

First, the tribal leadership was in a dif-

ficult position.

On the one hand their authority was under-

mined by the loss of their power to allocate land, the progressive weakening of tribal organization, and the fact that
they were the paid employees, agents and servants of the white
government.

Some chiefs, for example, owed their very posi-

tion to government support when it started to reduce the number of chiefs and some had to be dismissed and others retained.
On the other hand the position of the tribal leadership was
exaggerated by the prolonged absences of young males from the
reserves

85

and by the government's policy of community develop-

ment, as well as its view that the tribal leaders represented
black Zimbabweans as a whole.

This view led to the creation
86
of the National Council of Chiefs in 1962.
Second, the
83

For the Rhodesian Front's approach to rural black
administration, see Barber, pp. 221-247.
84

Holleman, pp. 255-291

85

see Weinrich, p. 22 and passim for a discussion of
the rural black elite.
86

The point is not that tribal or any other traditional
leaders were either pro- or anti-government as a whole; it is
simply that, given the structural position of these leaders,
they had little scope for independent political action.
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local councils in time became the means for the government
to implement goals, not an avenue for local self-expression
and independence.

It became the government's main link.with

the local population and a way to remain abreast of local
black political developwonts.

87

Third, after 1959 black

political activity beyond the above channels or activity
that undermined the authority of the local leadership and
officials was severely circumscribed by the Native Affairs
Amendment Act.

Any meeting of more than twelve blacks, for
88
example, required the consent of the local commissioner.
Thus the blacks of the reserves lived under the impact
of at least three crises.

There was a demographic crisis as

black population increases combined with the limited amount
of land available led to severe over-population.

There was

also an ecological crisis as overpopulation further decreased
the productive capacities of the soil and as the reforms of
the 1950s undermined blacks' security in rural tenure.

Finally,

there was a political crisis as the traditional leadership
of the rural areas was first undermined and then reconstituted by the government in its desired form (i.e. as paid
public servants who had no independent political power).
87

Holleman notes that the government's information of
rural conditions was often slanted by the bureaucratic selfinterest of the local commissioners. Holleman, pp. 34-38.
88

These restrictions were actually requested by the
tribal leadership. See Loney, p. 188.
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Although these crisis conditions existed, the blacks of the
reserves had little independent political power to engage in
collective action in order to remove those problems.

Since

some of the reserves were in remote areas they were to some
degree out of the reach of the white government, but most of
the blacks lived under conditions where the government had
knowledge of local black political developments and had a
vast array of means to repress it.

There were local leaders

and organizational forms, but these could hardly be expected
to strike an independent course of political action.
3.1.2.

The African Purchase Areas
Blacks could initially buy land outside of the reserves

and, when few blacks managed to do so, the Land tpportionment
Act reserved certain areas for black purchase.

By 1961

these purchase areas consisted of 86 widely scattered areas,
amounting to approximately eight percent of the total land
area.

Like the reserves, the purchase areas were overpopula-

ted with an average of 21 persons per square mile.

89

The first blacks who bought land in the purchase areas
were mainly foreign-born blacks like the Fingoes, who could
not claim traditional land, and Zimbabwean blacks from educational, commercial and other elite groups.

As more blacks

were displaced by the land apportionment measures, these
89

Kay, Rhodesia:

A Human Geography, pp. 37-58.

209

original inhabitants were joined by successful farmers of
the reserves.

By 1956, when the application list for black

purchase was closed because of a shortage of land, the number
of black farmers in the purchase areas amounted to 8,500. 90
Since the acquisition of farmland required a period of tenure,
government certification of farming skills and, most importantly, capital, the population of the purchase areas is also
skewed.

The main factor is age, with 85 percent of the male

cultivators of the areas older than 45 years.

91

Although the

quality of the soil, access to railways and roads, and market
opportunities presented difficulties similar to those of the
reserves, the purchase area farmers usually produced a surplus.

By 1965 approximately 32 percent of their production

was consumed locally and the remaining 68 percent sold.

These

cash sales amounted to one-third of all marketed black agricultural produce.

92

90

Most of the post-1945 arrivals were "master farmers",
i.e. plotholders with enough capital and at least three years
of contact with agricultural extension officers. The notion
that successful black farmers could come to own their own land
is comparable to the freeholding peasantry (as opposed to
copyholding peasants) in British history. William R. Duggan,
"The Native Land Husbandry Act of 1951 and The Rural African
Middle Class of Southern Rhodesia'~ African Affairs 79 (April
1980): 227-239.
See also Oliver B. Pollak, "Black Farmers and
White Politics in Rhodesia", African Affairs74 (July 1975): 263277.
91

Purchase area farmers employ a small number of permanent black laborers or rely on female and seasonal labor.
Pollak, p. 268.
92

Government policy favored the purchase area farmers
over those of the reserves, with the former able to gain
easier access to extension services, credit and market opportunities. Nelson, p. 294.
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How did these conditions affect the political activity
of the purchase area farmers?

First, the black farmers lived

on 200-acre plots with their families, other dependents and
employees.

Since many of these blacks are originally from the

reserves and since purchase area farms are isolated from one
another, purchase area residents tend to preserve their social
and political ties with the blacks of the reserves.

Second,

although these ties are preserved, the blacks of the purchase areas are an elite; blacks either bought land with
their savings from high status occupations, or worked their
way up through the reserves and then bought land.

These

similarities as an elite are accentuated by the common concerns the farmers face after they have bought

land.

Third,

it should be remembered that the purchase area farmers are,
in both number and the land area that they command, only a
small fraction of the black population.

Compared to the

blacks of the reserves, the blacks of the purchase area thus
are a small and socio-culturally diverse elite who have
similar socio-economic backgrounds and concerns.
The elite of the purchase area has a long history of
political activity.

In the 1930s several farmers created

organizations to advance their interests and these eventu93
.
F armers Un1on.
·
. t o th e Af r1can
a 11 y merge d 1n
93

Like many

The African Farmers Union operated under different
names; this title will be used here.
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black organizations of the pre-war era, the AFU was consciously elitist; the organization excluded the farmers of
the reserves and scrupulously avoided identification with
the poorer inhabitants of the reserves.

Even the tribal

leadership of the reserves was barred from the AFU conferences.

Since it usually sought government aid, the AFU was

cautious and deferential in its dealings with the government
which, until the Second World War, was indifferent to its
pleas for aid.

After 1945, however, the goals of the govern-

ment and the AFU coincided and, under the leadership of Aaron
Jacha, the AFU entered a phase of active collaboration with
the government.

This collaboration included an attempt to

merge the AFU with the white farming association (the Rhodesia National Farmers Union).

94

During the 1950s the AFU and its constituents were
relatively isolated from the dislocations brought about by
the government's efforts to reform black agriculture; indeed
they were often held as the model of what the farmers of the
reserves should be.

The issue that brought matters to the

fore was the presence of squatters in the purchase areas.
When the purchase areas were created in 1930, approximately
150,000 blacks were already living in the areas assigned
as purchase areas and by 1960 about 110,000 of these remained.
94

Jacha was one of the leading figures in the old ANC,
but left it in the 1950s when it became more militant. Pollak,
p. 272.
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In 1960 the government's land commission recommended that
these squatters remain in the purchase areas, as it was too
expensive to resettle them elsewhere, and that the land they
occupied should be called Special Native Areas. 95 The purchase
areas, in other words, should be reduced.

The AFU, however,

thought that the squatters should either be expelled from
the purchase·areas (like they were expelled from white farms)
or the land that they occupied should be replaced by land
from the category of unreserved land.

Eventually the purchase

areas were not enlarged and the category of special native
areas was created, but the dispute forced the AFU to oppose
the government after a long period of cooperation.

The ex-

perience also radicalized the AFU-leadership, as Jacha was
replaced by William Kona, who supported the ANC and later the
NDP, and who opened up avenues of grass-roots participation
within the AFU by creating strong regional branches. 96
When ZAPU and ZANU emerged, the purchase

area farmers

thus were engaged in organizational politics and had, to a
degree, disassociated themselves from the government.

At

least some of the purchase area farmers indeed openly supported the predecessors of ZAPU and ZANU.

Though the record of

the farmers' organizational forum hardly shows a concern with the
95The Select Committee on the Resettlement of Natives
(Salisbury: Government Printer, 1960), the Quinton Report.
96 Pollak, pp. 269-274.
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lot of farmers in the reserves, the farmers nevertheless
tended to preserve their social and other ties with the
blacks of the reserves.
3.1.3.

Blacks on White Farms
White agriculture after 1945 changed under the govern-

ment's pressure to increase production.

Two of these changes

affected the position of blacks who lived on white farms
(either as tenant farmers who performed certain duties as a
permanent or semi-permanent employee).

First, foreign- and

domestic-owned estate farming increased with most ,.of thes·e concentrated in the southwestern and

eastern provinces

(Matabeleland North and South, Manicaland and Victoria) where
cotton, citrus, tobacco, tea and sugar is grown.

In central

and western provinces (the low Midlands and Matabeleland)
97
.
. .1 ar t o th e es t a t e- t ype f arm1ng.
some ca ttl e ranc h es were s1m1
s~ccnd,

the rise of corporate farming, government aid and the

stress on improved production techniques did lead to some
mechanization, but simultaneously white agriculture increased
its dependency on unskilled labor.

In fact, between 1946 and

1961 the number of black farmworkers rose from 142,000 to
272,000.

These black farmworkers were unevenly distributed

97
Michael Bratton "Structural Transformation in Zimbabwe:
Comparative Not.es from the Neo-Coloniza tion of Kenya", The
Journal of Modern African Studies 15 (December 1977): 602-603.
See also Arrighi, "The Political Economy of Rhodesia", pp.
352-359.
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with most in Mashonaland North (35.2 percent of the total) and
Mashonaland South (25.3 percent), Manicaland (15.5 percent),
and Victoria (10.3 percent), and significantly less in Matabeleland North and South (7.7 percent) and the Midlands (6.0
percent).

98

The number of farmworkers included a high pro-

99
.
(50 percen t ) o f f ore1gn-born
.
port1on
wor k ers.
Given this number of black farmworkers (272,000 or 23
percent of the black population) and their distribution
(heavily concentrated in the eastern areas), under what socioeconomic and political conditions did these farmworkers live?
First, more than 60 percent of the black farmworkers are
permanent or semi-permanent employees, with the remainder
either casual workers or foreign-born contract workers.

100

Second, except for the central and western areas, there was
a high number of workers per farm with about 60 per farm in
Mashonaland

.
an d 66 1n

No~th,

36 in Mashonaland South, 45 in Manicaland,

v·1c t or1a.
.
101

Third, although these workers

earned wages, they actually had several sources of income
with in-kind payments, employer contributions to pension funds
and other aids, and support from friends and relatives in
urban employment.

102

There was no agricultural minimum wage;

98

n.G. Clark, Agricultural and Plantation Workers in
Rhodesia (Gwelo, Zimbabwe: Mambo Press, 1977), pp. 24-26.

99

Ibid., pp. 31-32.

100
Nelson, p. 290.
101

Clarke, p. 26.
102 Ibid., pp. 44-51.
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wages and other working conditions were determined by agreements made under the Vaster Servant Act and the African Labour
Regulations Act.

This gave the employer total control over

workers as the loss of employment could mean the loss of
tenure on white farms, basic subsistence and welfare assistance.

103

place.

Fourth, employer control extended beyond the workIn

~he

case of single farms, there was a strong pater-

nalist tradition whereby white farmers frequently and personally intruded in the private lives of their workers.

On

the estates, the division of farm labor brought more impersonal bureaucratic control.

Blacks here lived in compounds

and were supervised by bossboys and policemen.

Managers

tended to be more aloof, with the result that the black bossboys and policemen played a crucial role in the mediation

.
t en t • 104
o f wor k er d 1scon
The preceding shows that black farmworkers on estates
and single farms fell under the all-encompassing control of
their white employers and their assistants.

When worker dis-

content arose, employers had a variety of means to contain
it; these included hearing complaints, using the services of
the local commissioner, using the bossboys and policemen, and
displaying a sense of fair play expressed in the local language.

Although there were labor strikes on white farms,

103

Ibid.

104 Ibid., pp. 146-149.
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this was not the dominant form of workers' discontent.
Rather, workers tended to express their discontent surreptitiously in the form of insolence, absenteeism, arson, theft,
go-slow work and malicious damage to property.

105

There was one significant attempt to unionize black
farmworkers with the creation of the Agricultural and Plantation
Workers Union (APWU) in Matabeleland.

The activities of APWU

were inhibited by the resistance of employers and financial
trouble, as farmworkers did not or could not pay union dues.
The result was that the APWU became dependent on foreign support.

In addition, the activists of the APWU fomd

it dif-

ficult to organize the farmworkers because they were dispersed in scattered areas.

When the Emergency Powers Act

then forbade rural travel by union organizers, the APWU was
.
1 y cr1pp
. 1 e d • 106
e ff ec t 1ve

When ZAPU and ZANU emerged, the black farmworkers thus
had no history of involvement in organizational black politics.
These farmworkers lived on estates and single farms under the
total control of employers and their assistants.

Support of

ZAPU and ZANU would thus entail a great risk for black farmworkers.
lOSibid., pp. 177-178.
106

The National African Federation of Unions and the
African Trades Union Congress later offered black farmworkers
some national political representation.
Ibid., pp. 188-193.
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3.1.4.

Blacks in Urban Areas
By 1962 approximately 18 percent of all blacks resided

in urban areas,

107

where they were employed in the public

service, industry and commerce, and domestic service.

These

workers lived either in the townships or in rooms on whites'
property;

108

few blacks owned their own property in urban

areas as they were, until 1960, forbidden to do so.

Moreover,

few blacks were born in the urban areas or are permanent
residents; most are temporary residents

f~om

rural areas who

attempt to supplement their income by wage employment.

The

urban black population is therefore skewed in terms of age
and sex; most are young (under 45 years of age) and male,
although the proportion of women (approximately 35 percent
in 1964) was increasing.

109

As previously discussed, most black organizational
activity after the Second World War took place in an urban
setting and it was noted that urban collective action by
blacks was difficult to organize and sustain.

Activists

and organizers were subject to surveillance and arrest, organizations were banned, publications censored, and the
107
According to the 1962 census.
108

For a comprehensive discussion, see D. G. Clarke,
Domestic Workers in Rhodesia: The Economics of Masters and
Servants (Gwelo, Zimbabwe: Mambo Press, 1974).
109

Rogers and Frantz, p. 15.
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membership arrested or detained.

When collective action did

take place it could be repressed.

Many blacks lived in

black townships on the edge of white urban areas and thus
could be isolated from employment, shops and access to other
townships.

Although the geophysical features of blacks'

urban environment thus inhibited collective action, it is
often said that the urban setting provided blacks with opportunities to develop organizations which minimized or superseded tribal affiliations, as it brought together blacks
from different tribal backgrounds and gave them common socio-

.
110
econom1c concerns.
Although the influence of tribal factors will be discussed more fully in the following chapter, it is worth
noting at this point that urbanization, at least as far as
Zi~babwe

is concerned, did not necessarily erase the influ-

ence of tribal and rural factors.

Indeed, it is possible to

argue that urbanization entrenched such influences.

First,

most blacks in the urban areas were temporary residents who
maintained a strong interest in the security of rural tenure
and hence the position and fate of rural society.

In fact,

an absence from the rural areas may have increased an awareness of the security of rural tenure

Second, most migrants'

immediate concerns were not political but directed towards
welfare needs and the organizations that focused on them.

110

8 ee, for example, Newhati.
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These welfare associations were organized and run by ethnic
groups.

Third, blacks who migrated tended to migrate to the

urban area closest to their area of permanent residence. and
thus urban areas' political activites were often dominated
by the group living in the area.

In Salisbury, for example,

the Mashonas were heavily represented in political and other
organizations, whereas Bulawayo was dominated by the neighboring Matabele.

111

It is consequently not suprising that

"tribalism" is often mentioned as a centripetal force in
black organizational politics.
4.

112

Conclusion
When ZAPU and ZANU emerged before UDI they claimed

that they and not the tribal leadership, as the government
claimed, represented black Zimbabweans as a whole.

That

the government claimed the support of the tribal leadership
was not

~ising,

as their effort to create a multi-racial

political constituency with a middle class
failed.

~haracter

had

Yet, even presuming that ZAPU and ZANU did repre-

sent black Zimbabweans, it was clear that collective action
111

Nelson, p. 87.

~There are no systematic studies of the influence of
tribal and other traditional loyalties in black politics in
Zimbabwe. One does find fleeting references to it, such as
in the leadership struggles of the AFU (Pollak, p. 272), the
elections and actions of the advisory boards in urban areas,
and in the actions of the V.atabele Home Movement and the
Mashonaland Cultural Society (Newhati, pp. 259-260).
11
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by blacks would be difficult.
Approximately 60 percent of the black population lived
in the reserves, engaged in subsistence agriculture and·
maintained a strong sense of socio-cultural cohesion.

But

the local leadership and organizations (down to kraals of
twelve people) rarely displayed a willingness to oppose the
government or to act in a politically independent manner
and, even if they had done so, they were within the reach of
the government's repressive means.

The position of black

agricultural workers (23 percent of the total black population) was even worse, as they fell under the all-encompassing
control of their employers and their assistants.

Urban blacks

(about 18 percent of the total black population) had participated in some collective action, but the geo-physical
features of the urban environment discouraged future action
and, moreover, past action had resulted in the government's
strengthening of its repressive power.

Finally, there were

the purchase area farmers who seemed to have the greatest
scope for independent political action, but their numbers and
the land area that they inhabited were sma11.

113

Given these

conditions, it was clear that ZAPU and ZANU's efforts at
mobilization would be difficult.
113

Furthermore, their efforts

There are some minorities in Zimbabwe.
See Floyd
Dotson and Lillian 0. Dotson, The Indian Minority of Zambia,
Rhodesia and Malawi {New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University
Press, 1969).
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would be subject to government repression, which already had
severely weakened the black organizations by arrests, detentions and the banning of organizations.

These challenges

from without could be complemented by any internal weaknesses
(such as tribal squabbles and financial weaknesses) that ZAPU
and ZANU developed.

CHAPTER IV
THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER:
INTERNATIONAL NATIONALISM, GUERRILLA WAR
AND THE RESPONSE OF THE REGIME
This chapter consists of an examination of black collective action in Zimbabwe and the Smith regime's response
to that action between 1962 and 1979.

With regard to black

action, the examination focuses on four questions, namely
(a) What was the nature, extent and effectiveness of their
actions; (b) Whether some blacks participated more in the
guerrilla war than others, for example, the blacks of the
reserves, purchase area farmers, farmworkers or urban dwellers; (c) What organizational forms were generated by the
guerrilla war; and (d) What was the character of the black
elite that sought to ally itself with and/or encourage black
collective action.

The natural counterpart to these questions

is the response of the Smith regime; here the focus is on
what actions the regime took with regard to public security
and its effectiveness.

To facilitate discussion of these

questions, the period between 1962 and 1979 is subdivided
into two periods, that period between 1962 and 1970, and that
between 1970 and 1979.
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1.

1962-1970: International Nationalism
During the first half of 1962, most of ZAPU's activi-

ties were directed at the generation of international support,
especially that of the British government, which ZAPU believed
to be the formal sovereign in Zimbabwe and which appeared to
be the only government capable of influencing the white
regime.

This emphasis on foreign-diplomatic activity led the

ZAPU leadership, and Joshua Nkomo in particular, to be absent
from Zimbabwe for most of the first half of 1962.

Within

Zimbabwe there were some violent incidents, including petrol
bomb attacks, a strike in Salisbury, attacks on cattle dips
and other property, the burning of a forest in the eastern
part of Zimbabwe, and disruptions of railroads.

1

dents, however, were "irregular and infrequent."

These inci2

When Nkomo returned to Zimbabwe in July, ZAPU could
claim some success at securing international support from the
United Nations and the Afro-Asian nations, but its attempt to
influence the British government was thus far unsuccessful.

3

Within Zimbabwe ZAPU's position became precarious when the
1

Anthony R. Wilkenson, "From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe" in
Basil Davidson, Joe Slovo and Anthony R. Wilkenson, Southern
Africa: The New Politics of Revolution (New York: Penguin
Books, 1976), p:-227:--·-·--·-·2

3

Barber, p. 141.
See Day, International Nationalism, pp. 25-43.
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Whitehead (or Urtited Federal Party) regime launched an investigation of ZAPU and its report blamed ZAPU for most of the
violence of 1962.

4

Even if it was not responsible for this

violence, ZAPU indeed did plan on some violent action in the
future, because it sent supporters abroad to acquire military
training and made preparations to smuggle arms into Zimbabwe.
These men would form the nucleus of the military wing of ZAPU.
During September 1962 a "Zimbabwe Liberation /,rroy" started to
advertise its existence by distributing leaflets, but as yet
the ZAPU leadership denied any connection with it.
these denials, ZAPU was banned in September 1962.

Despite

5

With the banning of ZAPU the UFP regime amended its
Unlawful Organizations Act so that it, among others, prohibited the leadership of an organization declared illegal to
reconstitute itself under another name, and amended the Law
and Order (Maintenance) Act to widen its scope and to increase
the severity of punitive measures.

This included a mandatory

death sentence for setting fire to a residential building,
vehicles and aircraft, regardless of whether it was occupied.
4

See the Report on the Zimhiliwe African Peoples' Union
(Salisbury: Government Printer, 1962).
5

Gibson, p. 161.
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on the grounds of these provisions, this law became known
as the "hanging bill."
many of ZAPU's leaders.

In addition, the regime detained
6

Because of the prohibition on. the

reconstitution of an illegal organization, ZAPU decided to
remain as such and Nkomo, who was in Zambia at the time of
the arrest of ZAPU's leaders, prepared to locate it in Tanzania as the seat of a Zimbabwean "government-in-exile."

The

location and designation of ZAPU, however, was rejected by
the Tanzanian president (Julius Nyerere) and other African
leaders.

Rebuffed, ZAPU found a home in Lusaka, Zambia,

where Nkomo was joined by the rannants

of the ZAPU membership

and by former ANC members who were released by the Rhodesian
Front regime when it came to power in December 1962.

7

With ZAPU now based in Zambia, its leadership became
divided over leadership and tactics, much of which was focused
on Nkomo's personality and leadership style.

While the move

to Zambia had reasonable grounds, i.e. government actions
made effective action within Zimbabwe impossible, Nkomo was
6
7

Including Takawira, Mugabe and Moyo.

The release of the detained nationalist leadership
was part of an initial conciliatory approach by the Rhodesian
Front. See Barber, pp. 196-220.
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accused of avoiding altogether a struggle within Zimbabwe,
directed by ZAPU as an underground movement.

Instead, so

the criticisms went, Nkomo preferred to concentrate on foreigndiplomatic actions, which not only brought dubious success
(it "converted those already converted") but deprived ZAPU
of a strong leadership element when it was still struggling
to establish itself.

8

Nkomo reacted to these charges by call-

ing a mass rally in Salisbury in August 1963, where he publicly
castigated the discontented ZAPU leaders, like Robert Mugabe,
Leopold Takawira, Mouton Malianga, Ndabaningi Sithole, Nathan
Shamuyarira and Enos Nkala.

In response, Mugabe, Takawira,

Malianga, Sithole and Herbert Chitepo formed the Zimbabwe
African National Union (ZANU) on August 9,1963, with Sithole
as president.

This development led Nkomo to form the Peoples

Caretaker Council (PCC) to operate within Zimbabwe:

outside

of the country, the PCC operated under the name of ZAPU.

9

Between August 1963 and August 1964 there was widespread violence in Zimbabwe and by the end of 1964, 4,435
contraventions of the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act had been
recorded.

This was the "worst year on record for violence and

8

Day (pp. 112-119) accounts Nkomo's travels and cites
critics who argue that Nkomo travelled because he feared he
would be arrested within Zimbabwe.
9

Ibid., p. 22.
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the breakdown of law and order":

10

schools were burnt, pro-

perty in rural and urban areas destroyed, and people were
intimidated, stoned and killed.

Most of these incidents

involved or were directed against blacks, particularly on the
part of ZAPU and ZANU supporters who battled each other.

11

In response, the Smith regime prohibited ZAPU and ZANU from
holding mee!Jngs, and later started to detain their leadership, including Nkomo, Mugabe, Sithole and other members.

12

Finally the PCC (or ZAPU) and ZANU were declared illegal in
August 1964.

The PCC then suspended itself as an internal

wing of ZAPU and the remaining leaders gathered in ZAPU's
headq.uarters in Zambia, where James Chikerema became acting
president assisted by Nyandoro, Moyo and Silumdika.

13

With Sithole and W.ugabe absent, the remnants of ZANU also fled
to Zambia, where Herbert Chitepo assumed the leadership.
Although there was a striking difference between the
rhetoric of ZAPU and ZANU, with the latter usually more
10

The Director of African Affairs in Salisbury as
quoted by Barber, p. 210.
11 navid Martin and Phyllis Johnson, The Struggle for
Zimbabwe (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1981), pp. 70-71.
and Wilkenson, pp. 228-231.
12A total of 1,791 were detained between January 1964
and June 1965. Bowman, p. 60.
13The dissolution of internal party arrangements
occurred at the Cold Comfort experimental farm, and later
became controversial.
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militant,

14

their actions or strategies were quite similar.

Both mainly engaged in foreign-diplomatic activity to secure
international support, and attempted to secure British support and possibly intervention to prevent a possible UDI or
to prevent the British transfer of the CAF's armed forces to
the Smith regime.

15

Yet ZAPU and ZANU did prepare for a

guerrilla struggle within Zimbabwe:

ZAPU sent recruits to

the Soviet Union, China and North Korea, while ZANU recruits
were sent to Ghana.

16

Except for one ZANU attack by the

"Crocodile Conunando" in July 1964 in the Melsetter area,

17

however, there were no noteworthy guerrilla incidents within
Zimbabwe.
ZAPU and ZANU's emphasis on foreign-diplomatic activity
and their infighting before UDI is often slngled out for
criticism.

Given government repression, it is argued, the

best tactic would have been to regroup, preserve unity, and
develop an underground structure as preparation for guerrilla
struggle.

Was the emphasis on foreign-diplomatic activity

then inappropriate?

It should be remembered that the

-----,:;-:-------14Gibson, p. 175. For a sample of these differences,
see Christopher Nyangoni and Gideon Nyandoro, pp. 64-113.
l5Day (p. ~2-103) characterizes this activity as "international nationalism."
16 Ibid., pp. 104-111.
17 For an account of this incident, see Davis M'Gabe,
"The Beginnings of Guerrilla Warfare" in W. Cartey and M.
Kilson (eds) The Africa Reader:
Independent Africa (New York)
Vintage Books, 1970).
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constitutional status of Zimbabwe prior to UDI was genuinely
ambiguous.

On the one hand, Britain claimed to exercise

"reserve powers" over a territory described in contradictory
terms as a ''self-governing colony", while on the other hand,
the Smith regime claimed that the 1961 constitution amounted
to a state of independence.
tactical dilemma.

Thus ZAPU and ZANU were in a

If Zimbabwe were a colony, a foreign-

diplomatic offensive was entirely appropriate, since similar
actions by other nationalist groups in Britain's African
colonies had resulted in independence.

However, if Zimbabwe

were independent and sovereignty exercised by the Smith
regime or the white minority, ZAPU and ZANU had to develop
power through, for example, the development of a guerrilla
army, that could threaten the Smith regime from within Zimbabwe.

In this respect the Emith regime would react dif-

ferently than the metropolitan power; they would resist
claims for political equality and are formidable adversaries
in doing so.

For them the question would be not whether to

resist black nationalist demands, but how to do so.

18

Stated

differently, the termination of foreign or colonial rule can
be achieved without necessarily establishing a position of
physical, coercive or military superiority, while the downfall of an independent, domestic regime is unlikely if it
18Kenneth W. Grundy, "Black Soldiers in a White Military:
Political Change in South Africa", The Journal of Strategic
Studies 4 (September 1981): 296.
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cannot be defeated in physical-military terms.

19

With ZAPU

and ZANU's leadership experience in foreign-diplomatic activity and their restrictions within Zimbabwe, it is not
surprising that they chose the colonial version of the Zimbabwean dispute.

20

Their misjudgment, rather, was in being

"mesmerized" by potential British rule and intervention
even after Britain clearly indicated that it would not intervene

21

and in underestimating the adverse effects of pro-

longed absences by the leadership.

22

Why did ZAPU and ZANU spend so much time in battling
each other rather than the Smith regime?

Internal schisms

and rival movements characterize many southern African
liberation movements; their nature and causes tend to be
interpreted differently. First, it is argued that internal
schisms are a by-product of regime repression.

Since re-

pression eventually forces groups into exile, they have
difficulty in waging an authentic guerrilla struggle and then
suffer morale problems and exaggerate their claims of
19
on this crucial strategic distinction, see Rejai,
p. 19; Robert Taber, The War of the Flea (Bungay, Suffolk:
The Chaucer Press, 1970), pp. 90-91; and Andrew Mack,
" Sharpening the Contradictions: Guerrilla Strategy in
Irr:perialist Wars'~ Race and Class 17 (Autumn 1975): 161-177.
20
21
22

Day, pp. 120-125.
Gibson, p. 156.
Day, pp. 125-128.
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"success."

These and other indignities and anxieties of

exile naturally engender epithets and charges of treason,
collusion with "agents of imperialism", "revisionism",and "adventurism."

23

Second, it is argued that liberation

movements - in exile or operating from within - are bureaucratic or political institutions in which demand for status,
roles and positions exceeds supply.

This leads to intense

competition for positions, whereby candidates attempt to
beat competitors by questioning their loyalty, commitment,
honesty and character, and invoke linguistic, tribal, regional,
racial and class considerations to demonstrate a greater fol24
.
1 OW1ng.

Third, some have argued that tribalism is not

simply a matter of revolutionary job competition, but that
rivalry among tribal and other ethno-linguistic groups
find expression in organizations.

This leads to struggles

among the leadership and the membership at large, defe·ctions
and eventually the creation of rival movements.

Particular

. 1 ar soc1a
. 1 group. 25
groups t h en t en d t o overrepresen t a par t 1cu
23

John A. Marcum, "The Exile Condition and Revolutionary
Effectiveness: Southern African Liberation Movements" in
Christian P. Potholm and Richard Dale (eds.), Southern Africa
in Perspective (New York: The Free Press, 1972), p. 274.
24

See the study of Mozambican liberation movements by
Walter C. Opello, "Pluralism and Elite Conflict in an Independence Movement: FRELIMO in the 1960s" Journal of Southern
African Studies 2 (October 1975): 66-82.'
25J. Bowyer Bell, "The Future of Guerrilla Revolution
in Southern Africa", Africa Today 19 (Winter 1972): 12-13.
Bell specifically includes the Zimbabwean movements in this
statement.
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To see the initial split between ZAPU and ZANU as an
irrevocable division of Mashona and Ma tabe•le political
loyalties, with the former located in ZANU and the latter in
ZAPU, seems strained.

Although almost half of ZAP1''s execu-

tives left to join ZANU there was no exodus among the local
branch leaders of the membership.

Not onJy did ZAPU retain

most of its membership, it continued to attract support in
urban areas that had large concentrations of Mashona and
Matabele.

E\·en the dissatisfaction with Nkomo cannot easily

be explained in tribal terms, as Nkomo is a member of the
Kf·.langa, a branch of the Mashona confederation but one which
liveE• in the western part of Zimbabwe and has close ties with
the Matabele.

Nkomo himself also apparently did not engage

in tribal exclusivism.

26

Yet, even if the original split was

not primarily due to tribal exclusivism, it was clear that
the organizations' exile condition, their close proximity in
Lusaka, the relative paucity of organizational positions and
regime repression provided a fertile ground for internecine
By 1965 ZAPU and ZANU seemed the bitterest of

warfare.

enemies, whose differences could not be resolved by the reconciliation attempts of the Organization of African Unity
(OAU).

The OAU then recognized and supported both

26

scholars agree that the initial split was not primarily over tribal matters.
See Bowman, p. 55; Wilkenson,
p. 228; Nelson, p. 179; and Gibson, pp. 161-162.
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. t.1ons. 27
organ1za
When UDI was announced in 1965, ZAPU and ZANU were in
a difficult position.

As the previous chapter showed, .blacks

in the various areas of Zimbabwe were unlikely to engage in
any spontaneous or locally organized action.

In addition,

the successive regimes had armed themselves with a battery
of repressjve means and used them to pre-empt any collective
action - urbc:.n or rural - by blacks.

While ZAPU and ZANU

regrouped, they were now based abroad, led by substitute
leadership, engaged in internecine warfare, and emphasized
foreign-diplomatic action more than preparation for guerrilla
struggle.

UDI and events in its aftermath presented a stun-

ning defeat for this strategy.

Britain remained unwilling

to intervene and even the independent African nations, who
were converted to the nation&.list cause, could not be
persuaded to sever diplomatic relations with Britain as a
retaliatory measure.

As far as the United Nations was con-

cerned it did react, but it was only after more than a year
that the Secu1·i ty Council determined that the

Zimbabwe~n

situation was, as argued by ZAPU and ZANU in terms of Article
39 of the UN Charter, a threat to international peace and
security.

The Security Council, however, still refused to

authorize the use of collective international force in
27

The OAU's African Liberation Committee did favor
ZAPU in its financial allocations. Martin and Johnson, p. 71.
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terms of Article 42.

Sanctions were instituted, but these
.

were b ro k en b y many na t 1ons.

28

Thus ZAPU and ZANU were faced with a situation that
necessitated action ain•ed at the overthrow of the Smith
regime as tt..e defacto sovereign power in Zimbabwe.

At the

same time the OAU adopted a policy whereby it would favor
only those liberation groups that waged effective politicalmilitary struggles within their respective territories.

29

ZAPU and ZANU now had to attempt guerrilla struggle within
Zimbabwe.

Between 1966 and 1970 ZAPU and ZANU clashed with

the regime's security forces on seven major occasions, with
six of these incidents directed by ZAPU.

Only the first

incident (or incursion) was directed by ZANU, which led to
a clash with regime security forces near Sinoia in April

1966.

ZANU infiltrat€d other groups and these survived un-

detected for a longer time, but they too were eventually
discovered and arrested and killed.

These actions by ZANU's

Zimbabwe African National LiberatioD Army (ZANLA) were

28
Negotiations and sanctions will be discussed in the
following chapter.
29

This decision followed on the failure of an ALC committee (composed of Malawi, Tanzania, Zambia, Uganda, Kenya
and Ethiopia) to unite ZAPU and ZANU. This committee was hampered by its own internal difficulties. Zambia, for example,
supported ZAPU, while ZANU was supported by Tanzania. Leonard
T. Kapung~ ''The OAU's Support for the Liberation of Southern
Africa" in Yassin El-Ayouty (ed.),The Organization of African
Unity After Ten Years: Comparative Perspectives (New York:
Praeger, 1975), pp. 138-139. On the OAU an~ ALC's views on
Zimbabwe, see Zdenek Cervenka, The Unfinished Quest for Unity
(London: Julian Friedmann Publishers, 1977), pp. 45-63 and
122-127.
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denounced by ZAPU, whose Zimbabv'e Liberation Army (ZLA) had
not yet made any incursions.
In July 1967 ZAPU forces,
•
accompanied by members of the South African ANC, infiltrated
Matabeleland North and made their way to the Wankie Game
Reserve in the south of the province.

By August and September

they were detected by the regime's security forces, attacked
and eventually captured and killed.

During 1968 ZAPU again

made infiltrations, one entering Zimbabwe from west of Lake
Kariba into Matabeleland North, and three to the east of the
lake.

These were also detected by the regime's security

forces and captured and/or killed.

During 1969 there were

no reported clashes within Zimbabwe, leading observers to
conclude that neither ZAPU nor ZANU could wage an effective
guerrilla campaign within the country.

30

This apparent demise of ZAPU and ZANU as effective
guerrilla forces can be explained in reference to their
mobilization efforts, their organizational forms, internal
problems, and the nature of counter guE·rrilla warfare by the
Smith regime.
30

wilkenson, pp. 232-244; J. Bowyer Bell, "The Frustration of Insurgency: The Rhodesian Example in the Sixties,"
Military Affairs 35 (February 1971): 1-5; Gibson, pp. 164
178; Kees Maxey, The Fight for Zimbabwe (London: Rex Collings,
1975); and Michael Morris, Armed Conflict in Southern Africa
(Cape Town, South Africa: Jeremy Spence, 1974), pp. 28-42.
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1.1.

Mobilization
There is no evidence to suggest that ZAPU and ZANU

intended to infiltrate trained recruits as agents for local
political mobilization during the period between 1965 and
1970.

Initial infiltrations from Zambia were not covert or

intended for local political targets, nor were attacks of
the "hit and run" variety.

Attacks consisted of conven-

tionally-styled positional warfare, rationalized by the
organizations as "facing the government squarely" or a
"policy of confrcntation."

31

This led to heavy losses and

demoralization.
There were several reasons for ZAPU and ZANU's taste
for confrontation.

One (and perhaps the most important)

reason was the OAU's stipulation that it would recognize and
support only the effective liberation organizations.

Con-

sequently the
polarized liberation movements, in order to gain the
support of the OAU, had to seem to be fighting.
So
armed men were sent into the territories at precisely
the time an OAU organ was about to meet ••• (and) leaders
of the liberation movements would go to the OAU and
claim to be waging an armed struggle ••• In other words,
revolutionary effectiveness was sacrificed for propc.gandistic reasons.32
The influence of international (as opposed to local) factors
is also evident in the targets of the infiltrating groups.
31

IIEz S. Reid,"African Nationalism in South Africa and
Zimbabwe" in Potholm and Dale, p. 44.
32

Kapungu, pp. 138-139.
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Both ZAPU and ZANU avoided the Tonga reserves adjacent to
Lake Kariba and preferied to risk a long and difficult route
to the more distant reserves in the vicinity of Bulawayo and
the farmworkers in the vicinity of Salisbury.

These targets

may be partly explained by the lure of urban areas, but more
obviously

by the fact that ZAPU and ZANU were conscious of

their ethnic stereotypes and tried to overcome them for
international consumption.

Thus ZANU (or ZANLA), which was

said to be dominated by Mashona,

entered Matabeleland, while

ZAPU with its Matabele stereotype, entered Mashonaland.

33

While these may have been laudable attempts to create supratribal organizations, it demonstrates the importance of
international factors in the respective organizations' strategic thinking.

Another r€ason for the taste for confrontation

was that the exile in Zambia had produced a psychological
attitude of, impatience, reinforced by the misguided belief
that the Smith regime, like the colonial regimes in former
struggles in Africa, would quickly succumb to the pressure
. 1 ence. 34
o f v1o

Finally, it is said that ZAPU, which directed

most of the armed clashes, was mainly trained in the Soviet
Union, whose training de-emphasized guerrilla warfare in
rural areas, whereas ZANU (or ZANLA) received most of its
33
34

wilkenson, p. 241.
Martin and Johnson, p. 11.

,.
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training from Chinese instructors, who were familiar with
the tenets of guerrilla warfare and the need for political
mo b 1.].1za t.1on. 35
Mobiliz&.tion efforts in the areas adjacent to Zambia
would be difficult.

Geographically Lake Kariba constitutes

a large part of the Zambia-Zimbabwe borde:·r and crossing it
by boat would expose the guerrillas to detection from the
air.

This left only two options for entry into target

areas:

one to the west of the lake into the Matabeleland

North province, and the other east of the lake into Mashonaland North.

As Tables I and II show, the northern areas of

Mashona- and Matabeleland North are largely depopulated,
because the land is designated as national land (game
reserves) or as unassigned land.

The more densely populated

reserves lie directly east of LakE: Kariba or further south.
Thus guerrillas had to spend much of the initial part of
their infiltration in steep (especially in Mashonaland North),
waterless, and otherwise inhospitable terrain without the
assistance of the local population - and hence deprived of
the means and ends of guerrilla warfare.
Clearly Zambia was of limited value as a base for
infiltration, although it was the only neighborhing state
willing to host ZAPU and ZANU.

When infiltration did take

place, the actions seemed premised more on international
than local factors, with ZANU and ZAPU preferring dramatic
35

Ibid., pp. 10-11.
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confrontations to score points with an international audience.

Even if mobilization were seriously attempted, it

would be difficult, as the area adjacent to Zambia is geophysically inhospitable and largely devoid of population.
1.2. Organizational Forms
By late 1970 most of the strategic assessments of the
progress of· ·zAPU and ZANU reflected a gloomy pessimism.

The

diagnosis, in most cases, was that the respective organizations needed to place greater emphasis on mobilization
efforts within Zimbabwe and, in order to do so, they needed
to become political parties.

36

ZAPU originally intended to be a political party that
operated within Zimbabwe and, before it was banned, it
formed a military wing, known first as the Zimbabwe Liberation Army (ZLA) and later as the Zimbabwe Peoples Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA), that was covertly directed by a member
of the ZAPU executive.

When ZAPU was banned it operated for

a time within Zimbabwe under the name of the Peoples Caretaker Council (PCC) and, when it was threatened with banning,
its leadership met at the Cold Comfort experimental farm,
dissolved existing internal organizational arrangements and
discussed arrangements if banning were indeed to occur.
When the PCC was then banned, the remnants of ZAPU gathered
36

See, for· example, Kenneth W. Grundy, Confrontation
and Accomodation in Southern Africa (Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1973), pp. 180-183.
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in LusakE under the arrangements made at the Cold Comfort
meeting.

Chikerema was the acting president in Nkomo's

absence and headed a national executive, with each of the
members of the executive at the head of functional areas,
such as youth affairs, education, military affairs, and so
forth.

Authority over ZIPRA was exercised by a high command,

headed by a military commander (or head of staff).

The

actual planning and waging of the guerrilla struggle was
placed under the authority of a War Council, representing
military and civilian-political leaders.

37

The Cold Comfort meeting was not a constitutional
conference; it simply made practical arrangements which, in
the absence of Nkomo and under the conditions of exile,
had deteriorated to disarray and mismanagement.

These

internal problems were publicly aired in three documents.
The first document, "Observations on Our Struggle"

W8.S

pre-

sented by Moyo (ZAPU's national treEsurer and second in
command in the military department) and criticised the indiscipline and self-indulgence of ZIPRA members, the dictatorial leadership style of Chikerema, and the Zambian intelligence forces' penetration of ZAPU.

To correct these prob-

lems, Moyo proposed that military-style discipline should
37G.b
1. son, pp. 169-170.
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be imposed, the War Council should be strengthened by including more ZIPRA forces and particularly the members of
the high command, recruitment efforts should be increased,
and ZAPU should review its strategy of confrontation.

In

the second document, "Reply to Observation on Our Struggle"
Chikerema defended hjs leadership style by noting that the
Cold Comfort meeting did not create formal structures but
resigned itself to Nkomo's judgment on such matters.

Since

Nkomo then appointed Chikerema, hjs position could not be
questioned.

While Chikerema did admit that ZIPRA

leadership, sound administration and cohesion, he

lack~:
accusE~d

Moyo of trying to manipulate the positions within it so as
to establish his own influence.

Therefore Moyo was relieved

of his command, as were his supporters on the executive
committee (Nyandoro and Silundika).

Chikerema's actions

led to a third document, "On the Coup Crisis Precipitated by

J. Chikerema", wherein Moyo and Silundika disassociated
themselves from Nyandoro and called for the collective
exercise of authority within ZAPu.

38

As these documents indicate, there were sevE·ral
causes of the internal problems of ZAPU, which together
reveal its internal dynamics.

First, the rivals on the ZAPU

executive were supported by tribal groups, with the Zezuru
38

This section is based on Ibid., pp. 169-173.
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(a branch of the Mashona) conspicuous supporters of Chikerema
and the Matabele supporting Moyo and Silundika.

Indeed,

ZAPU could only maintain a facade of md ty by housing the
rival factions in separate military camps and political
.
39
o ff 1ces.

Second, it was clear that the internal rivalries

were fueled by the highly informal organizational form of
ZAPU.

Nkomo's leadership style derived from his personal

authority, but Chikerema's imitation of it was clearly unsuccessful.

Third,

it became evident that the rjvals on the

executive were maneuvering to gain control over the 400-man
ZIPRA contingent,

40

but their very rivalry made them

incap-

able of doing so.
ZANU's organizational form was originally set by a
party congress, attended by 22 members, at Gwelo in May 1964.
It crea tec1 a central commit tee, with members

respon~>ible

functional areas, and appointed Chitepo as president.

for

When

ZANU was banned in September 1964, the central committee
instructed Chitepo to organize a military wing, known as
ZANLA, which was headed by a military high comm£.nd and a
commander.

The daily operations of the struggJe fell under

the authority of a Revolutionary Council,
members and headed by Chitepo.
39
40

41

Martin and Johnson, pp. 29-30.
Ibid., p. 30.

41G.b
1 son, pp. 180-181.

composed of 16

243

Like ZAPU, ZANU experienced internal problems in
Lusaka and accusations were made of the self-indulgence of
leaders, a lack of resolve, tribalism, and personality ·
clashes.

The discussion of these problems at ZAPU's first

annual review conference nevertheless resulted in the
reaffirmation of Chitepo as leader, but led to an internal
reorganization as the Revolutionary Council was replaced
by a Supreme Council, known as DARE (short for Dare re
Chimurenga).

The civilian-political leaders also attempted

to assert their leadership over ZANLA by having a member of
the central committee, the secretary of defense, chair the
DARE meetings.

42

The reorganization did not solve all of

ZANU's internal problems, as Chitepo continued to be the
target of criticism, the "politicians" on DARE were accused
of a preoccupation with foreign-diplomatic action and preference for dramatic guerrilla confrontations, and tribalism.
With regard to the latter, two-thirds of DARE were indeed
Mashona, as well as many of tte other top positions within
ZANU.

There was not, however, a single branch of the

Mashona that dominated ZANu.

43

By 1970 ZAPU and ZANU were thus

in a period of orga-

nizational transformation as they struggled to adjust to
the exile environment in Zambia, tried to transform
42
43

Ibid., pp. 181-183.
Gann and Henrikson, p. 106 (fn. 36).
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themselves into entities capable of waging effective guerrilla warfare (i.e. they had to develop a military component
or had to become armies rather than parties), and as the·
leadership underwent a transition with the positions of the
former prominent leaders now filled by less known figures.
In view of these transitions, it was inevitable that internal problems and rivalries would be exacerbated.

Most pro-

minent among these was the tension between the guerrillas
and the civilian-political leaders (the "politicians"),
with the latter being accused of avoiding a genuine guerrilla
struggle within Zimbabwe.

Even within the ranks of the

political leadership there were rivalries, caused by a
variety of factors including personality, tactics, leadership
style and the use of tribal support in bids for power.

Yet

neither ZAPU nor ZANU were, as stereotyped, exclusive Matabele or

Mashon~

organizations.

Tribal attachments were used

rather than dominated.
1.3. Leadership
The leadership of ZAPl! and ZANU were primarily drawn
from the ranks of urban and professional blacks; teachers,
in particular, were heavily represented.

44

Most of the

leadership had by 1970 acquired experience of foreign travel.
The various branches of the Mashona are predominant, as could
44 Mugabe, Sithole, Silundika and Takawjra were among
the teachers. Chitepo was a lawyer.
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be expected from a black population which is about 71 percent Mashona and about 16 percent Matabele.

45

Most of the

leadership was spawned by the black organizational activity
of the 1950s.

Moyo, Nkomo, Takawira, Mugabe and Sithc.le all

had experience in the ANC and the NDP, while Moyo and Nkomo
were also formerly active in black trade union politics.
Many

indeed.~pent

most of their adult lives as organizational

. . t s. 46
ac t 1v1s

Since most of these leaders were former office-holders
of black organizations, it left each with soo1e experience
of organizational politics, but also with a personal following and personal-political ambitions.

While most of the top

leadership was in detention between 1962 and 1970 (and thereafter), the secondary leadership who moved into their vacated
organizational positions moved in an organizational environment where new offices and roles were created.

This encouraged

the cultivation of personal followings, rivalries and other
power-seeking behavior and, although this equipped many with
in-fighting skills, the attempt to wage guerrilla war required
and generated a new leadership component.

By 1970 many of

the ZP.PU and ZANU recruits had returned from training abroad,
but they had not yet moved into important decision-making
positions.
45

It was nevertheless clear that the political

Nelson, p. 74.

46 Nyandoro and Chikerema were orginally active in the
Youth League in Salisbury. See the previous chapter.
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leadership was rethinking its strategy of foreign-diplomatic
actions combined with some dramatic military confrontations.
In early 1970 ZAPU's Chikerema stated that they were now
preparing for a protracted guerrilla struggle that required
political mobilization and covert rural organizations.

Chikerema

gave no indication as to how ZAPU would accomplish this, given
that ZAPU was internally divided and Zambia had severe limitations
as a base for infiltration.

There was no mention of ZAPU's

earlier cooperation with the South African ANC or,

47

more

importantly, that ZAPU would attempt to make contact with the
Frente de Libertacao de Mozambique (FRELIMO) of Mozambique.
Since 1968 FRELIMO had been successful at establishing its presence in the northwestern province of Mozambique, Tete, which
was adjacent to the northeastern areas of Zimbabwe.

A working

relationship with FRELIMO could allow ZIRPA forces to enter
Mashonaland North and South.

48

ZANU's leadership made no public

mention of a change in strategy; indeed the most startling
strategic statement came from Sithole, on trial for advocating
the murder of Ian Smith, who said:

"I wish to disassociate my

name in word, thought or deed from any subversive activities,
from any terrorist activities, and from any form of violence." 49
47G.b
1 son, pp. 168-169.
48

FRELIMO in fact saw ZAPU as its natural ally but the
internal problems of ZAPU prevented it from making any lasting contact with FRELIMO. Martin and Johnson, pp. 15-16.
49

Ibid., p. 148.
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Nevertheless ZANU continued to send recruits to their training camp at

Itumbi in Zambia, where they were trained by

Tanzanian and Chinese instructors.

50

ZANU had not made ·any

noteworthy incursions into Zimbabwe since 1966, but it
established a working relationship with FRELIMO, which permitted a small contingent of ZANLA forces to join FRELIMO

operations~~ observers and trainees. 51
Thus the leadership that was in effective control of
ZAPU and ZANU in Zambia was only a fraction of the leadership
spawned by black organizational activity of the 1950s.

The

competitiveness of this elite was encouraged by the transitional organizational environment in which they found themselves.

Guerrilla war also required new leadership skills

and, although training was underway, a new style of leadership had not yet emerged.
important success, namely

ZANU's leaders did have one
th~ir

contact with FRELIMO; if

FRELIMO then could establish its control in Mozambique,
this would widen the tactical possibilities for ZANU.
1.4. Counter Guerrilla Warfare
When UDI was declared the Zimbabwean defense establishment was divided into three components, namely the regular
50

with little mobilization and recruitment within
Zambabwe, ZAPU and ZANU found recruits within the large exile
and refugee communities of Zimbabweans in Zambia. Gann and
Henrikson, p. 97.
51 Martin and Johnson, pp. 17-18.
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(or standing ) force, the territorial (or citizen) force,
and the British South Africa Police.
The regular force consisted of the Rhodesia Army and
the Rhodesia Air Force.

The Rhodesia Army numbered approxi-

mately 3,500 men and was organized into two battalions, the
all-white Royal Rhodesia Rf:giment and the Rhodesian African
Rifles of about 1,000 black troops under the command of
white officers.

These were both infantry battalions, and

resorted under the authority of a military headquarters.

The

Rhodesia Air Force by 1969 consisted of approximately 1,000
men, organized into seven squadrons, with about 80 aircraft.

52

The territorial force consisted of approximately 10,000 white
men, organized into eight infantry' battalions and support
units.

These men were called up for nine months of national

service, after which they were assigned to certain units,
attended parades, or could be activated.

The British South

Africa Police consisted of approximately 6,400 men in permanent employ.

The BSAP was a quasi-military force; its mem-

bers were trained in light infantry tactics and carried light
arms.

A considerable proportion of the BSAP was black, either

as policemen or as messengers.

In addition to the permanent

employees of the BSAP, there was a reserve police force, which
expanded during the 1960s; its largely white membership rose
52

The development of the air force occurred under the
CAFand, when it was dissolved, the air force was transferred
tothe Zimbabwean defense establishment.
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to about 28,500 in 1970.

In equipment, training and doctrine,

the Zimbabwean military establishment was deeply influenced
by the British military tradition.

53

A rough division of labor existed among the above

military components.

The regular army and the air force were

responsible for security in the border areas, while the BSAP
was responsible for ordinary crime control and other matters
affecting the public security in internal areas.

Both of

these responsibilities were aided by a well-organized intelligence system, which included a network of urban and rural
. f ormers. 54
bl ac k 1n
When the first infiltration of guerrillas occurred, the
Zimbabwean military establishment's only exposure to guerrilla
warfare
gency.

55

was service as a volunteer unit in the Malayan EmerDuring the ensuing period (1966 and after) the

security forces nevertheless countered the guerrilla threat
53

Internation~l Institute for Strategic Studies, The
Military Balance, 1969-1970 (London, 1970), p. 53 and Richard
Booth, The Armed Forces of African ~tates, Adelphi Papers,
No. 67 (May 1970). For the historical development of the Zimbabwean armed forces, see Lewis H. Gann, "From Ox Wagon to
Armored Car'~ Military Review 48 (April 1968): 63-72.
54

Besides the intelligence network, small parties of
security forces masquerading as guerrillas were also allowed
to roam the countryside. See Roy Christie, For the President's
Eyes Only (Johannesburg: Hugh Keartland Publishers, 1971),
pp. 10-30 and Martin and Johnson, p. 9.

55This unit included Peter Walls, later the supreme
commander of the regime's security forces.
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in a way that was touted as a model for counter-guerrilla
warfare elsewhere.

Acting on the information of its intel-

ligence network and air surveillance, tracker units would be
dispatched by helicopter to identify the position of guerrillas, and then other units (or the tracker unit) would
ambush, capture and/or kill the guerrillas.

Three units dis-

tinguished themselves in these actions, namely the Grey's
Scouts, a highly mobile infantry unit; the Selous Scouts,
essentially a tracker unit composed of blacks and whites and
trained to roam the countryside for long periods of time; and
the Special Air Services, an airborne commando unit with intelligence and light infantry duties.

56

In assessing the effectiveness of the counter guerrilla
operations it is important to remember that the initial guerrilla attacks were small and rather clumsy.

Moreover, the

regime's security forces were supported by South African
men and equipment after ZAPU announced that it had formed a
military alliance with South Africa's ANC.

The South African

para-military contingent was responsible for security in the
border area west of Lake Kariba, and was assisted by South
African helicopters and spotter planes.

Estimates of the

size of the contingent vary, but even a conservative estimate
56 see particularly Bell, "The Frustration of Insurgency:
The Rhodesian Example in the Sixties"; Russel W. Howe, "War
in Southern Africa", Foreign Affairs 48 (October 1969): 150165; and Gann and Henrikson, pp. 64-66. For a contrasting
View, see Fire Force Exposed (London: Anti-Apartheid Movement,
1979).
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of 1,000 men gave South Africa a substantial role in the
Zimbabwean operations.

57

The cost of the para-military

contingent was borne by South Africa.

58

An assessment of

the regime's security operations also has to account for
its cost.

There was a gradual rise in defense expenditures,

from approximately Rh $20 million in 1964 to approximately
Rh $40 million in 1973.

In 1967 the defense expenditures

amounted to about 6.5 percent of the annual budget, rising
to about 9 percent in 1973.

59

With regard to manpower, the

size of the regular force and the BSAP did not noticeably
increase, but the police reserve and especially the territorial force and its commitments expanded.

National service

was forced to increase to a twelve-month period of active
duty (up from nine months), after which the trainees were
subject to one-month or longer short tours of duty.

60

These

57
'
While guerrillas claimed that there were 8,000 South
African troops by 1972, other accounts estimate the number
at 5,000 in the same year, rising to between 7,000 and 10,000
by 1973. Stockholm Institute for Peace Research (SIPRI),
Southern Africa: The Escalation of a Conflict (New York:
Praeger, 1976), p. 109. Nelson estimates the number at 1,000
by early 1970 (p. 347).
58

wilkenson, pp. 328-329.

59 see Ibid., p. 306; Nelson, p. 336 and Kenneth W.
Grundy, "The Social Costs of Armed Struggle in Southern Pfrica"
Armed Forces and Society 7 (Spring 1981): 456. Hereafter cited
as "Social Costs". These figures are drawn from the Central
Statistical Office in Salisbury.
It is likely that they do
not reveal disguised military expenditures or South African
budget support.
60

Grundy, "Social Costs", pp. 447-448.
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commitments

we~e

a drain on the Zimbabwean economy, but the

war itself did not seem to increase emigration as there was
a net overall gain in immigration during the 1965-1970

. d . 61
per1o
In view of the self-destructive behaviour of ZAPU and
ZANU of this period, the size of the South African contingent, and the costs (although still modest) of the security
operations, the regime's "success" at countering the guerrilla threat was clearly a qualified one.

Yet the regime

viewed the decline of guerrilla activities during 1969 and

1970 as an unqualified success.

Instead of a simple boost in

62
. t o overcon f"d
mor a 1 e, th ey 1 aspe d 1n
1 ence.
1.5.

Summary
By the end of 1970 there thus was little evidence that

ZAPU or ZANU was engaging in a serious and sustained attempt
at mobilizing rural blacks in its cause.

There was some

infiltration, but these efforts were rather clumsy and aimed
more at scoring foreign-diplomatic victories than on local
mobilization.

With no visible increases in local or rural

black activity it is thus clear that rural blacks would not
become more active at the mere existence of ZAPU and ZANU.
The blacks of the reserves, the purchase area farmers and

61 see Wilkenson, p. 307 and William G. Kuepper, G.
Lynne Lackey and E. Nelson Swinerton, pp. 5-6.
62 Gann and Herikson, p. 67 and Martin and Johnson, p. 96.
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and the farmworkers seemed to change little from the position in 1965.

With regard to organizational form, both ZAPU

and ZANU were in a transitional period complicated by the
conditions of exile and elite competitiveness.

ZAPU and ZANU

were neither fully armies or political parties; they were
more informal organizations characterized by the tension
between their military and civilian-political components.
The leadership (or elite) of ZAPU and ZANU was, despite the
similarity of their socio-economic backgrounds and their
past experiences, characterized by highly competitive
behavior by substitute leaders.

There was no single reason

for this competitiveness; it appears to be a combination of,
among other things, the pressures of the exile environment,
personality factors, organizational setting, and personal
ambitions nurtured by a long involvement in organizational
black politics.
Given these features, the counter guerrilla actions
clearly scored a victory by default, but the Smith regime
did not view it as such.

Rather, they overlooked the cost

of their operations and overlooked the possibility of renewed
guerrilla actions.

In short, the regime became complacent

because they thought that they had scored a military victory.
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2.

1971-1979:

Guerrilla Warfare

In the period between 1971 and 1972 security forces
reported no armed clashes with the guerrillas, but several
signs pointed to the increase of guerrilla activity.

In the

areas bordering on Zambia, ZIPRA concentrated on the use of
landmines against civilian and military vehicles.

In retalia-

tion, the Smith regime demanded guarantees from Zambia that
guerrilla infiltration cease and, when this was not forthcoming, closed the border with Zambia.

63

In the northeastern

areas bordering on Mozambique there were reports of armed
clashes and infiltration, and the Smith regime expressed
alarm at the failure of the Portuguese forces to contain
FRELIMO in Tete.

64

By the end of 1972 (December) the Smith

regime indeed admitted that guerrilla actions were increasing,
and said that the situation was "far more serious than it
appears on the surface."

65

63

Despite Zambia's refusal to prevent guerrilla infiltration, Smith reopened the border, but the Zambian government regarded the closure as permanent. For a full account,
see The Rhodesia-Zambia Border Closure, January-February 1973
(London:
International Defense and Aid Fund, May 1973).
64
65

wilkenson, pp. 273-274.

Ibid., p. 258 and Maxey, p. 108. According to BSAP
statistics (Wilkenson, p. 231) there was a rise in the contraventions in the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act from 130 in
1970 to 396 in 1972 and finally to 636 in 1972. These figures
do not necessarily reveal a rise in rural political activity,
as they include urban unrest associated with the arrival of
the Pearce Commission and the creation of the African National
Council by Bishop Muzorewa.
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Between 1971 and 1972 there were no signs, however,
that ZAPU and ZANU would reconcile their differences.

The

continued internecine warfare led to a threat by President
Kaunda of Zambia in late 1971 that, unless they settled their
differences, he would expel them from Zambia.

In response

some of the leaders of ZAPU and ZANU formed the Front for the
Liberation of Zimbabwe (FROLIZI), but FROLIZI was actively
supported by only James Chikerema, leading to charges that
FROLIZI was a Zezuru clique.

FROLIZI nevertheless did

manage to establish a training camp and infiltrated a few
guerr1"11 a groups. 66
it collapsed.

As a political force of unity, however,

67

With ZAPU and ZANU unreconciled, the period between

1970 and 1972 witnessed the rebirth of overt organizational
68
black activity within Zimbabwe.
During 1970 the British
and Zimbabwean governments announced the conclusion of a
settlement and in 1971 a British commission, led by Lord
Pearce, arrived in Zimbabwe to test blacks' acceptance of
•t • 69

1

To organize black opposition to the proposals an

African National Council (ANC) was created by the Reverend
66

A second attempt at a unified front came when ZAPU
and ZANU announced the formation of a joint military command
(JMC).
67

see Tony Kirk, "Politics and Violence in Rhodesia"
African Affairs 74 (January 1975): 3-38.

68

up to this point blacks found electoral expression
in the multi-racial Centre Party, who returned seven members
of parliament.
69Negotiations will be discussed in next chapter.
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canaan

Banana and Bishop Abel Muzorewa.

The ANC quickly

demonstrated its urban viability by organizing meetings,
providing blacks with information, and by advertising its
opposition to the proposals.

The subsequent British rejec-

tion of the settlement proposals further enhanced the stature
. par t•1cu1 ar. 70
o f th e ANC an d Muzorewa 1n
When ZANU then claimed responsibility for an attack
on a white farm in the northeastern districts in December
1972, it was against a background marked by the emergence of
the ANC within Zimbabwe and the deteriorating position of
the Portuguese forces in Mozambique.

These and other

domestic and international events influenced ZAPU and ZANU's
subsequent mobilization efforts, their organizational form,
the behaviour of their elite, and the nature of the regime's
counter guerrilla operations.
2.1. Mobilization
In the two years after the attack of December 1972,
ZANLA used the Tete province of Mozambique to infiltrate the
northeastern areas of Zimbabwe.

This border area consists of

a 150 mile long and 40 mile wide set of black reserves, as
well as the small Chesa purchase area, and its rugged geophysical features facilitate guerrilla operations.

By

70
:
On the creation of the ANC, see Eshmael Mlambo (ed.)
No Future Without Us: The Story of the African National
Council (London: The African National Council, 1973).
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mid-1973 ZANLA had in fact firmly established its political
influence over the area.

71

ZANLA initially acquired its freedom of movement in
the northeastern areas by making covert contact with the
religious and political authorities of local areas.

Thus

ZANLA made contact with the relevant spirit mediums and, in
honour of their role in these and past actions, named their
operational sectors after them,

72

and made contact with

sympathetic chiefs, ward- and kraalheads.

73

With the support

of the inhabitants of the reserves and the purchase areas,
ZANLA then launched a variety of actions.
stores;

74

They robbed

ambushed security forces (often after these hit

landmines); abducted and/or killed civilians; and, acting on
the information supplied by farmworkers, attacked white
farmers and their property.

75

These actions were undertaken

71

Maxey, pp. 98-131; Wilkenson, p. 284; and Martin and
Johnson, pp. 73-91.
72

on the nature and importance of the spirit mediums
in the guerrilla struggle, see Terence 0. Rc.nger "The Death
of Chaminuka: Spirit Mediums, Nationalism and the Guerrilla
Wf:·.r in Zimbabwe•; African A:ffairs 81 (July 1982): 349-369.
73

An early supporter in the northE:astern areas was
Chief Chiweshe of the Chiweshe reserve. Unsympathetic tribal
leaders frequently became targets for attack. Gann and
Henrikson, pp. 90-92.
74

There is some evidence that social banditry was interspersed with the guerrilla warfare, and that guerrillas' indiscipline led to criminal actions. Wilkenson, p. 269.
75 Jbid., pp. 268-270.
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bY full-time and part-time (or locally recruited) guerrillas,
both of whom were assisted by women and mujibas (landless,
unemployed or otherwise available young men) who acted as
local scouts and contacts.

Full-time recurits were heavily

drawn from local villages and particularly from the migrant
and refugee communities in Zambia and Mozambique.

Judging

from the number of abductions and press-gangings, it was
clear that ZANLA experienced some recruitment problems at
.
t.1me. 76
t h 1s

Although ZANLA had acquired freedom of movement within
the reserves and the purchase areas of the northeastern districts, they did not attempt to create "liberated areas",
as characterized by geo-political control and the creation
of alternative political institutions.

The reason was that

the security forces could still detect and pursue ZANLA
forces.

77

Yet ZANLA established a political network and, as

long as it was supported by the local population and remained
highly mobile, they could continue their actions in the area.
In the western areas ZIPRA continued its mine offensive, supplemented by a number of infiltrations, ambushes
and other attacks.

While the scale of their operation was

76

Gann and Henrikson, pp. 97-99 and Martin and Johnson,
pp. 73-91.
77Martyn Gregory, "Zimbabwe 1980: Politicisation
through Armed Struggle and Electoral Mobilization" Journal
of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 19 (March 1981): 69.
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smaller than that of ZANLA, ZIPRA forces were more disciplined, better equipped and trained, and were capable of
executing well-planned and -led operations.

78

Given these

qualities, the Smith regime expected an increase in ZIPRA
activities, especially in the southeastern areas of Matabeleland.

79
The Portuguese coup of April 1974 created new possi-

bilities for ZANLA.

It had established a working relation-

ship with FRELIMO and, with the active support of FRELIMO
as the future government of Mozambique or even with the
absence of Portuguese forces, ZANLA could locate its bases
within the sanctuary of Mozambique and infiltrate Zimbabwe
along the long eastern border.

Due to problems within

ZANLA and ZIPRA, however, it was only two years after the
Portuguese coup (in 1976) that they could make full use of
these tactical possibilities.
The Portuguese coup led to a "spirit of detente" in
southern Africa as Zambia responded to South Africa's request for a relaxation of tensions in the area.

This led

to a summit meeting of southern African leaders at Victoria
Falls in December 1974 to settle, among other things, the
Zimbabwean question.

As an indication of its good faith

78 This was also the view of the Smith regime.
See Paul
Moorcraft, A Short Thous~nd Years: The End of Rhodesia~s
Rebellion (Salisbury·: Galaxie, 1979), p. 164.
79
Martin and Johnson, p. 112.
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in the detente effort, the Smith regime released the detained
nationalist leaders, allowing Nkomo, Sithole, Chikerema and
Muzorewa to attend the meeting.

These leaders signed a

"unity agreement" to provide for a common bargaining position
during the negotiations; the respective organizations (ZAPU
and ZANU) would still exist, but the ANC, now called the
United African National Council or UANC, would be the umbrella
organization for the nationalists.
was

institut~d

80

A temporary ceasefire

as a prelude to negotiations.

Despite these

developments, the effort at negotiations was shortlived and
by January 1975 the ceasefire and the unity collapsed.

The

Smith regime stopped the release of detained leaders (or
members of banned organizations) and guerrilla attacks continued.
In Zambia, however, ZANU was wracked by internal political and military problems.

In March 1975 Chitepo, its pre-

sident, was killed by a car bomb, and the Zambian authorities
suspected the other leaders of ZANU to be responsible and
therefore arrested most of the DARE and ZANLA high command.
In addition, several senior military commanders led by Thomas
Nhari attempted a coup within ZANU and the violence that
accompanied it led the Zambian authorities to make a sweeping
series of arrests of ZANU (and ZANLA) members.

In March 1975

Zambia in fact banned ZANU and the other nationalist groups
and closed their offices.
8

The remaining guerrillas

°For the text, see Nyangoni and Nyandoro, pp. 295-296.
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were restricted to their bases and training camps.
authorities responded similarly in May 1975.

Tanzanian

In Tanzania

there was also dissatisfaction among ZANLA forces concerning
the political leadership.

Guerrillas at the Mgagao training

camp produced a Mgagao Declaration charging that the present
political leadership (Sithole of ZANU itself and Chikerema,
Nkomo and Muzorewa of the UANC as umbrella organization) were
wholly incapable of leading the guerrilla struggle.

Of the

leE.dership, only Robert Mugabe was singled out for praise.
In Mozambique, where the transition to a FRELIMO government
was under way and where the ramificaitons of Chitepo's murder
was also felt, ZANLA guerrillas were effectively restricted
to their bases and training camps.

Mugabe and a senior ZANLA

commander Tekere was under vitural house arrest in Quelimane.
The result of these problems within ZANU was predictable, while
the number of recruits arriving in Mozambique increased, organizational activity declined to about three active guerrilla
groups within Zimbabwe.

81

While the hosts of the nationalist organizations were
agreed that the struggle against the Smith regime should continue, their attitude by 1975 was that guerrilla actions as
hitherto

characterized could no longer be supported.

Con-

sequently they agreed that all the guerrillas should be concentrated in Mozambique under some form of unity.
81

Martin and Johnson, p. 215.

Thus ZIPRA
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and ZANLA were to merge into a united Zimbabwe Peoples Army
(ZIPA), and be led by a military committee of 18 members with
ReX Nhongo (the senior ZANLA commander)

a~

chief of staff.

It was unclear as to uhder what political authority ZIPA
would function.

Mugabe was the appointed leader of the guer-

rillas ZANLA, but ZANU's leaders~lp still formally belonged
.
.
to Sithole and, moreover, Mugabe's movements within Mozambique were restricted.

ZAPU was led by Nkomo, but he advo-

cated a negotiated ending to the conflict and was involved in
the UANC of Muzorewa.

As such he did not command the con-

fidence of the guerrillas of ZIPA.

82

By the end of 1975 there were between 5,000 and 10,000
guerrillas of ZANLA gathered in Mozambican camps, as well as
a much smaller ZIPRA contingent,
tration began again.

83

and in January 1976 infil-

Unlike their earlier efforts, the guer-

rillas now had few recruitment problems and could infiltrate
'Zimbabwe at more points, including the Manicaland, Victoria
and Matabeleland South provinnes.

By the end of_ 1976

Proximately 1700 guerrillas had crossed the

~P~

bbrd~r:into

82 The 'ANC formed a council to direct guerrilla acti~i
ties, the Zimbabwe Liberation Council or ZLC, composed of
Muzorewa, Sithole, Chikerema and Nkomo.
83

A figure of at least 6,000 ZANLA guerrillas and 1,000
ZIPRA guerrillas is usually cited. See Patrick O'Meara,'~ho
aesia: From White Rule to Independent Zimbabwe" in Gwendolen
(BlCar~er and Patrick O'Meara (eds), Southern Africa in Crisis
oom~ngton, Indiana:
Indiana University Press, 1977), pp.
36 ~37; Gann and Henrikson, p. 103; and Robert I. Rotberg,
S
-lffer the Future (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard Univers ty Press, 1980), p. 262.
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Zimbabwe 84 and .the Smith regime admitted that the "war zone"
85
bad doubled.
In the following years (1976 to 1979) guerrilla actions increased. dramatically.

By_ July, ZANLA guer-

rillas within Zimbabwe increased to approximately 3,000 and
their actions resulted in the deaths of 197 security forces.
86
In the western areas ZIPRA acti~ity also increased.
By
March 1978 ZANLA's forces within Zimbabwe rose to 13,000
and even higher (to about 15,000) by July 1979.

87

While the availability of Mozambique as a host state
increased with effectiveness of ZANLA and ZIPRA actions
increased, there were still problems within the organizations.
One of these was that political and military cooperation was
tenuous.

In October 1974 the leaders of ZAPU and ZANU formed

the Patriotic Front (PF) to facilitate their negotiations
at the Geneva conference organized by the British government,
but this cooperation did not encourage military cooperation.
During the preceding years ZANLA and ZIPRA bad acquired

dif~

ferent zones of influence, received different training and
84

Gann and Henrikson, p. 80.

85

O'Meara, pp. 33-34. During 1976, 191 security forces
and 45 civilians were killed.
In retaliation, Zimbabwe closed
its border with Vozambique in March 1976. Martin and Johnson,
p. 263.
86

Rotberg; Suffer the Future, pp. 262-263.

87
The extent of ZANLA's infiltration, presented in a
Paper at the Lancaster House conference, was confirmed.by its
acceptance by the Zimbabwean and British governments. See
Martin and Johnson, pp. xx-xxi.
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were different in organization, discipline and tactical
doctrine.

ZIPA could not resolve these differences and

violent clashes between them continued.

88

As before, these

clashes led to detentions by the Mozambican government.
ZANLA also had to contend with the effects of raids by the
security forces' raids on their bases and training camps.
By 1979 it was clear that ZIPA was in practice dominated by
ZANLA.

Many of the ZIPRA guerrillas left Mozambique and

returned to Zambia and by the end of 1979 ZANLA was responsible for most of the attacks in the northeast, while ZIPRA
was responsible for most of the guerrilla action in the
western areas adjacent to Zambia.

89

Guerrilla infiltration thus occurred in two waves:
the first occurred in the 1972/1973 period, was directed
by ZANLA, and was geographically focused on the northeastern
areas' reserves and small purchase areas; the second wave
occurred in the 1976-1979 period, was again mainly directed
by ZANLA (although ZIPRA actions also increased) and spread
from the northeastern areas westward towards the central and
southeastern

arP.~S

of Zimbabwe.

Infiltration was thus

8 8ro counter training differences, ZANLA and ZIPRA would
in the future receive training at the same camp (Nachingwea)
in Tanzania.
89There is wide agreement on this point. See Gregory,
pp. 73-74; Gann and Henrikson, pp. 54-55; Martin and Johnson,
pp. 235-263; and Colin Legum, Western Crisis Over Southern
Africa (New York: Africana Publishing Company, 1979), pp.
219-220. Hereafter cited as Western Crisis.
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strongly influenced by the availability of Mozambique as a
host state.

The guerrillas were supported by the blacks of

the reserves and the purchase areas and enjoyed most of their
freedom of action in the reserves.

Black farmworkers were

also crucial, in that they supplied information about suitable targets for attack.

It is doubtful whether the reserves

were liberated areas in the sense that the term is usually
used, nor was there extensive mobilization by incorporating
the local population into the political organization of ZAPU
or ZANU.

Both ZANLA and ZIPRA enjoyed some freedom of action

within their separate regions of influence as a result of
local political support but, except for recruits drawn from
villages, the rural population's role was designed to meet
military rather than political purposes.
2.2.

90

Organizational Form
In 1970 ZAPU and ZANU were neither fully political

parties nor fully armies, but were rather highly informal
organizations struggling to transform into entities capable
of waging guerrilla warfare.

This transition was complicated

by tensions between military and civilian-political leaders
and other divisive factors.

In the years between 1971 and

1979, ZANU was characterized by the following organizational
features.
90 Political mobilization increased dramatically after
the announcement of upcoming elections. Gregory, pp. 67-91.
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First, ZANLA remained a loosely organized military
organization without the benefit of a stable command structure or leadership.

At the highest organizational level,

ZANLA's actions were directed by the DARE and the high command and, at lower levels, there were regional (or geographical) commands, operating under the authority of a
provincial and operational commander and a dozen section
commanders.

This organizational arrangement, combined with

attrition by the security forces and the intermittent
absences of military commanders, provided an environment suitable for the development of personal followings and cliques. 91
Second, while ZANLA could nominally absorb more recruits, it was ill-equipped to adequately train, equip and
command increasing numbers of recruits.

Only a fraction of

the new recruits received full training from the Chinese,
Tanzanian and Mozambican instructors.

Many of these recruits,

moreover, came from urban environments and, when they were
infiltrated in rural environments without maps, medicine,
arms and other aids, their effectiveness was often limited.
Bf:sides the resulting morale problems and psychological exhaustion, the guerrillas often felt betrayed by their
91

Lower level section commanders were given discretionary powers as to the selection of targets. This may have
contributed to the tendency to cultivate personal followings
and banditry. Wr,ll-known examples of this are Kid Morongorongo, Nhari and Solomon Ngoni.
See Anatomy of Fear (Salisbury: M:-tnistry of Information, 1974).
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leadership and thus became resentful towards superiors.

92

Third, while some of the rank-and-file's resentments
were vented against their military superiors, most of the
bitterest sentiments were reserved for the political leaders.
"Politicians" were seen as self-indulgent, deceitful, ambitious and lacking resolve; in contrast, the guerrillas were
seen as dedicated "boys in the bush" and "fighters."

As

indicated before, these tensions played a key role in the
Nhari rebellion and the Mgagao Declaration and were heightened
by the return of the detained political leadership after
1975.

Nkomo, who advocated a negotiated settlement to the

dispute, and Sithole, who had denounced the guerrilla struggle at his trial, were particular targets of criticism.

93

Finally, when Sithole was released and tried to reassert his leadership in ZANU, he was defeated.

Sithole tried

to replace Tongogara, who was the elected as ZANU's secretary
of defense in 1973, held a position on the DARE and has a
large personal following.

When Sithole lost power after the

Mgago Declaration a substitute was not elected.

Instead,

the leaders of the hosts of ZANU on two occasions asked the
commanders of ZANLA to list their preference among the
political leadership and, when Mugabe repeatedly held the
92

Gann and Henrikson, pp. 87-90.

93 Martin and Johnson, pp. 159-169 and 196-202.
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confidence of the commanders, he became the leader of ZANU.
The dominance of ZANLA within ZANU became obvious with the
internal reform of the organization in 1977, when it ~n~
larged ZANLA's representation on the central committee.
Mugabe was elected president, but eighteen of the remaining

25 members of the central committee were either a military
commander or had at some point undergone military training.
Clearly, the military component within ZANU was dominant.

94

Compared to ZANLA's loose form, ZIPRA was smaller,
better trained and equipped, and followed a conventional
military style as regards organization.

These organizational

features discouraged internal divisions, indiscipline and
morale problems,

95

and left it in a

bE~tter

the recruits of the 1976-1979 period.
problems also occurred in ZIPRA.

96

position to absorb

Yet some of ZANLA's

One of these was the ten-

dency to form ·cliques and personal followings, which led to
armed clashes and subsequent deter,tions within Zambia.
Another problem was the tension between the military and
civilian-political leaders, although it was less pronounced
than in the case of ZANLA.

A major reason for the more

94

Ironical1y, 1977 was heralded as the "year of the
party." The reorganization did not lead to the softening of
civil-military tensions, although Mugabe continued .to be supported by the senior ZANLA commanders, in particular Josiah
Tongogara and R~x Nhongo. Legum, Western Crisis·, PI>~ 219-220.

95

ziPRA also appears to have had sophisticated weaponry,
as evidenced by the shooting down of a Zimbabwean aircraft.
See "Please Don't Kill Us" and "We Shot It Down"7 Newsweek,
September 18, 1978, pp. 45-47.
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amicable civil-military relations within ZAPU was that
Chikerema, who had been the target of much dissatisfaction
in the 1966-1970 period, lost power in the 1970s and ZAPU
was then led by Moyo and Silundika as political figures and
97
Al f re d Mangena as m1"l"t
1 ary comman d er.
When the ceasefire was instituted in December 1979
ZAPU and ZANU thus were both essentially military organizations.

As armies rather than parties, there were tensions

between the military and civil-political leaders, with the
latter accused of a variety of transgressions.

In organiza-

tional style ZIPRA differed somewhat from ZANLA in that the
former was patterned more after a conventional military institution, but both were loosely styled rather than formal
organizations.
2.3.

Leadership
As previously discussed, the period between 1966 and

1970 was characterized by elite competitiveness.

In the

absence of the detained top leadership, the leadership fell
to substitute figures who competed for positions.

By the end

of 1979 this competitiveness was even more pronounced.

The

only unity that the nationalist elite could provide was a
facade of unity for negotiating purposes (the UANC and the
Patriotic Front) at the Geneva and Lancaster House
97colin Legum (ed.),Africa Contemporary Record: Annual
Survey and Documents 1976-1977 (London: Rex Collings, p.
A-13-A-22. Hereafter cited as ACR 1976-1977.
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conferences.

Indeed, the Smith regime after 1976 seemed

to owe much of its existence to the fact that there was disunity among the nationalists.
While there were certain factors at the time of the
creation of ZAPU and ZANU that made for disunity, it is
said that additional quarrels and the experiences of the
following guerrilla struggle reinforced differences.

Thus

differences in personality (for example, Nkomo the "genial
autocrat" versus Mugabe as the "intense intellectual") were
reinforced by different operational areas (ZANLA east and
ZIPRA west), ideological bifurcation (ZANU radical/Marxist
and ZAPU moderate/capitalist), tactics (Nkomo's negotiations
versus Mugabe's militancy) and their training (the Chinese,
Tanzanian and Mozambican advisors of ZANLA as opposed to
ZIPRA's Soviet advisors).

98

The result is a somewhat sim-

plistic view of a nationalist elite divided by irreconcilable
differences.
As the previous discussion has shown, all of the factors
mentioned above did at one time or another play a role in
problems between and within ZAPU and ZANU.

Yet at other

times the differences seem trivial, resulting more from differences in tone than substance.

Nkomo, for example, did

want negotiations, but ZAPU and ZANU were agreed that a
swift transfer to black majority rule was necessary.
98

see, for example, Gann and Henrikson, p. 44.

This
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leads to the question of whether differences within and
between the organizations were deliberately encouraged, by
either the Zimbabwean regime or the nationalists themselves.
Nationalists on several occasions charged that the
Smith regime was encouraging tribalism.

99

This took the

form of subversive actions by informers and other members of
the Smith regime's intelligence network.

Yet divisions

persisted even after the Smith regime accepted black majority
rule and the Muzorewa regime was installee.

Consequently,

it raises the possibility that the divisions were exaggerated
by the nationalists themselves.
It is important to note that the nationalist le!aders
in detention for most of the struggle and the leaders that
filled their positions could not take their political following within their organization for granted.

Thus the leader-

ship as a whole was forced to constantly struggle to consoli1

date its positions within the respective organizations.

Un-

doubtedly tthe top leadership suffered worst from this, because
I

they were placed in the company of competitors without any
certainty about their following.

Some of these, like Sithole,
'

tried to reassert their authority over ZANU but found that
the organization was transformed during their absence.
99

Legum, ACR 1976-1977, pp. A 13-A 33.
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Mugabe labored to make himself acceptable to the senior
ZANLA commanders by espousing a militant Marxist ideology
and posture.

100

In the subsequent election, however, Mugabe

felt that such an approach would lead to defeat by the voters
and hence downplayed his radical aspirations.

In other words,

the leadership of the different organizations exaggerated
and manipulated differences to suit their own ambitions and
that o f

. organ1za
. t.1ons. 101
th e1r

Thus the competitiveness of the

nat~onalist

leadership

can best be seen as organizational and personal drives for
political power.

Although this entailed the exaggeration and

manipulation of differences, it dces not make differences less
real.

Regional, tribal, personality, tactical and ideological

differences remain; it is simply their political expression
and use that vary according to considerations of power.
2.4. Counter Guerrilla Warfare
As previously discussed, the bungled initial attempts
at guerrilla warfare and the regime's counter actions resulted

100

on Mugabe's Marxism and his rise to power, see Xan
Smiley, "Zimbabwe, Southern Africa and the Rise of Robert
Mugabe," Foreign Affairs 85 (Summer 1980): 1060-1083. Smiley
notes that the ZANLA guerrillas initially referred to Mugabe
not as their leader but as a "spokesman." (p. 1063).

101

This interpretation follows that of John Day, "The
Divisions of the Rhodesian African Nationalist Movement" The
World Today 33 (October 1977): 385-394. Day states:
The divisions between the various nationalist factions
originated in and are sustained by the leaders' contempt
for each other's leadership, and by their ambitions to
increase their own personal power. (p. 392).
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in a qualified victory for the Smith regime during the period
between 1966 and 1970.

The fmith regime nevertheless saw

these as an unqualified victory, with the result that a mere
boost in morale reached immodest and complacent proportions.
Even if guerrilla actions were to increase, the regime saw
no cause for alarm, because it would be given advance warning

by its intelligence network.
The intelligence network, however, failed to detect
several crucial developments which led to ZANLA's guerrilla
actions in the northeastern areas, namely the change in
ZANLA's strategy from one of confrontation to a more orthodox
guerrilla campaign and ZANLA's development of ties with
FRELIMO.

Even by late 1973 the Smith regime still believed

that the Zambian border areas were the critical regions for
guerrilla activity.

Regime intelligence was generated

mainly by three sources, the Ministry of Internal Affaris
whose district or local commissioners were in contact with
chiefs and ward and kraal heads, an external intelligence
wing (the Central Intelligence Organization of CIO), and the
intelligence officers of the defense and police establishments.
Of these, the Ministry of Internal Affairs in particular
failed to gather accurate information during the 1970s, partly
because its informants in the rural areas were co-opted, eliminated or neutralized by the guerrillas and partly because
the department lacked adequate funds to conduct intelligence
activities.

In general the reports of the other intelligence
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sources were more accurate, but the Smith regime placed more
faith in the Ministry of Internal Affairs' knowledge of rural

.
102
affa1rs.
As a result of this intelligence failure, the Smith
regime struggled to regain the initiative in the years prior
to the Portuguese coup of 1974.

The organization of the

defense establishment remained essentially unaltered.

The

counter guerrilla forces consisted of five major army units,
namely the white Rhodesia Light Infantry, the Rhodesian
African Rifles composed of blacks and led by white officers,
the Selous Scouts as a predominantly black tracker unit, the
racially mixed Grey Scouts as mounted infantry, and the
Special Air Service as an

el~te

commando/paratroop unit.

These units were assisted by the air force and the BSAP.

All

were manned by regular (or permanent) personnel, national
servicemen, territorial forces on short tours of duty, and
. t s. 103
reserv1s

Whereas most of these forces up to 1970 were deployed
in the western regions, ZANLA's actions in the northeastern
areas led to the designation of the area as an "operational
zone" in DHcember 1972 under the code name of Operation Hurricane.

In this zone counter guerrilla actions took place

Under the authority of a Joint Operations Command (JOC),

102

see Martin and Johnson, pp. 6-8, who note that the
intelligence failure was later admitted by officers of the
Smith regime.

103

James K. Bruton, "Counterinsurgency in Rhodesia",
Military Review 59 (March 1979): 32-38.
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which linked the senior officers of the Ministry of Internal
104
Affairs, army, air force and police.
·
In the Operation
Hurricane area and in the other subsequent operational zones
forces were not geographically disp8rsed.

Instead the mode

of operation consisted of "search" operations by ground and
air forces followed by "destroy" operations (named Fire
Forces) to engage guerrillas.

By 1979, three-quarters of all

guerrilla casualties were attributed to these Fire Forces.

105

In addition to these search and destroy operations,
the regime also took several measures to discourage guerrilla
actions.

First, the regime in 1972 adopted a policy of impos-

106
.
f 1nes
.
. h a b 1. t an t s ( as
ing co 11 ect1ve
on v ill ages wh ose 1n
individuals or as a group) aided the guerrillas or failed to
notify the regime security forces of their presence.

So~e-

times these fines took the form of cash fines, but usually
cattle was seized.

Second, in the border areas the regime

created "no go" or "free fire" zones in defoliated areas.

104 Legum, Western Crisis Over Southern Africa, p. 222.
105Army personnel played the major role in the decisions and actions on the operational zones. See Gann and Henrikson, p. 65 and "Tea and Terrorists'~ Newsweek, May 8, 1978,
pp. 52-53. For a more critical account, based on personal
experiences, see Barry Cohen, "The War in Rhodesia: A Dissenter's View'~ African Affairs 76 (October 1977): 483-494.
106 Made possible by the Emergency Powers (Collective
Fines) Act of 1973.
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Officially these areas were nomansland, i.e., any person not
attached to the security forces could be shot on sight.
Other areas were subject to curfew regulations.

Third, the

regime widened and legalized discretionary powers for the
security forces by the Indemnity and Compensation Act.
According to this act, the belief that one's actions would
strengthen public security or would counter "terrorism"
absolved the person from blame.

As a complementary measure

the regime amended the Law and Order (Maintenance) Act to
include punishment for undergoing guerrilla training (varying between the death sentence and twenty years imprisonment),
for hosting, aiding or failing to report guerrillas (the
death sentence to twenty years), and for committing an act
of terrorism (the death sentence to thirty years).

107

Fourth, the regime sought to control public information about
the conflict by press censorship (imposed under the Emergency
Powers Act) and the restriction of journalists.

108

Finally

the regime adopted a policy of population resettlement in the
107

Tony Hodges, "Counterinsurgency and the Fate of Rural
Blacks", Africa Report 22 (September-October 1977): 15-20 and
Bruton, pp. 32-38. Except for the amnesty that accompanied
the release of the nationalist leaders in 1974, the death sentence was maintained throughout the conflict and frequently
used against guerrillas.
108

see Pieter Niesewand, In Camera: Secret Justice in
Rhodesia (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1973) and Elaine
:Windrich, "Rhodesian Censorship: The Role of the Media in the
Making of a One-Party f:tate", African Affairs 78 (October 1979):
523-534.
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northeastern and later other areas.

Under this policy blacks

were settled in protected villages that were guarded by a
Guard Force, a local militia resorting under the authority of
the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

Similarly, the construe-

tion of the protected villages was the responsibility of the
Ministry of Internal Affairs.

109

Since the guerrillas suffered from a variety of internal problems during the period between 1973 and 1976, it is
difficult to gauge the overall effectiveness of the regime's
actions.

Some policies, like the collective fines and popu-

lation resettlement, were clearly counterproductive from a
security viewpoint,

110

while other policies like the no go

areas, curfew regulations and the death sentence for guerrilla
training, support and actions were criticised on security and
moral grounds.

111

I

Yet, judging from the decline of guerrilla

109
Protected villages were enclosed by barbed wire, with
guardposts and floodlights.
Each usually housed about 2,000
inhabitants, living on small plots allocated to families, and
with access to medical, educational and other facilities. CoLditions and size, however, varied. A.K.H. Weinrich, "Strategic Resettlement in Rhodesia",Journal of Southern African
Studies 3 (April 1977): 207-229.
110
1n the Chiweshe reserve, for example, 43,000 blacks
were resettled within one month. Many blacks resisted resettlement and when they were coerced to do so became resentful
and more sympathetic towards the guerrillas, who indeed foten
selected the villages as targets for recruitment. Hodges, p. 18.
111 Much of this criticism originated from within Zimbabwe,
like from the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace and
the Roman Catholic Bishops' Conference. See their Rhodesia The Moral Issue (Gwelo, Zimbabwe: Mambo Press, 1968). Criticism also came from within Parliament. Martin and Johnson,
pp. 102-104.
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activity to three active groups in the northeast by the end
of 1975, it is likely that at least a measure of effectiveness was reached.
As before, however, effectiveness was linKed to increasing costs in both money and manpower.

In 1973, with only

one operational zone (Hurricane), the army, air force and
BSAP complained of manpower shortages.

These complaints led

to the Defense Act of 1972 and the creation of a Directorate
of Security Manpower, which widened national service and
short tour obligations and made evasion of them more difficult.112

In addition, the regime planned on increasing the

. th e secur1"t y f orces. 113
numb er o f bl ac k s 1n

In purely finan-

cial terms the cost of the operations was also escaJating
as defense expenditures rose from Rh $65 million in 1974 and
to Rh$96 in 1976.

114

It is against the background of rising costs in counter
guerrilla operations that the second wave of guerrilla
112

These measures included the extension of national
service to one year, doubling the intake of the national
servicemen, and more duties for the increased territorial
forces.
Wilkenson, p. 281
Blacks constituted about 40 percent of the re~ular
army and about 60 percent of the BSAP. Grundy, "Social
Costs", p. 449. There also was a contingent of mercenaries
serving with the regime's forces.
See Legum, ACR1976-1977,
p. A 50-A 51 and David Anable, "The Return of the Mercenaries•; Africa Report 20 (November-December 1975): 2-6.
113

114

Grundy, "Social Costs", p. 457.
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infiltration (1976-1979) occurred.

In response to these in-

til tra tions the regime announced thf: formation of three new
operational zones, Operation Trasher in February 1976 to
cover the eastern border in the vicinity of Umtali, Operation
Repulse in May 1976 to cover the border areas of Victoria
province and the rail and road links with South Africa, and
Operation Tangent in December 1976 to cover the border areas
of the west and northwest.

Operations in these areas resem-

bled those of Operation Hurricane.

The only new counter

guerrilla tactic was the border raids on guerrilla bases and
other camps in Mozambique and Zambia. 115
By 1979 the cost of the counter guerrilla operations
reach major proportions.

With regard to manpower, the number

of security forces' casualties rose from 403 in 1977 to 724
in 1978 and finally to 788 in 1979.

116

The defense establish-

ment expanded to a total of 115,000 men with most of the
increases taking place in the territorial force;
115
of 1977.
116

117

of these,

There were more than 200 of these raids by the end
Martin and Johnson, p. 286.
Grundy, "Social Costs", p. 457.

117The number of regular forces rose from 3,500 to
about 5,000, while the territorial forces rose from about
10,000 in 1973 to 45,000 in 1976 and to about 58,000 in 1978.
Figures taken from the International Institute for Strategic
Studies, The Military Balance, 1975-1976 and 1977-1978 (London, 1977 and 1979).
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however, only 25,000 could be active at any one time.

118

To

offset manpower shortages the regime was forced to widen the
obligations for military service, including short tc·urs of
duty for men between 51 and 60 years old and planned

119
natl·onal servl·ce for blacks.

p·1nanc1a
· 11 y th e d e f ense ex-

penditures rose from Rh$ 146 million in 1977 to Rh$ 197 million in 1978.
African aid,

120

Originally this burden was lightened by South
but South African withdrew its contingent

after the Victoria Falls conference of 1975.
The preceding shows that the counter guerrilla actions
entered the 1971-1979 period at a disadvantage because of an
intelligence failure.

Subsequently the security forces strug-

gled to regain the initiative and in doing so developed effective search and destroy operations which, combined with the
guerrillas' weaknesses, led to a decline in guerrilla actions
in 1975.

The socio-economic and other operations that

accompanied the search and destroy operations, such as collective fines and population resettlement, however, were often
crude, ineffective and counterproductive and were accompanied
by the steadily increasing cost of the operations.

118

This cost

Gann and Henrikson, p. 65.

119Black conscription was ordered by the Muzorewa
regime and would have produced a 25,000 force loyal to Muzorewa. Grundy, "Social Costs", pp. 449-450.
120Estimated at about 50 percent of the total budget.
Ibid., p. 456.
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increased dramatically after the increase in guerrilla
activities after January 1976.

By the end of 1979 search

and destroy operations were still conducted against guerrillas, but the overall cost of the operations bad reached
a critical level.
2.5.

Summary
When the ceasefire was instituted in late 1979 it was

thus clear that guerrilla infiltration occurred in two waves
(1971-1973 and 1976-1979), that ZANLA and ZIPRA had established
spearate areas of influence, and that their actions within
those areas were aimed guaranteeing the guerrillas freedom of
action within the rural areas rather than incorporating the
rural population into the respective organizations.
the extent and

Given

location of the guerrilla actions it is clear

that blacks of the reserves, the small purchase areas and
farmworkers all supported the guerrillas in one or another
form, although the guerrillas enjoyed greatest freedom of
movement within the reserves.

In organizational form ZANLA

and ZIPRA were essentially military organizations; military
figures dominated decision-making and were often bitterly
hostile towards the civilian-political leaders.

The leader-

ship was highly competitive but this competitiveness should
not be seen as the irrevocable division of ascriptive and
other loyalties; rather, the competitiveness is shaped and
encouraged by organizational and personal drives for power.
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Finally, on a purely tactical level the regime's counter
guerrilla operations were an effective deterrent or at least
an inhibition of guerrillas' freedom of movement but, given
the limited resources of the regime, escalating costs made
their indefinjte continuation improbable.
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Figure IV:
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CHAPTER V
SANCTIONS, NEGOTIATIONS AND THE EFFECTS
OF GUERRILLA WARFARE
This chapter discusses the way in which the conflict
in Zimbabwe ended.

After UDI several parties tried to

resolve the conflict and eventually the resolution came by
highly unusual means, namely an election monitored by a
British peacekeeping force.
way?

Why did the conflict end in this

The reasons, it is submitted, can be found in the

changing domestic, regional and international conditions in
which the guerrilla warfare

took place.

These conditions

are seen to fall into two eras, the UDI era before 1974 and
the era after the Portuguese coup that was characterized by
guerrilla warfare.
1.

1965-1973:

An End to UDI?

In the era between 1965 and the Portuguese coup the
possible ending of the conflict was subject to three interwoven sets of condition·s, namely the international environment characterized by British efforts to end UDI as a legal
question, the regional environment characterized by South
African and, to a lesser extent, Portuguese support of the
Smith regime, and the domestic environment marked by limited
guerrilla warfare and the entrenchment of the Smith regime.
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1.1. The International Environment
When UDI was announced, the parties most immediately
involved in Zimbabwe disagreed on the nature of the conflict.
For Britain, UDI was a constitutional problem brought on by
a rebellious and reactionary white minority's illegal seizure
of power.

For the black nationalists, UDI and the question

of illegality was yet another manifestation of their view
that the Smith regime (and the other white regimes preceding
it) ruled unjustly.

The Smith regime's view contradicted

charges of illegality and injustice; their self-conception
was that they were the only government capable of exercising
responsible government in Zimbabwe.
Britain claimed that the 1961 constitution did not
grant independence, which could only come about through
further negotiations based on the principles of:

(1) un-

impeded progress toward majority rule; (2) guarantees
against retrogressive amendments of the 1961-constitution;
(3) immediate improvements in the political status of the
black population; (4) progress toward the abolition of racial
discrimination; and (5) British satisfaction that any proposed basis for independence was acceptable to all the
people of Zimbabwe.

1

If the negotiations based on these five principles
1

southern Rhodesia - Document Relating to the Negotiations between the United Kingdom and Southern Rhodesian
Governments, November 1963 to November 1965, Cmnd. 2807.
Hereafter referred to as Cmnd. 2807.
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were to fail and UDI be declared, the British government
said it
would be an open act of defiance and rebellion and it
would be treasonable to take steps to give effect to
it .•. would bring to an end relationship between her
[Zimbabwe] and Britain, would cut her off from the
rest of the Commonwealth, from most foreign governments,
and from international organizations; would inflict
disastrous economic damage upon her; and would leave
her isolated and v~rtually friendless in a largely
hostile continent.
Although the British government thus threatened the Smith
regime that a UDI would be met by a variety of punitive
measures, it made it clear that it was powerless to prevent
it.

Specifically, the British government denied that it
3
would use force as a preventive or punitive measure.
While the British renunciation of the use of force
4
was justifiably based on practical military and political coosiderations,
it was a poor bargaining ploy 5 that dEm:>nstrated the contradictory British
position.

On

the one hand it claimed sovereignty in Z:ini:>abwe but, en the

2

Written exchange between Wilson and Smith, October 24,
1964 in Ibid.
3

Ibid., p. 132. For Wilson's views, see Harold Wilson,
The Labour Government 1964-1970: A Personal Record (London:
Michael Joseph, 1971). Force would only be used if requested
by the British governor in the event of a collapse in the
public security of Zimbabwe. Public opinion in Britain was
also opposed to the use of force. Robert C. Good, UDI: The
International Politics of the Rhodesian Rebellion (Princeton,
New ~ersey: Princeton University Press, 1973), p. 62.
4

See William Gutteridge,"Rhodesia: The Use of Military
Force", The World Today 2l(December 1966): 499-503 and P.C.
Rao, "The Rhodesian Crisis and the Use of Force", Africa
Quarterly 6 (January-March 1967): 2B5-296.
5Loney, pp. 133-136 and Robert Good, pp. 53-65.
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other band declared that it was powerless to exercise that sovereignty.
The British assessment of its power lay with the economic
and diplomatic isolation and pressure that it could bring to
bE!ar on the Smith regime; faced with economic chaos and diplomatic

isolation, it was argued, the Smith regime would

capitulate.
British reaction to UDI was prompt.

Between November

1965 and January it adopted a variety of measures designed to
exert pressure on the Smith regime.

An order-in-council

announced that Zimbabwe now was a crown colony, enabling the
British parliament to govern or at least pass laws on Zimbabwe;
Zimbabwe was banned from the sterling monetary area; no
British investment capital would be made available to Zimbabwean firms;

Britain banned all Zimbabwean imports and all

trade with it was suspended; Zimbabwean import of oil was
prohibited; and all Zimbabwean assets in Britain were frozen.
Britain urged other states to do likewise

and in November

1965 the United Nations Security Council adopted a voluntary
6
embargo against Zfmbabwe.
Collectively, Britain stated, these
measures would end UDI "within weeks."

7

An end to UDI would,

however, not be tantamount to majority rule; it would leave
a white government in power but give it a constitutional
guarantee that progress toward majority rule would be unimpeded.
6

security Council Resolutions 216 and 217 of 1965.

7 wilson, p. 196.
8 Cmnd. 2807, pp. 125-142.

8
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Britain's handlings of the UDI-question was harshly
criticized by the Afro-Asian nations and other members of
the United Nations.

They argued that Britain should have

pressed for a mandatory trade embargo.

The question over

UDI was not the first appearance of Zimbabwe on the UN
agenda.

In 1962, the UN Committee of 24 (the decolonization

committee) created a special committee 9 to examine Zimbabwe's
1961 constitution, which found that it did not provide blacks
with adequate representation.

Later this committee ruled

that Britain did have the constitutional authority to intervene in Zimbabwe and a General Assembly resolution requested
Britain to restore the political rights of blacks in the
territory.

The Security Council also discussed the Zimbabwean

question when it requested Britain not to transfer the
military forces of the CAF to the Zimbabwean military forces,
but Britain

vetoed the resolution.

As part of their stra-

tegy, black nationalist leaders actively participated in
these UN debates, as did representatives of the Zimbabwean
government, but Britain usually did not participate in the discussicns.
Britain's support of the voluntary trade embargo was thus a
reversal of its stance but it still did not meet the expectations of other UN members, who proposed a mandatory embargo
and/or the declaration of the Smith regime (and the situation
9

The Special Committee on the Situation with Regard
to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of
Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.
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in Zimbabwe) as a threat to international peace and consequently intervention by the UN or Britain.

10

Britain used the UN as a secondary vehicle in its
relations with Zimbabwe, usual1y when it wanted to publicly
express its disapproval about its ongoing negotiations with
the Smith regime.

In December 1966, for example, Prime

Minister Wilson and Smith met on the HMS Tiger to discuss the
UDI question.

These negotiations were based on the afore-

mentioned firm principles but resulted in the addition of a
sixth principle to the effect that minority (white) rights
would be guaranteed.
racial intermediate

Under the Tiger proposals, a multigovernment headed by Smith would be

formed, during which Britain would test the acceptability
of the new proposals.

If this arrangement broke down, Bri-

tain reserved the right to intervene.

The Smith regime re-

jected these proposals and the Tiger meeting ended in failure.

11

In reaction, the British government did not veto

a UN resolution imposing a mandatory embargo on select Zimbabwean goods and a resolution stating that Zimbabwe was a
"threat to world peace."

Britain thus could intercept oil

shipments bound for Zimbabwe through the port of

Beira in

10

see J. Leo Cefkin, "The Rhodesian Question at the
United Nations", International Organization 22 (Summer 1968):
649-669.
11

For the official correspondence of the Tiger proposals, see Rhodesia: Documents Relating to Proposals for a
Settlement, 1966, Cmnd. 3171, 1968 and the Relations Between
the Rhodesian Government and the United Kingdom, November 1965December 1966 (Salisbury: Government Printer, 1966). For
a discussion of the issues, see Robert Good, pp. 182-197.
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.
12
Mozamb 1que.

In May 1968 Britain again did not use her

veto when the Security Council passed a mandatory comprehensive embargo.

On this occasion Britain wished to express

disapproval of the Smith regime's execution of five blacks
in defiance of a royal pardon.

13

The hangings caused a rift

in Britain's bipartisan approach to the UDI question and
there was pressure on the Wilson government to abandon its
position that independence could be granted with the Smith
regime still in power.

Some agreed that the British position

should preclude independence without majority (i.e. no
independence before majority rule or NIBMAR).

In search of

a quick solution, the British government softened its stance
on the requirement that any solution should be subject to
the population's approval as tested by the British.

Accord-

ing to the meeting that took place on the HMS Fearless, such
approval could take place under the oversight of the Smith
regime.

14

The Smith regime again rejected the proposals,

which led to the adoption of a NIBMAR policy by the British
government.

12
13

15

security Council Resolutions 221 and 232 of 1966.
security Council Resolution 253 of 1968.

14

see Rhodesia: Report on the Discussions Held on
Board HMS Fearless, October 1968, Cmnd. 3793.

15
Robert Good, pp. 201-271.
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The failure of the Tiger- and more generous Fearlessproposals, the ineffectiveness of sanctions

16

and the 1968

executions robbed the British government of most of its
negotiating options.

Instead of negotiating from weakness,

the Smith regime seemed to be negotiating from strength,

17
Br1·t·1s h concess1ons.
.
.
expec t 1ng

The reasons for this

strength and. confidence derived from certain regional and
domestic conditions that, paradoxically,were also a source
of potential weakness.

1.2. The Regional Environment
Prior to the Portuguese coup of April 1974, Zimbabwe
was ensconced in the so-called "White Bastion" consisting of
Zimbabwe and another white minority-ruled state (South Africa
and its administration in Namibia), colonial territories
(Angola and Mozambique), and small black-ruled states (Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland).
ed in a network of

Since these states were enmesh-

long~standing

social, economic and

political ties, it produced a strong incentive to ameliorate
tensions and South Africa, as the most powerful state in the

16

The long-term effects of sanctions
later in this chapter.

will be discussed

17For a sympathetic view of the Smith regime's position, see Kenneth Young, Rhodesia and Independence: A Study
in British Colonial Policy (London: Dent and Sons, 1969).
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region, tended to set the tone and direction of most political developments.

18

As previous chapters showed, much of the political
development of Zimbabwe was premised on opposition and
reaction to South Africa's wealth and its political direc19
. 11 y th e r1se
.
·
1 1sm.
·
tions, espec1a
o f Af r1· k aner na t 1ona

With

its foreign policy emphasis of legalism and painstaking conformity to international custom,

20

South African officials

were initially displeased by UDI but they stated that they
would not apply pressure on the Smith regime through, for
example, sanctions.

As far as South Africa was concerned,

the dispute should be settled between Britain and Zimbabwe
18

The best study of the tension-reducing features
of the southern African region remains Kenneth W. Grundy,
Confrontation and Accommodation, especially p. 1-117.
19
These include the initial settlement of whites in
Zimbabwe in hope of a "second Reef"; imperial opposition to
the late 1890s, the intended incorporation of Zimbabwe into
South Africa and its effects on land policies, and opposition to Afrikaner nationalism and the Kational Party regime
in South Africa.
20

see John E. Spence, Republic Under Pressure: A
Study of South African Foreign Policy (London: Oxford
University Press, 1965); Edwin S. Munger, Notes on the Formation of South African Foreign Policy (Pasadena, California: Castle Press, 1965); Gerrit C. Olivier, Suid-Afrika se
Buitelandse Beleid (Pretoria: Academica, 1977); and James
Barber, South Africa's Foreign Policy, 1945-1970 (London:
Oxford University Press, 1973).
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in a friendly and realistic manner.

21

South Africa neverthe-

less came to regard a white-ruled Zimbabwe as an essential
buffer between itself and hostile and possible guerrilla
actions from black African states.

Thus South Africa's active

support of the Smith regime was created by its post-1960
military-security concerns

22

and, in the ensuing years, this

support became the single most important factor in the survival of the Smith regime.
official and private forms.

South African support took many
As previously noted, South Africa

sent a para-military contingent that played a critical role
in the Smith regime's security operations, sent equipment and
contributed to Zimbabwe's defense budget.

23

South Africa also

maintained an accredited diplomatic office in Zimbabwe and continually made public and private statements of political
21

Grundy, pp. 256-257. Grundy cites South African
officials who describe the Smith regime as "second-rate
political blacks" and "cowboys" who risk provocative and destabilizing actions in a delicate environment.
Ibid., p. 256.
22

christopher Hill, "UDI and South African Foreign
Policy", Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies 7 (July
196 9 ) :
96 -1 0 3 •
23

These contributions were not revealed in official
data and it~ extent thus remains a matter of speculation.
Estimates of the para-military contingent is modestly set at
1,000 men (Nelson, p. 347), while others set it at between
5,000 and 10,000 men by 1973 (SIPRI, p. 109). Budget support
is estimated at approximately 50 percent of the total budget.
Grundy, "Social Costs", 456.
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support.

24

Zimbabwean consumers were supplied by South

African manufacturers, trade

25

and technical cooperation con-

tinued26 and Zimbabwean firms continued to have access to
south African capital.

27

Finally, Zimbabwe's exports made use

of South Africa's railways, roads and ports.

28

In addition to South African support, the Smith regime
relied on Portuguese support.

One form of support was mili-

tary cooperation, which allowed the Zimbabwean and Portuguese
counter-guerrilla forces to cross the border between Zimbabwe
and Mozambique in pursuit of guerrillas.
relied

29

Zimbabwe also

on the roads and railways of Mozambique to export

goods through Beira and Maputo which, in view of the congestion of South African ports, provided a valuable alternative
24

There was no known formal military alliance between
Zimbabwe and South Africa (and Portugal). When questioned
about such a possibility, the South African premier replied:
" ••. good friends do not need a pact. Good friends know what
their duty is if a neighbour's house is on fire." Grundy,
Confrontation and Accommodation, p. 222.
25

see Adrian Guelke, "Africa as a Market for South
African Goods", The Journal of Modern African Studies 12
(March 1974): 69-98.
Imports from South Africa rose from Rh
$527 million in 1965 to Rh $121.5 million in 1971 (out of a
trade total of Rh $282.4 million).
Ibid., p. 76.
26

South Africa's Sixth ProJohn Sprack, Rhodesia:
Vince (London:
International Defence and Aid Fund, 1974),
pp. 51-61.
27 capital movements were faciliated by South African
firms' subsidiaries in Zimbabwe.
28
29

Grundy, Confrontation and Accommodation, pp. 49-59.
wilkenson, pp. 273-274.
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outlet.

Most importantly, Zimbabwe relied on oil imports

from the pipelines in Beira.

30

By 1973 Zimbabwe's reliance on South Africa in particu.ticular reached a point at which it was described as a "sixth
province" of South Pfrica.

31

This economic and political

dependency revealed the weaknesses of the Smith regime.

While

there was no public criticism from the South African government, much of the military and industrial equipment sent to
Zimbabwean manufacturers found its access to the South African
and Zambian market restricted.

South African firms did not

re-invest their profits within Zimbabwe and the trade agreement between the two countries gave liberal terms of trade
to South Africa.

32

Moreover, when the Smith regime closed

its Zambian border, the

~outh

African premier disavowed

complicity with the action and implied that it was provocative
and unnecessary·.

33

This subtle criticism can best be seen

30

when Britain patrolled the Mozambique Channel, oil
reached Zimbabwe via South Africa.
3lsprac k , pass1m.
.
See also the annual reports of the
Security Council Committee Established in Pursuance of Resolution 253 (1968) Concerning the Question of Southern Africa.

32

Sprack, pp. 39-51.

33
.
south African newspapers criticized the closure as
"overhasty", "rash" and urged South African policy-makers to
recognize that "Rhodesia's interests are not necessarily ours."
Kenneth Good,"Settler Colonialism in Rhodesia", pp. 33-34.
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against the background of a shift in South Africa's foreign
policy.

To break out of its own isolation, South Africa

launched an "outward-looking" policy to seek a political
accommodation with, in particular, hostile black African
.
34
nat1ons.
Since UDI the nations of Africa had been unremittently hostile to the Smith regime on the grounds that it prevented ''national self-determination" or constituted a "flagrant violation of the inalienable rights of the legitimate
inhabitants" and practiced racism of "doctrines of human
inequality."

35

Consequently African nations were dedicated

to the liberation of Zimbabwe and channelled their efforts to
that and through the UN (as previously discussed), as well as
the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the British
Commonwealth.
At the founding of the OAU in 1963 it was agreed that
the OAU itself would
of Zimbabwe.

not be responsible for the liberation

The OAU would simply provide aid through a

34

see Robert Molteno, Africa and South Africa: The
Implications of South Africa's "Outward-Looking" Policy
(London: Africa Bureau, 1971).
35Moses E. Akpan, "African Goals and Strategies Toward
Southern Africa", African Studies Review 14 (September 1971):
244-246. The Smith regime was accused of a variety of excesses and transgressions. Regardless of whether it was guilty
of those, it would be naive to conclude that Black African
states are united in support of liberation in Southern Africa
because they are united in their commitment to human rights.
Many of the states that have been very strong in supporting
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special Fund supported by the contributions of African (and
other) nations and create a united liberation front by reconciling movements through an African Liberation Committee
(ALC).

36

From the beginning the liberation effort was plagued

by a variety of problems.

F)rst, states did not adequately

contribute to the Special Fund, either because they were unwilling to do so or because they objected to the ALC's use of
funds.

37

Second, the ALC's

membership increased steadily as

those states who did contribute to the Special Fund demanded
membership in the ALC which turned concerted action into a
series of compromises to suit members.

Third, events like

the Nigerian civil war divided the OAU and some states resigned
from the OAU.

The consequence of these problems was that

African states preferred to bypass the ALC and to deal directly
with the liberation movements and to provide aid in nonmonetary form, such as accommodating refugees and providing
instructors, facilities and equipment.

The most likely

Southern African liberation, ranging from Amin's Uganda to
Sekou Toure's Guinea, are guilty of gross violations of human
rights in their own societies.
It would be almost as naive
to assert that Black African States are committed to the principle of "majority rule", if by that is meant a system of
government that allows the majority of the people periodically
to choose their own rulers in free elections. Ali A. Mazrui
and David F. Gordon, "Independent African States and the
Struggle for Southern Africa" in John Seiler (ed.), Southern
Africa Since the Portuguese Coup (Boulder, Colorado:--Westview
Press, 1980), p. 185.
36

See Cervenka, The Unfinished Quest for Unity:
Africa and the OAU, pp. 50-58 on the organization of the ALC.
37
Kapungu, "The OAU's Support For the Liberation of
Southern Africa", pp. 142-143.

/

r
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contributors were those states that were close to Zimbabwe
in a geographic and cultural sense, were ideologically
sympathetic to particular groups and whose leaders' per.

50 nalit1es

38
. . t 1a
. t 1ves.
.
su1. t e d sue h 1n1

The centrifugal forces within the OAU and the large
role that individual states consequently played in aid to
nationalist groups in Zimbabwe complicated the contribution
of African nations to the overthrow of the Smith regime.

On

the one hand, they provided unflagging moral support at a
time when these groups were ineffective but, on the other
hand, they failed to unite rival groups whose very rivalry
contributed to their ineffectiveness.

Indeed, both ZAPU and

ZANU were recognized by the OAU and thus both were eligible
for aid from the OAU (and other nations).
Besides the OAU and the UN, some African nations used
the Commonwealth to press for the overthrow of the Smith
regime and majority rule.

Since the British government

claimed that Zimbabwe was a colonial territory, executive
authority in Zimbabwe now was vested in the Secretary of State
for Commonwealth Relations.

More importantly, a Commonwealth

Sanctions Committee (later renamed the Commonwealth Committee
on South Africa) was formed to monitor sanction; it sponsored
38

vincent B. Khapoya, The Politics of Decision: A
£omparative Study of African Policy Toward the Liberation
~ovements, University of Denver, Monograph Series in World
Affairs, 12 (1974-1975), pp. 26-29.
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most of the resolutions at the UN.

Indeed, the Commonwealth

sanctions Committee became the institution which linked
African and other Commonwealth members with British init1ati~es

and the opposition expressed to initiatives, such as

the Fearless proposals, often led to changes in British
policy.

39
Thus the prevailing conditions in the regional environ-

ment between 1965 and the Portuguese coup supported the survival of the Smith regime.

Black African Lations provided

valuable moral and non-monetary support to ZAPU and ZANU, but
also failed to unite and hence contributed to the ineffectiveness of these groups.

African nations developed an

important channel of access to British initiatives through
the Commonwealth but, as long as the British initiatives were
unsuccessful, the access did not lead to concrete results.
Zimbabwe also became progressively dependent on South Africa
and, by the end of 1973 the Smith regime's survival seemed
vulnerable only in the unlikely event that South Pfrica
renounced its support.

1.3.

The Domestic Environment
The Smith regime operated first under an

or UDI constitution.

independence

It replaced the 1961 constitution as

the queen was substituted with an "officer administering the

39Robert Good, pp. 166-177.
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governmen t "

(Clifford Dupont) and privy council authority

with the Zimbabwean High Court.

The Constitutional Council,

which monitored civil rights violations, was retained but
became an all-white body.

This UDI question could be amended

by two-thirds legislative vote.

40

Following the failure of the Tiger proposals, the Smith
regime appoi-nted the Whaley Commission to advise it on a new
constitution for Zimbabwe.

41

The Whaley report was completed

by April 10, 1968 and rejected both on definite white and
black rule; instead, it proposed a multi-racial legislature at
best half controlled by blacks, i.e. eventual "parity."

42

The proposal for parity met with considerable opposition,
particularly from within Rhodesian Front (RF) ranks,
was eventually abandoned.

43 and

It was replaced by a constitution

developed by the RF, approved by the electorate in a referendum in June 1969 and by the legislature in November 1969, and
came into effect in April 1970.

This constitution enlarged

40. .
.
The UDI constitution closely resembled the 1961
constitution.
See the "Constitution of Rhodesia 1965" in
Palley, pp. 751-759.
41
The existing 1961 and 1965 constitutions were found
unsuitable because they failed to provide a suitable basis for
negotiations. The Whaley Commission had a multi-racial composition, one black member was Charles Mzingeli Moyo, former
leader of RICO. R. Hodder-Williams, "Rhodesia's Search For A
Constitution: Or, Whatever Happened To Whaley?" African
Affairs 69 (July 1970): 217-224.
42 see the Report of the Constitutional Committee 1968
(Salisbury: Government Printer, 1968), Tha Whaley Report.
43 Hodder-Williams, pp. 225-235.
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the legislative assembly to 66 seats of which 50 were filled
by whites.

The remaining 16 members were black, elected by

two rolls:

a lower roll returned 8 members while the other

8 were elected by traditional black authorities (chiefs and
headmen).

A second house was established (a Senate), exer-

cising delaying powers by 10 whites, 10 black chiefs and three
members appointed by the president who, under Zimbabwe's new
republican status, was the head of state.

Thus racially

segregated voting rolls were established, and the Constitu44
tional Council abolished.
The RF dominated the legislature and executive of Zimbabwe, winning all white seats in the general elections of
May 1965 and April 1970.

RF organization, as stated before,

developed from a populist philosophy that emphasized party
control over the legislature, executive and bureaucracy.
Each of the 50·constituencies contained about 1,500 voters,
of which about 400 were members of 3-4 local RF branches.
Local branches were dominated by non-members of parliament,
who elected members to the annual divisional and national
RF congresses.

The function of the divisional congresses was

to filter and coordinate proposals from local branches, which
reach the party's executive through formal proposals or
44 see the Proposals for a New Constitution of Rhodesia
(Salisbury: Government Printer, 1969) and the Constitution
of Rhodesia (Salisbury Government Printer, 1969).
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through divisional leaders who have permanent membership
in national party institutions.
party congress

The function of the national

was to elect national party executives once

to set subscription fees.

The central national party insti-

tution was the National Executive, composed of 10 members
of parliament and 50 members elected by the divisional and
national

co~~resses.

The National Committee met quarterly

to oversee the operations of the cabinet, and several subcommittees were formed to oversee the
legislature and bureaucracy.

oper~tions

of the

Thus the RF was in fact an

organizational parallel of the government.

45

Within the government and the RF organization, two
features were evident.

First, rural constituencies and

interests were overrepresented withinthe parliament, the
RF caucus membership contained a 35 percent farmer component;
by law, at least 18 of the white constituencies were required
to be rural and many members of the executive were full
or parttime farmers.

With the RF, there is a similar bias.

Rural branches outnumber urban ones by 102 to 63, chairmen
of urban branches often were closely linked to the farming
community, and about one-third of the National Executive
were members of rural branches.

Second, the cabinet and

45There are other national party bodies, such as
the National Standing Committee (a smaller replica of the
~ational Executive), the Party Finance Committee (responsible
for party financial management) and the secretariat. Bowman,
pp. 92-97.
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executive had little discretionary power.
the Tiger and Fearless proposals and the

The defeat of
~haley

report all

indicate that Smith was largely deprived of decision-making
initiative.

Indeed, Smith represented himself in negotia-

tions as the captive of extremist institutions and opinion
at home.

46

In the period between 1965 and the Portuguese coup,
the RF overwhelmed the political parties and forces of moderation.

The UFP was eclipsed in the 1965 election.

Subse-

quently a Center Party was formed by remnants of opposition
groups and opposed the 1969 constitution; one important
supporter, Major General Putterhill (a former commander
of the Zimbabwean armed forces) argued that it would increase
guerrilla activity-and was attacked by Smith as an ''extreme
leftist."

47

By 1973 the most powerful pressure group in

Zimbabwe was the bureaucracy.

Between 1964 and 1969 public

service employees increased in number from 40,000 to 78,000.
White central government employees amounted to 24,000 by
1973 who, with their spouses, comprised one-third of the
white electorate.

There

were 13,000 tenured positions

in the central bureaucracy; of these only 829 were filled
46

Ibid., pp. 97-109 and Hodder-Williams, pp. 228235. The British government also regarded Smith as a moderate.
Robert Good, pp. 186-193 and 262~265.
47 Bowman, p. 139.
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by blacks, as compared to about 1,700 in 1965.
better

Blacks were

represented in untenured positions, with 23,000

of the 35,000 positions filled by blacks.

48

The control established over the governmental machinery and the press

49

provided the Smith regime with wide-

ranging means to respond to the guerrillas and to British
proposals.

Prior to 1974, moreover, there was little indica-

tion that the experience of guerrilla warfare had produced
serious political divisions within the RF and the white
population at large.

It was nevertheless clear that there

were practical difficulties in defending UDI, two of which
require elaboration.
1.3.1.

Sanctions
As previously discussed, the Zimbabwean economy was

by 1965 diversified, but each economic sector was vulnerable.
Agricultural output was dominated by whites who produced
for export and, as the world market fluctuated, so did the
government's foreign exchange reservoir.

With regard to

manufacturing, its contribution to the GDP increased, but
it was geared to a small and relatively unsophisticated

48

Nelson, p. 156.

49 Ibid. , pp. 225-234 and Elaine Windrich, 1 'Rhodesian
Censorship: The Role of the Media in the Making of a OneParty State", pp. 523-534.
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domestic market; it produced a limited range of low quality
goods for the black market.

High quality goods and indus-

trial equipment had to be imported.

Over the first nine

years o'f UDI, several changes occurred in this economic
structure.
First, the effort to counter sanctions brought the
economy under full and direct state management.

After 1964

exports and imports were managed by the National Export
Promotion Council (NEPCO), later called Universal Exports
(UNIVEX), who were assisted by four committees, representing
commerce, industry, agriculture and mining.

Together these

organizations limited imports through, for example, quotas,
import ceilings and short-term licenses, encouraged production by selected firms, stockpiled goods, and intervened
in the internal labor and fiscal affairs of foreign and
domestic firms.

The government also placed a ban on revela-

tions or any public information about the state of the
economy under the Official Secrets Act of 1919 and the
Emergency Powers (Espionage) Regulations of 1969.

Firms'

compliance with regulations was ensured by the Emergency
Powers (Control of Corporations) Regulations and the Emergency Powers (Industrial Relations) Regulations of 1965.
The Smith regime repudiated all of Zimbabwe's debt to the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (the
World Bank) and conducted agreements with South Africa and
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Portugal to

guarantee regional trade and access to ports,

roads and rail facilities.

Finally, the regime developed

a network of trade commissioners who established covert
economic ties with other nations.

50

Second, sanctions and the effort to counter them
resulted in further diversification.

The ban on tobacco

exports to Britain produced a major slump in the value of
agricultural produce; tobacco production dropped from 246
million pounds in 1965 to 145 million pounds in 1972, forcing
50 percent of the white farmers to either go out of business
or to change their crop production.

The result was the

diversification of agricultural production as tobacco exports were surpassed by especially cotton and sugar.

Even

with tobacco in a slump, the value of agriculture's contribution to the GDP rose from Rh $128 million in 1965, to
Rh $218 million in 1972.

While agriculture's share of the

GDP declined slightly, from 18.4 percent in 1965 to 17.3
51
percent in 1972,
that of manufacturing increased form
19.4 percent in 1965 to 23.2 percent in 1972.

Manufacturing's

expansion was not primarily due to the expansion of existing
firms; rather, it was due to the government's program of
50 For a good account, see Leonard T. Kapungu, The
United Nations and Economic Sanctions Againsh Rhodesia-(Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1973), pp.
103-122. See also Stephen Park, Business as Usual: Transactions Violating Rhodesian Sanctions (Washington, D.C.;
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1973), pp. 1-33.
51

.
Nelson, pp. 250-251.
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import substitution on the basis of "one product, one manufacturer."52

Mining output's share of the GOP declined

slightly (from 6.9 percent in 1969 to 5.7 percent in 1972),
but the value of it increased dramatically from Rh $48.3
million in 1965 to Rh $72.2 million in 1972.

One reason

for this rise in value was that the mining industry was
dominated by multinational firms and they had little difficulty in evading sanctions through parent companies.

53

Third, Zimbabwe's trading patterns shifted as trade
with the former Central African Federation partners (Zambia
and Malawi) and Britain was replaced with trade with South
Africa.

Imports from South Africa rose from Rh $54.9 million

in 1965 to Rh $121.0 million in 1973, and exports to South
Africa rose from 10.2 percent of total trade to 21.1 percent
in 1972.

54

British trade with Zimbabwe dropped sharply

as Zimbabwe was replaced by Zambia and Malawi as Britain's
central African trading partners.

55

Most importantly, Zimbabwe was able to sustain
52

Ibid., p. 241.

53

Ibid., p. 238.

54

Guelke, p. 76.

55Michael Williams and Michael Parsonage, "Britain
and Rhodesia: The Economic Background to Sanctions",
World Today 29 (September 1973): 382-383.
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an average growth rate of 6.5 percent between 1965 and

1972, 56 contradicting the predictions that sanctions would
cause economic chaos--and political concessions.

The growth

rate led some observers to conclude that sanctions had a
stimulating effect on the Zimbabwean economy, providing
proof of the ability of a state-managed economy to sustain
growth under·conditions of economic isolation by import
substitution.

Under those conditions the Smith regime

57
.
.
1 y wou ld rna k e no po 1.1 t.1ca 1 concess1ons.
o b v1ous

Other

observers argued differently, noting that the diversification of the Zimbabwean economy (not state management) allowed
it to withstand sanctions, but that genuine growth was inhibited by restrictions on exports and the scarcity of foreign
capital and investment.

58

Since there was a shortage of

investment capital, moreover, the state made allocations
on a priority basis to the sectors most productive in an
immediate sense, like mining and manufacturing, with the
result that sectors less profitable (like roads and railways)
received inadequate funds and deteriorated. 59

56

There were

Nelson, p. 246.

57Timothy Curtin and David Murray, Economic Sanctions
and Rhodesia (London:
Institute of Economic Affairs, 1967)
and T.R.C. Curtin, "Rhodesian Economic Development Ur:der
Sanctions and 'The Long Haul'", African Affairs 67 (April
1968): 100-110.
58 R.T. McKinnel, "Assessing the Economic Impact of
Sanctions Against Rhodesia", African Affairs 67 (July 1968):
227-232.
59Nelson, p. 257.
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also indications that sanctions produced negative trends
in state financial management.

With limited domestic savings,

a shortage of foreign capital and a narrow tax base, the·
government could not meet its financial obligations as Zimbabwe's major investor and was forced to borrow money.

Thus

the public debt of Zimbabwe increased by 40 percent between
1965 and 1972.

60

In economic terms sanctions thus had a mixed effect,
but overall they tended to accentuate the structural features
of the Zimbabwean economy, such as economic diversification,
state intervention and dependency on exports (particularly
to South Africa).

The intended short-term political effects

were most disappointing.

Although public debt rose and

some sectors of the economy, especially its infrastructure,
deteriorated these difficulties were insufficient to cause
a change in the political directions of the Smith regime.
1.3.2.

The Smith Regime and Black Zimbabweans
Under UDI the Smith regime's policy toward the blacks

underwent three changes:

the political role of the tradi-

tional-tribal authorities were upgraded, a new land act
was passed, and segregationist practices increased.
With regard to the role of the traditional-tribal
60 1bid., pp. 260-261.
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authorities, both the 1965 and 1969 constitutions gave them
representation in the national legislature, as they

we~e

viewed as the representatives of blacks as a whole.

In

addition, the local power of those figures were increased.
In 1966 the chiefs became "peace officers" with legal discretionary powers over local matters of law and order, ineluding the power of arrest.

In 1969 the African Law and

Tribal Act extended this legal power as chiefs presided
over most local civil and some criminal cases.

Chiefs'

powers to allocate land were restored by the Tribal Trust
Land Act of 1967.

The number of black local councils in-

creased steadily to about 153 in 1972 under the aegis of
the community development approach of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, who created approximately 265 ad hoc bodies
. 1 oca 1 proJec
. t s. 61
. t th e counc1'1 s 1n
t o ass1s
By 1972 government expenditure on community development amounted to 8 percent of the GDP.

62

Most of these

funds went to civil administration; only 2 percent went
towards black education.

The government was chronically

short of funds for black educational expansion to meet the
needs of the black population, of which 50 percent is under
the age of 15.
61

This forced a reduction in the years required

Holleman, pp. 316-357.

62Nelson, p. 258.
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for primary education and a cutback in the funding for missionary schools; finally, the government made black education
a responsibility of the local councils, which were required
to raise their own funds.

63

In 1969, the Land Apportionment Act was replaced
by a Land Tenure Act, which divided the total land area
into African areas of about 46.6 percent of the total land

64

and white areas, also of about 46.6 percent of the total
land.

National Land (wildlife reserves and forests) account-

ed for the remaining portion.

The previous category of

Unreserved Land, open to all races, was eliminated.

65

In

terms of the amount of land allocated, the Land Tfnure Act
of 1969 did not bring any fundamental changes in the patterns
established by the Land Apportionment Act, but the regime
was more determined to remove, by all the means available,
blacks living in white areas.

66

Moreover, there were indica-

tions that the blacks' lands were viewed as potentially
autonomous economic-political units with, for example,
63

Lester K. Weiner, "African Education in Rhodesia
since UDI", Africa Today 14 (Special Issue 1967): 14-15.
64

Reserves accounted for about 41.3 percent of the
black land areas and the purchase areas for about 3. 8 percent.
Kay, Rhodesia:
A Human Geography, p. 50.
65

Ibid.

66 one example of this determination was the removal
of the Tangwena branch of the Mashona.
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separate legislative assemblies, and developed by an industrial development council.

This led some observers to con-

elude that the Smith regime had embarked on a policy similar to South Africa's separate developmentlbantustan policy.

67

Finally, the Smith regime's policy toward urban blacks
also invited comparisons with South African race policy.
The MuniciP?-.1 Amendment Act of 1967 authorized local town
councils to segregate public recreational facilities and
other conveniences.

Under the Residential Property Owners'

(Protection) Bill of 1970, residents could have their residential area declared as "exclusive", i.e. blacks and multiracial suburbs could be prevented.

Under the policy of

urban renewal, black small businessmen were evicted from
decayed urban areas.

Multi-racial hotels found their

licenses not renewed and multi-racial urban schools were
closed.

68
Between 1965 and the Portuguese coup the environment

within Zimbabwe thus witnessed the demise of moderating
forces in the white political spectrum.

The RF with its

strong rural component dominated public life and the information about it by centralized government control and a
well-organized party of the populist mold.

As regards race

67 sir Robert Tredgold quoted by Jack Halpern,
"Polarization in Rhodesia: State, Church and Peoples",
World Today 27 (January 1971): 5.

68 Bowman, pp. 143-144.
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policy, there was little sign of moderating influences,
whether in the form of "winning hearts and minds", "removing
the causes of the discontent" or any other compromises.
The changes that did occur seem rather to have accentuated
existing problems, such as racial discrimination, educational
opportunities for blacks and land segregation.

Sanctions

did produce neither political concessions nor political
divisions.

However,

sanctions did have effects, in that

they deepened the structural features of the economy.

Most

importantly, they revealed that, although the Smith regime
used all the means at its disposal to maintain itself (i.e.
total defense) its means were limited and unevenly dispersed.

There was a shortage of foreign exchange, capital

and investment, public debt rose and the priority planning
it produced deprived certain economic and geographic areas
of public funds.
2.

1974-1979:

The End of Guerrilla Warfare

The second era of the Zimbabwean conflict

~as

initi-

ated by the Portuguese coup of 1974 and ended in the latter
half of 1979 with the Lancaster House conference and a ceasefire.

The events set in motion by the Portuguese coup

brought dramatic international, regional and domestic changes,
which together led to the negotiated ending to the conflict.
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2.1.

The International Environment
Prior to the Portuguese coup British initiatives

led to an agreement with the Smith regime, but the subs·equent test of black opinion by the Pearce Commission met
with opposition led by the ANC of Bishop Abel Muzorewa and
the Reverend Canaan BanE.na and were defeated.
the

British.~overnment

This led

to conclude that it could not resolve

the differences between the Smith regime and black opposition.

A settlement, the British Foreign Secretary told

the House of Commons, was now up to the Zimbabwean groups
themselves; settlement proposals would be suspended until
a "better climate" developed.

In the meantime, sanctions

would continue as an "atmosphere conducive to discussion",
as well as ministerial-level contact.
Even when the Portuguese coup occurred, the British
policy continued to be one of avoiding any new initiatives.
The Wilson government did announce, however, that sanctions
would be increased and that the basis of the previous negotiations--the six principles--were void.

The onus in reaching

a new settlement would henceforth rest with the Smith regime
and Britain would only regard the dispute as resolved if
it were convinced of black acceptance.

69

Between 1974 and

69Previously the (Conservative) British government
had blamed the nationalist leaders for the breakdown of
the 1971 settlement. See Robert Good, pp. 292-327. See
also, Rhodesia: Proposals for a Settlement, Cmnd. 4835
and Rhodesia: Proposals for a Settlement of the Commission
Qn Rhodesian Opinion under the Rt. Hon. the Lord Pearce,
Cmnd. 4964.
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1976, the British policy remained one of "no initiatives"
as South African policy toward the Smith regime changed,
Zambia exerted greater pressure

for a settlement, as the

Smith regime released the detained nationalist leaders and
negotiated with the ANC and Nkomo, and as guerrilla actions
increased.

When the Smith regime proposed a bipartisan

British panel to devise a settlement, the British government
replied that they would only consent to a new constitutional
conference if the Smith regime agreed to the principle of
majority rule and held elections for it within an 18-month
to two-year period.
"extreme".

Smith rejected the proposals as

70

With the British policy options apparently exhausted, the United States for the first time took an active
interest in the Zimbabwean situation. 71

In view of the

70

1976:

"Not Rhodesia Again?" The Economist, March 27,
12-13 and Martin and Johnson, pp. 229-230.
71

un1 occurred in the period when the United States
was engaged in the Vietnam w~·.r and a gentleman's agreement
existed between the British and American governments to
the effect that the U.S. would support British actions in
Zimbabwe and in return receive British support for American
actions in Vietnam. The U.S. did express its support for
United Nations sanctions by Executive Order 1132 and called
on firms to comply with the ban on trade with Zimbabwe.
The Nixon ad~inistration shifted the emphasis of American
policy and under Secretary of State Kissinger the National
Security Council produced a memorandum (NSSM 39) on policy
options in southern Africa. As recommended by NSSM 39,
the Nixon administration "partially relaxed" its measures
against the Smith regime (although it closed its consulate
in Salisbury in March 1970) and planned on backing away
from sanctions, especially those related to strategic
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termination of Portuguese rule in southern Africa, the
presence of Cuban troops in Angola and South Africa's
policy changes, the Ford administration announced a change
in the previous policy.

Speaking in Lusaka in April 1976,

secretary of State Kissinger stated that American policy
henceforth supported meaningful and negotiated change in
Zimbabwe.

Kissinger repudiated any support for the Smith

regime, proposed progress toward majority rule on a strict
timetable, and pledged to protect minority rights, provide
technical and economic assistance to Zimbabwe during a transition period and assistance to refugees.
singer arranged a series

Subsequently Kis-

of meetings with the leaders of

Zimbabwe, South Africa and Angola, Mozambique, Botswana,
Tanzania and Zambia (the frontline states)--which on September 24, 1976 led to the Smith regime's acceptance of black
majority rule under a five-point plan. 72
minerals. The latter goal resulted in the Byrd Amendment
to the Military Procurement Act of 1971, allowing the import
of Zimbabwean chrome. The Byrd Amendment was criticized
by independent African nations and became symbolic of the
United States' tacit support of the Smith regime.
See Anthony
Lake, The "Tar Baby" Option: American Policy Toward Southern
Rhodesia (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976); W.A.E.
Skurnik, "Recent United States Policy in Africa", Current
History 64 (March 1973): 97-135; and Bruce Oudes, "Southern
Afric:a Policy Watershed", Africa Report 19 (November-December
1974): 46-50.
72 The five points were: the Smith regime's agreement
to majority rule within two years; the establishment of
a multiracial Council of State (with a white chairman);
the creation of a Council of Ministers (with ~ black majority
and chairman); an end to sanctions; and a ceasefire. Elaine
Windrich, "Rhodesia: The Road from Luanda to Geneva", World
Today 33 (March 1977): 107-109.
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The American initiative floundered, however, when
the Kissinger proposals were rejected by the frontline states,
who called for renewed British participation in the settlement.

Britain responded by proposing a constitutional con-

ference attended by all parties concerned.

This took place

in Geneva in October, 1976, attended by Smith, Nkomo and
Mugabe (united in the Patriotic Front), and Sithole and
Muzorewa (as representatives of a United African National
Council).

The Geneva conference failed to produce an agree-

ment and was finally adjourned in December 1976.

73

The

failure of the separate initiatives of the United States
and Britain led to a coordinated Anglo-American effort at
settlement.

Their proposal was rejected, however, by the

Smith regime and the frontline states.

74

Having admitted the possibility of a black-ruled
Zimbabwe, the Smith regime wished to have "moderate" black
leaders (i.e. not Mugabe and the ZANU component of the Patriotic Front) installed as the future leaders of Zimbabwe.
The Smith regime thus accused the Anglo-American plan as
a

device to bring Mugabe to power and, when the initiative

failed, announced the convening of an internal constitutional
73

Ibid.

74 For details of this plan, see Legum, Western Crisis,
pp. 201-208.
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conference.

This constitutional conference resulted in

an "internal settlement", signed by Muzorewa, Sithole and
Chief Jeremiah Chirau (a traditional chief and leader of
the Zimbabwe United Peoples' Organization or ZUPO) in March
1978.

Under the internal agreement the Zimbabwean cabinet

was replaced by an E}:ecuti ve Counci 1, consisting of the
black leaders and Smith, and the legislature was enlarged
to a 100-seat lower house (with 72 black seats) and a 30seat upper house (with 20 black seats).

Elections were

held on two occasions, the first an all-white one which
approved the settlement and the second an April 1979 election
in which Muzorewa's UANC won the majority.

Under the inter-

nal settlement and the Muzorewa regime the Land Tenure Act
was abolished, a minimum wage policy adopted, educational
segregation prohibited and Zimbabwe's name changed (from
Rhodesia) to Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. 75
The internal settlement led to the return of many
of the exiled nationalist leaders.
from abroad.

It also received support

In the United States the Carter administration

was pressured to recognize the Muzorewa regime and end sane-

.
76
t 1ons.

Some British observers assessed the 1979 elections

75see Rotberg~

Suffer the Future, pp. 266-268.

76 "Shift U.S. Policy on Rhodesia?" U.S. News and
World Report, October 30, 1978, pp. 31-32; "Let's Make a
Deal", Newsweek, October 30, 1978, pp. 41-42.
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as "free and fair" and the newly-elected Thatcher government
hinted that it would recognize the Muzorewa regime and lift
.

sane t 1ons.

77

At the Commonwealth conference in August 1979,

however, the Thatcher government, under pressure from Commonwealth members, suggested that

~

test should be devised

that could electorally assess the clajms of the Muzorewa
regime and its rivals, and demanded that the Zimbabwean
groups participate in a constitutional conference in September 1979 at the Lancaster House in London.

Pressured by,

respectively, the frontline states and South Africa, the
Patriotic Front and the Muzorewa regime participated in
the Lancaster House conference and signed a set of agreements
that drastically revised the constitution of the internal
settlement, introduced a ceasefire and scheduled elections
monitored by a Commonwealth Monitoring Force.

In the interim

period Britain would be responsible for public security.

78

From 1974 to 1979 British policy thus changed from
a stance of "no initiatives" to one that exercised the
responsibilities it claimed when it declared Zimbabwe to
be a crown colony.

Similarly, the Smith regime moved from

a rejection of majority rule to its acceptance.

Two questions

77 R. W. Apple, Jr., "Tory Recognition of Rhodesia
A Possibility", New York Times, April 8, 1979, p. 3.
78 Rotberg, Suffer the Future, pp. 272-275. See
also Henry Wiseman and Alastair M. Taylor, From Rhodesia
to Zimbabwe: The Politics of Transition (New York: Pergamon,
1981) pp. 3-44.
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can therefore be raised:

Why did the Smith regime accept

majority rule in 1976 and why did the conflict end by
an election when ZAPU and ZANU (the Patriotic Front) guerrilla
actions were expanding?

These questions can best be addressed

by noting (a) the role of the regional patrons in the conflict and (b) the role of exhaustion in the policies of
the regional patrons and the Smith regime.
2. 2. The R(lgional Environment
As discussed earlier, South Africa became the regional
pattern of the Smith regime, while the black African nations
close to Zimbabwe became the patrons of ZAPU and ZANU.

As

regional conditions changed, these regional patrons shifted
the tone and direction of the Zimbabwean conflict.
The Portuguese coup of 1974 radically altered the
role of Zimbabwe in South Africa's strategic thinking.

A

FRELIMO government in Mozambique was more than a year away,
but South P.frica wanted an amicable relationship with Mozambique to guarantee its access to Mozambican ports, the labor
supply of southern Mozambique and the electricity of the
Cabora Bassa Dam.
creased.

Contrastingly, Zimbabwe's liability in-

ZANU's cooperation with FRELIMO would (it was

accurately feared) lead to guerrilla infiltration into
Zimbabwe, Mozambique could close its border with Zimbabwe
and hence increase Zimbabwe's reliance on South Africa's
already congested railways and ports, and Mozambique could
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participate in sanctions.

Under these conditions, the Smith

regime could only survive if South Africa increased its
support--at a time when the rationale for it disappeared.
Instead, there now was a strong incentive for South Africa
to pressure the Smith regime into a political settlement
as a means to stabilize relations between South Africa and
black southern African states.

79

Publicly there was no sign of a South Africa-Zimbabwe
rift.

South Africa signed a new trade agreement with Zim-

babwe, maintained its para-military contingent and completed
a railroad linking Rutenga with the

Beitbridge-Johannesburg

line (in the event that the Umtali-Beira line was closed).
Privately, however, South Africa and Zambia devised a "detente
scenario" for southern Africa whereby South Africa would
pressure Smith into a political settlement and withdraw
its para-military contingent.

The scenario would include

a constitutional conference, in preparation for which Smith
would release the detained nationalist leaders, and a ceasefire.

Following public disclosure, the Victoria Falls con-

ference did take place, Smith released the detained nationalist
leaders, and a ceasefire was announced.

80

79 colin Legum (ed.), Africa Contemporary Record: Annual
Survey and Documents 1974-1975 (London: Rex Collings, 1975),
pp. A3-Al5.
80

Jbid.
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The detente scenario stalled as political disunity
between the nationalists persisted, guerrilla attacks increased, and the release of detained leaders stopped.

South

Africa's policy change nevertheless had critical results:
the nationalists' top political leaders were released and
the South African para-military contingent was withdrawn
by August 1975, opening a widening public rift between South
Africa and Zimbabwe.

In October 1975 Smith criticized South

Africa's detente effort as futile and argued that it caused
Muzorewa to balk at an internal settlement.

Premier Vorster

demanded an apology, which Smith made publicly.

81

Between

August 1975 and August 1976 the South African incentive
to abandon political support of the Smith regime increased.
In August 1975 South African forces entered Angola on the
presumption that they would receive American support but,
while the United States criticized the Cuban presence, its
support was not forthcoming.

South African troops eventually

withdrew under mounting international and domestic
cism.

82

criti-

In July 1976 South Africa came under further pressure
81

Martin and Johnson, p. 237.

82see Kenneth W. Grundy, Defense Legislation and
Commlinal Politics: The Evolution of a White South African
Nation as Reflected in the Controversy Over the Assignment
of Armed Forces Abroad, 1912-1976 (Ohio University: Papers
in International Studies, No. 3, 1978).
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when the Soweto riots erupted.

For South Africa a "worst

case" scenario was clearly at hand:

the Cuban presence

raised the possibility of a conventional attack from ext.ernal sources, without western support for South Africa, and
combined with a Soweto-like domestic uprising.

83

South Africa's own difficulties thus discouraged
a supportive role for the Smith regime when the Kissinger
initiative took place in the latter half of 1976.

Instead,

there was a strong incentive to pressure the Smith regime
to accept the American plan.

With no regional patron and

faced with increasing guerrilla activities, budget deficits,
and manpower shortages, the Smith regime had no choice but
.
. t y ru 1 e. 84
to accep t bl ac k maJOr1
The announcement that black majority rule was acceptable changed the conditions of the Zimbabwean conflict.
Whereas previous efforts were directed at the downfall of
the Smith regime and although the Kissinger initiative failed,
the self-acknowledged political demise of the Smith regime
could henceforth be presumed.

Efforts now focused on the

black replacement of the Smith regime.

There were several

con tenders for pov!er-: within Zimbabwe there was the UANC
of Muzorewa and ZUPO (led by Chief Chirau) and, externally,

83 william Gutteridge, "South Africa: Strategy for
Survival", Conflict Studies 131 (June 1981): especially
14-21.
84 see John Day, "The Rhodesian Internal Settlement",
World Today 34 (July 1978): 268-276.
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there was ZANU, ZAPU and FROLIZI.

Each of these groups

had regional patrons and it is the role of the frontline
states as patrons of ZAPU and ZANU that was critical to
the ensuing power struggle.
Before 1974 African nations supported ZAPU and ZANU
through the OAU and the ALC.

Since these bodies were unable

to play a large role in the liberation effort in Zimbabwe,
the burden of support fell on neighboring states and Zambia
in particular.

Between 1974 and 1979, African nations'

support was characterized by three developments.
First, the frontline states replaced the ALC as vanguard of African liberation.

The idea of regular contact

between states bordering on liberation targets first surfaced during the Angolan confljct and the group intially
consisted of fivE:.· members, Presidents Kaunda of Zambia,
Mac:hel of Mozambique, Khama of Botswana and Nyerere of Tanzania.

President Neto of Angola later joined, and, as host

of the ALC, Tanzania assumed the leadership role within
the frontline states.

The staff of the ALC was incorporated

with the respective foreign policy-making staffs of the
frontline states.

The frontline states became part of the

"progressive" group within the OAU and, as their actions
were often controversial, they relied on the support of
Nigeria to sway the OAU as a whole.

Co~pared

to the old

ALC, the frontline states were a far more effective lobbying
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group.

They were closely involved with ZAPU and ZANU as

host states, most of the presidents were former guerrilla
leaders, and they were skilled at influencing more powerful
. an d Br1. t a1n.
. 85
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states (and the OAU) paid more attention to the role of
extra-continental powers in southern Africa.

One mani-

festation of this was pressure on the United States to repeal
the Byrd Amendment.

Another manifestation was the call

for more stringent sanctions and observance of them.

86

Third, the two closest frontline states, Mozambique and
Zambja, were exposed to the adverse effectE of the Zimbabwean
dispute.

Zambia, for

ex~mple,

lost its access to the Beira

pipeline and had to acquire its oil through other routes,
its trade with Zimbabwe declined sharply, and hence was
forced to rely on Southern trade, railways and ports.

87

Mozambique, similarly, suffered from the border closure,
the initiation of sanctions and border raids.

88

From the beginning of the conflict it was clear that
ZAPU and ZANU were wholly reliant on the frontline states.
85
86

. --Cervenka, pp. 62-63.
Legum, Western Crisis, p. 48.

87 Richard Hall, The High Price of Principles (London:
Hodder and Stoughton, 1969), especially pp. 161-177 and
230-244.
88

The cost of one year of sanctions for Mozambique
was estimated at between 70,000,000 pounds and 82,000,000
pounds. Martin and Johnson, p. 226.
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They, in effect, determined where ZAPU and ZANU headquarters
and bases were located, influenced the training and equipment
ZAPU and ZANU received, could (and did) close bases and
political headquarters, and detained leaders.

As discussed

earlier, these factors played a critical role in the effectiveness and indeed viability of ZAPU and ZANU.

Although

frontline states' support derived from principled support
of majority rule, the escalation of hostilities and their
adverse economic effects produced an incentive to end the
conflict.

The frontline states' support of a particular

Zimbabwean organization was essentially based on selfinterest:

support of the Muzorewa regime would not end

the conflict, whereas ZAPU and ZANU, who were responsible
for guerrilla actions and who were cooperating in the
Patriotic Front, alone could end the conflict.

Stated dif-

ferently, the frontline states opposed the Muzorewa regime
not because it was "insufficiently black" but because its
military establishment was controlled by the same personnel
as the Smith regime and because it excluded the Patriotic
Front.

In fact, the war did escalate most under the Muzorewa

regime with border raids on Mozambique and, for the first
time, a raid on Zambia.

More ominously, the Muzorewa regime

launched an emergency recruitment

camp~ign,

aimed at produc-

ing a 25,000 man army loyal to Muzorewa by January 1980.
89 "Rhodesia- the clearest outcome and the best",
Manchester Guardian, March 16, 1980, p. 1.

89
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In broad terms, the goals of the frontline states
coincided with the Anglo-American proposals.

There was

still the question of any Zimbabwe regime's legal status,
but British policy after the internal settlement came to
view the cessation of guerrilla war as the overriding question.90

When the British made an offer for an inclusive

constitutional conference at the 1979 meeting of the Commonwealth, the frontline states thus pressured the Patriotic
Front to participate.

91

The expectations of the British

government and the frontline states nevertheless diverged.
Since Muzorewa's UANC won 64.9 percent of the black vote
in the 1979 election, Britain thought it would defeat the
Patriotic Front.

The frontline states, however, expected

the Patriotic Front to win the elections.
2.3.

92

The Domestic Environment
As previously discussed, the initial UDI period eli-

minated the moderating influences from the white political
spectrum and a hardened and cohesive Rhodesian Front used
all the means at its disposal to maintain itself.

Sanctions

90 Legum, Western Crisis, p. 210.
91 The PF was reluctant to en1:er negotiations, arguing
that they were on the verge of military victory; they too,
however, believed that they would win the elections. Martin
and Johnson, pp. 315-316.
92 Martyn Gregory, "Rhodesia: From Lusaka to Lancaster
House'', World Today 36 (January 1980): 11-18.
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and the effort to counter them accentuated the structural
features of the economy and, although it did not lead to
the economic chaos Britain predicted,
lems.

it did cause some·prob-

After 1974, however, the economic, political and

other problems of the Smith regime increased.
First, the Smith regime experienced a financial crisis.

Defense expenditures rose from Rh $77 million in 1975

to Rh $96 million in 1976, Rh $146 million in 1977 and Rh
$197 million in 1978; in 1978 defense expenditures amounted
to 40 percent of the total budget, as against 25 percent
in 1976.

93

The rise in defense expenditures was combined

with a declining growth rate; in real terms the GDP fell
by 3 percent in 1976 and 7 percent in 1977.

94

With sanctions

cumulatively exercisjng an adverse effect on trade and investment and hence the availability of foreign exchange
and with the

r~gime

unable to raise revenues by taxation,

the Smith regime was forced to devalue twice (in October
1977 and April 1978) and to borrow money.

Public debt

between 1965 and 1974 amounted to Rh $590 million; in 1978
alone the Smith regime was forced to borrow Rh $240 million,
bringing its foreign indebtedness to Rh $189.

95

The ecor.omic

93 Grundy, "Social Costs": 456 and :V.ichael Raeburn
Black Fire! (London: Julian Friedmann, Publishers, 1978),
p. 238.
94 Roger Riddell,."What Economic Road", Africa Report
(May-June 1978): 54 and Day, "The Rhodesian Internal Settlement": 271.
95

Riddell: 53.
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difficulties led to and were compounded by emigration by
economically active whites.

While white migration still

showed a small annual net gain in 1972, a net loss started
to occur in 1973.

Between 1976 and 1977 the net outflow

increased by 26 percent and included large numbers of white
.
1 s. 96
pro f ess1ona

Second, the shortage of public funds increased the
need for priority planning and it was clear that the rural
black areas--the scene of the guerrilla actions--were deprived of funds.

Under the policy of community development

the black councils were entitled to raise their own funds
when public support was insufficient, but when guerrilla
actions increased most of the Ministry of Internal Affairs'
funds went into the construction of protected villages.
In addition, guerrilla actions prevented the generation
of local revenue as ZAPU and ZANU urged blacks not to pay
taxes and school and cattle-dipping fees and attacked government-owned stores and beerballs.

97

Faced with a shortage

of funds and local opposition, the regime's rural black
administration disintegrated.

By 1977 the black councils

were being disbanded as district commissioners resumed direct
rule.

98

Approximate:Iy 1,000 black schools were forced to

96 W'lk
1 enson, p. 307.

97Hodges:- 16 •
9

. ~Michael Bratton, Beyond Corr.munity Development:
The Pol1t1cal Economy of Rural Administration in Zimbabwe
(London: Catholic Institute for International Relations
1978), pp. 34-45.
'
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close and about 25 percent of the black educational population left without educational access.

By March 1979, 155

of 450 black hospitals were closed. 99

Cattle diseases re-

appeared with the closing of about 6,500 of the 8,000 cattledips which, combined with cattle seizures as collective
fines, led rural blacks to lose one-third of the total

h er d •

100

The rural situation was further worsened by popu-

lation instability.

By 1979 about 750,000 blacks found

themselves removed to protected villages, about 150,000
blacks fled to Mozambique and Zambia, and 500,000 migrated
to the security of urban areas.

If the number of blacks

who joined the guerrillas is added, almost a quarter of
the black population was "directly uprooted by the war."

101

Third, the strain of counter-guerrilla warfare produced political divisions within the Smith regime.

To gain

the support of the ANC the regime in 1975 appointed a Commission of Inquiry into Racial Discrimination which published
a report that proposed, among other things, the repeal of
certain forms of racial discrimination and the Land Tenure
Act. 102

While the Smith regime did not accept this Quenet
ggibid.

100Anthony R. Wilkenson, "The Inipact of the War",
in W.H. Morris-Jones and Dennis Aust1iJ (eds.), From Rhodesia
To Zimbabwe (London: Frank Cuss, 1980), pp. 119-120.
101 Grundy, "Social Costs": 460.
102 Report of the Commission of Inqu~ry into Racial
Discrimination (Salisbury: Government Pr1nter, 1976).
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Report as a whole, it did implement some proposals, such
as the ability of blacks to own urban property.

In the

critical Vorster-Smith meetings of September 1976, Smith
still enjoyed the

su~~ort

of the RF-membership.

Smith,

however, did not fully· inform the RF of South African pressure nor his acceptance of it and hence acquired a mandate
to negotiate with Kissinger.

103

Following Smith's accept-

ance of majority rule, the support of the UANC gained new
importance and Smith proposed the repeal of the Land Tenure
Act.

Although the Land Tenure Act was scrapped the RF

divided and Smith had to rely on the support of black parliamentarians to have it passed.

The chairman of the RF resign-

ed and twelve members were expelled.

They formed the

Rhodesian Action Party (RAP), which advocated a more forceful
counter-guerrilla campaign.

Those who felt Smith did not

go far enough in repealing offensive legislation formed
the National Unifying Force (NUF).
Except as factors causing the exhaustion of the Smith
regime, these problems and their implications remained in
the background at the Lancaster House conference.

In the

forefront were efforts to devise an acceptable and workable
transition to a new regime.

3.

The Transitional Arrangement
The Lancaster House conference produced several
103
Martin and Johnson, p. 250.
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-

agreements.

.

-

One agreement concerned the transitional period

before.an independence date, wherein Britain assumed full
colonial authority in Zimbabwe, represented by a governor
(Lord Soames).

Another agreement produced a ceasefire,

effective on December 28, 1979, and under the authority
of a Ceasefire Commission composed of a military aide to
the governor, one senior commander of the security forces
and one of the Patriotic Front.

The contending parties

were to disengage and the guerrillas to assemble in 16 assembly points (APs) by January 4, 1980.

This disengagement

was to be supervised by a 1,200 man Commonwealth Monitoring
Force.

Britain would supervise internationally-observed

elections after a two-month period.

104

The conference also produced an independence constitution.

The most salient aspect

of this constitution was

that it created a legislature with a 100-member lower house,
with 20 seats reserved for whites, and a senate.
of state

~ould

republic.

The head

be a president, i.e. Zimbabwe would be a

The constitution can be amended by a two-thirds

vote in the Senate and a 70 percent vote in the lower house.
The existing judicial system was preserved, as was the civil
service.
104

The public service commissions were required to

see Southern Rhodesia: Report of the Constitutional Conference, Cmnd .• 7802 (September-December 1979)
and Wiseman and Taylor, pp. 7-13 for more details. See also
"It Seems Like A Miracle", Time, November 26, 1979,
pp. 62-64 for an account of the conference itself.
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pay civil service pensions and uphold internal regulations.
With regard to the military establishment, the forces of
the Patriotic Front and the Muzorewa regime would be demobilized and then integrated, in equal proportions, into a
conventionally styled military establishment under the
authority of a High Command and the Ministry of Defense.
Finally, the constitution recognized private property and
land could not be acquired by compulsory means.

The "land

problem" would be solved by foreign (especially British
and American) aid for development and settlement. 105
The constitution was a product of 47 plenary sessions,
in which major differences existed among the three parties
(Britain, the Patriotic Front and the Muzorewa regime).
The final product thus was a compromise; no single group
fashioned the constitution to suit its own interests.

With

regard to the two Zimbabwean parties, their willingness
to make compromises was undoubtedly influenced by uncertainty
about the outcome of the elections.

Although both were

confident that they would win, there was no guarantee of
victory arid either could in the future be an outvoted
parliamentary minority.

Considerations of power thus re-

quired a "neutral" constitution.

Most conspicuously, the

105The recognition of private property and guarantees
against expulsion from it is contained in the Bill of Righto
of the constitution under "Freedom of Deprivation of Property." For a critique see "Shortcomings of British plan
for compensation", Manchester Guardian, november 11, 1979,
p. 9.
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constitution was a victory of the political over the military
leaders.

While the senior comnianders participated in the

Lancaster House conference, they were relieved of their
operational command during the transition period
their armies would be demobilized.

106

and

The new military estab-

lishment would be a creation of the political leadership.

107

In view of the fact that ZAPU and ZANU were armies
rather than political parties, their assembly intc the
assembly points was smoother than expected.

The Commonwealth

Monitoring Force was largely unarmed and could not enforce
compliance by the estimated 16,000 guerrillas who were required to assemble within only seven days.

Only a fraction

of the guerrillas reported within the first five days, but
thereafter the number increased and by January 7 there were
18,500-20,000 people gathered in the assembly points.

There were 219 violations of the ceasefire, with ZIPRA
accountable for 36, ZANLA for 134 and the security forces
108
for 14,
which led Lord Soames to employ the regime's
106operational command, the PF argued, would be a
"recipe for a coup." Wiseman and Taylor, p. 9.

107The new army would be composed of equal representation of those who fought the war, and training was started
by officers of a British Military and Advisory Training
Team. The regime security foTces, ZANLA and ZIPRA would
each have a ~ember on military· high command. "rbid., p. 66.
108 uartyn Gregory, "Zimbabwe 1980: Politic:tsation
through Armed Struggle and Electoral Mobilization": 75.
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security forces (in particular, the black Rhodesian African
Rifles) against the guerrillas.

This act was controversial,
109
as Britain was accused of bias against the Patriotic Front,
110
but gradually a sense of trust was established.
In the elections for the white parliamentary seats
111
in February 1980, the RF won all 20 seats.
In the context
for the remaining black seats, the Patriotic Front was at
a distinct disadvantage.

The UANC of Muzorewa had partici-

pated in the 1979 elections but neither ZAPU nor ZANU had
operated as political parties within Zimbabwe since 1964.
The Patriotic Front combining ZAPU and ZANU, moreover, was
a negotiating construct; it had "no headquarters or offices,
except the two co-chajrmen, no bureaucracy--in short no
existence except as a negotiating construct or alliance
112
of convenience."
The electoral campaign again revealed
the divisions between ZAPU and ZANU.

ZAPU changed its name

109wiseman and Taylor, p. 20.
110The most senior ZANLA commander, Tongogara, was
killed in December 1979 in a car accident in Mozambique.
111 Throughout the elections there were rumors that
the RF was about to oust Smith and replace him with David
Smith (Finance Minister under the Muzorewa regime). The
NUF boycotted the elections on the grounds that it was
racially segregated. Martyn Gregory, "The ~9~0 Rhodesia~
Elections - a first-hand account and analys1s , World Toaay
36 (March 1980): 181.
112Rotberg, Suffer the Future, p. 263.
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to Patriotic Front to stress unity and did not publicly
criticize Mugabe or ZANU, but they could not establish a
common electoral strategy or platform with ZANU.

113

ZANU's

electoral strategy emphasized the importance of the rural
vote.

A large number of guerrillas remained in the rural

areas 114 controlled by ZANLA to organize electoral support.
ZANU (PF) under Mugabe's leadership won 63 percent
of the votes, winning all the seats in Manicaland, Victoria
and the northeastern areas of Mashonaland North.

In the

western areas of Mashonaland North and South, ZANU (PF)
did slightly worse, winning 6 of 8 seats in the former and
14 of 16 in the latter.

Nkomo's PF (or ZAPU) did well in

the west (Matabeleland North and South), winning 15 of 16
seats.

In the Midlands, ZANU (PR) won 8 seats and the PF

(or ZAPU) 4.

The UANC of Muzorewa won only 3 seats (in

Mashonaland North and South).
won any seats.

115

None of the other parties

Thus Mugabe's ZANU (PF) won 57 of the

113

Gregory, "The Rhodesian Elections--a first-hand
account and analysis": 182-183.
114

This reduced the number of guerrillas that could
gather at the assembly points. That the number of people in
the points (20,000) exceeded the estimated number of guerrillas (15,000-16,000) is attributed to the fact that the
guerrillas sent surrogates (mujibas and women) and the return
of more than 200,000 refugees. Wiseman and Taylor, pp. 54
and 59 and "Playing with guns" Newsweek, January 14, 1980,
p. 51.
115These included a ZANU party, led by Sithole, and
a Zimbabwe Democratic Party (ZDP) led by Chikerema.
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80 black seats, Nkomo's PF (or ZAPU) 20 seats, and the UANC
3 seats.

In terms of the share of the vote, ZANU (PF) won

at least 80 percent of the popular vote in the eastern
provinces; in most of these areas, Nkomo's PF ( or ZAPU)
was outvoted by the UANC.
was reversed.

In the western areas, the position

In Matabeleland North and South, Nkomo's

PF (or ZAPU) won at least 80 percent, while ZANU (PF) could
only manage a 10.4 percent in the North and 6.85 percent
in the

~outh.

Only in the Midlands were there signs of

greater balance, with ZANU (PF) winning a 60 percent share
and Nkomo's PF about 28 percent.

116

Roughly speaking the electoral support of ZANU (PF)
and the PF (or ZAPU) coincided with, respectively, the operational areas of ZANLA and ZIPRA, and the Mashona
living areas.

and Ma tabele

Whether the electoral behavior of blacks

is correleated with tribal or any other socio-economic factor
is nevertheless

difficult to establish witb certainty.

The exact number of the Zimbabwean population, the number
of voters and their areas of permanent residence were all
unknown.

For example, the only breakdown that was given

was a provincial-regional one and this does not coincide
with tribal patterns.

The only significant factor appears

116 Martyn Gregory, "Zimbabwe 1980: Politicisation
through Armed Struggle and Electoral Mobilization": 62-65.
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to be the guerrilla war itself.

During it, ZANU (PF)

established its influence in certain areas, had the organizational resources to conduct a campaign there, and was
untainted by any collaboration with the Smith regime.
Nkomo's PF also established itself in certain regions, but
these were less populous and Nkomo was tainted by charges
of opportunism in his negotiations with Smith.

The UANC

seemed to suffer most from collaboration, as it was almost
eclipsed in the election returns.

117

Thus the negotiations, elections and arrangements
that ended the Zimbabwean conflict both confirmed and denied
the legacy of guerrilla warfare.

The large guerrilla armies

generated by the war were required to demobilize and a portion integrated into a new conventionally-styled military
establishment supervised by the civilian-political leadership.

Yet the armies provided the organizational resources

and ready-made regional constituencies on which the respective
groups contested the election.

Thus ZANU (PF) won the elec-

tion and the Mugabe regime assumed power on April 18, 1980. 118
117

Ibid. Although there were many acts of intimidation, especially in the northeastern areas, observers were
satisfied that the elections were "free and fair." Wiseman
and Taylor, pp. 93-94 and 155.
118

For an account of the proceedings, see "A Final,
Priceless Reward", Newsweek, April 28, 1980, pp. 47-49.
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The Mugabe regime operates under a constitutional order
that preserved the police, judicial and bureaucratic apparatus; that the respective groups chose to operate under this
order was a reflection of the political self-interest of
their leaderships.
The constitutional arrangements of the ending of
the Zimbabwean conflict raise

the question whether the

experience of guerrilla and counter-guerrilla warfare altered,
in any fundamental sense, the structural features of Zimbabwean society.

In this regard, four developments require

elaboration.
First, impoverished and overpopulated even before
UDI, the black rural areas' experience of guerrilla warfare
deepened the rural crisis.

Land was either devoid of popu-

lation or heavily overgrazed, cattle (and thus social status,
wealth and political power) lost, and schools, hospitals
and Stores Closed. ll

9

Cl ear l y, rura l bl ac k s pa1"d d ear l y

for their role in the guerrilla war.

Urban pressures also

consequently increased as unemployed refugees crowded the
urban areas in vast shantytowns.

120

Second, while emigration reduced the number of whites,
white farmers remained the most influential group through
119

see Martin Meredith, The Past is Another Country:
Rhodesia 1890-1979 (London: Andre Deutsch, 1979), pp. 305-309.
120

"Whoever Says We're Safe Lies", Time, April 30, 1974,
pp. 39-40. In Salisbury alene there were 60,000 uprooted black squatters.
Richard Hull, '"!be Continuing Crisis in Rhodesia", CUrrent History 78
(March 1980): 107-108.
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their role in the RF and as one-fifth of the economically
active whites.

Sanctions and guerrilla warfare added to

their importance.

With regard to sanctions, the regime

was forced to rely on agricultural exports as its manufacturing trade flagged, giving farmers generous state aid and
loans.

As regards guerrilla war, farmers who wished to

buy or develop land in tbe northeastern and eastern areas
most affected by guerrilla actions were virtually subsidized
121
by the regime.
Third, the regime's self-maintaining efforts led
to the growth and centralization of the public sector.
Expansion can be meG.sured in several ways.

Public employ-

ment rose from about 40,000 in 1964 to 78,000 in 1969 and
to about 118,000 in 1978.

This made the public sector by

far the largest single employer in Zimbabwe, and public
servants' earnings about one-quarter of total economic earn122
ings.
The largest proportion of these employees were
in the field of

education (including black education),
123
followed by internal affairs and then defense.
Overall
121 wilkenson, "From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe", PP· 30::i304.
122

Bratton, "The Public Service in Zimbabwe": 448.

123wiseman and Taylor, p. 16.
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there were 40 specialized civil service departments, resorting under the authority of 20 ministries.

These departments

exercised "direct rule from the center" by withholding funds
from local units, or by investing central government employees in local areas with quasi-judicial and para-military
powers under the umbrella of martial law and emergency regulations.

The expansion of the public sector increased the

number of black public employees, but in proportional terms
they did not increase (about 74 percent of the whole) and,
moreover, blacks were under-represented in the senior,
124
tenured positions (10 percent).
Fourth, the effort to counter sanctions led to agricultural and mineral diversification.

In agriculture,

tobacco was replaced by cotton and sugar as chief exports,
and production of peanuts, tea, soybeans, maize and sorghum
increased.

In mining, copper became the major product,

supplemented by chromium, nickel, silver, iron, asbestos
and gold.

With a few exceptions (such as the domestic tex-

tile industry), however, these products were exported and
hence their value was subject to fluctuations.

With regard

to manufacturing, its share of the GDP increased from approximately 18 percent in 1965 to about 23 percent in 1977 but,
as the 1974-1979 period showed, its development is contingent
12 4 Bratton "The Public Service in Zimbabwe": 450459. See also D.G. Clarke, "The Growth and Economic Impact
of the Public Sector of Rhodesia", Rhodesian Journal of
Economics 6 (September 1972):
48-60 •
....
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on the availability of foreign capital and protection from
125
especially South African manufacturers.
In short, the 15-year conflict accentuated and tperefore more clearly revealed the structural features of Zimbabwean society.

While the Mugabe regime differs from pre-

vious regimes in that its political legitimacy is not disputed, its policy options are, like those of previous
regimes, effectively constrained by these structural
features.

In an immediate sense the constraining role of

these structures is further complicated by the highly

com~

petitive nature of the black elite and by the problems presented by the demilitarization of a people-in-arms.
4.

Conclusion
This chapter raised the question of why the war ended

in an election.

It was argued that this question can best

be understood by noting (a) the role of the Smith regime's
and the guerrillas' regional patrons and (b) the role of
exhaustion of all parties concerned.

In the first years

of the conflict (1965-1973), the guerrillas posed no serious
threat to the Smith regime and Britain thus was forced to
resolve a dispute characterized by international-legal issues.
Britain tried to force the Smith regime into negotiations
by means of economic and diplomatic pressure but the
125Rotberg, Suffer the Future, pp. 242-246 and Legum,
Western Crisis, pp. 229-234.
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hardened regime managed to evade this pressure by mobilizing
its economy on a war footing and by relying on South African
(and, to a lesser extent, Portuguese) aid.
After 1973, the Zimbabwean conflict changed fundamentally as guerrilla actions progressively increased.

Thus

the Smith regime was severely weakened by its counter guerrilla operations and the cumulative effect of sanctions
and, when its regional patron (South Africa) withdrew its
support, it had no choice but to announce its own political
demise.

This announcement in 1976 again shifted the grounds

of the conflict, as the search was now for a suitable black
replacement.

The Smith regime (and South Africa) wanted

a "moderate" black group or at least not Mugabe's ZANU in
power and thus drew Muzorewa (UANC), Sithole and Chirau
into an internal settlement.

The Muzorewa regime (or rule

by the "modera t.es"), however, increased the level of hostilities, which alarmed the frontline states and Britain which,
for economic and political reasons, wanted an end to the
conflict.

Under the aegis of the Commonwealth the frontline

states and Britain thus developed a plan to end the conflict
and all the regional patrons involved pressured the concerned
groups to participate.
By the ending of the conflict in the latter half
of 1979 and early 1980, none of the Zimbabwean cont€nders
were thus masters of their own fate.

The respecti-.;e leaders
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behaved according to what they were, namely contenders for
power who seek to maximize their power.

These considerations

did not produce extremism at the Lancaster House conference;
rather they produced compromises as no group wanted to be
a future victim of a biased legal order.

The group that

did win the following elections clearly did so on the basis
of its

orga~izational

personnel.

resources, particularly its military

It inherited an order, however, in which those

organizational resources are transformed and an order whose
structural features (and hence problems) were accentuated
by the experiences of the 15-year conflict.

CHAPTER VI
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
This study has addressed the question why a particular kind of revolution occurred in Zimbabwe.

The examination

was informed by two theoretical traditions, namely the
theoretical literature on revolutions in general and the
theoretical literature on African upheavals, especially the
work of those scholars who argue that African revolutions
are not caused by nor lead to socio-economic transformations.
Following the structural approach developed by Eisenstadt,
Paige, Skocpol and Wolf, the analysis has then sought to
determine whether.a crisis within the Zimbabwean regime coincided with a rural uprising.
The analysis pursued several avenues.

First, it

focused on the nature of the white community and its relation
to the state (central political power and bureaucracy) and
the economy, as well as to international pressure.

Second,

the nature of black political life since 1888 was examined,
with particular attention paid to the socio-economic constraints and legal regulations under which blacks lived, what
the political implications of those conditions were, and the
organizational forms black collective action took in response
to these conditions.

Third, the struggle for power between

1962 and 1979 was examined in order to determine the nature
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and effectiveness of black collective action, which blacks
were most active in the struggle and why, the organizational
forms generated by the struggle for power, the nature of the
black elite or leadership, and the nature and effectiveness
of the regime's counteractions.

Finally, the manner in which

the conflict ended was examined.
1.

Zimbabwe 1888-1965: The Emergence
of a Political Crisis
The study shows that state power in Zimbabwe prior to

1965 was the preserve of whites who systematically excluded
blacks from electoral and other political power.

This gave

the successive Zimbabwean regimes in the period prior to 1965
a very narrow support base.

Although the regime's support

was narrowly based on the whites, not all whites participated
equally in thE· political process.

Public policy-making was

dominated by the executive, seen not as cabinet dominance but
as the dominant role of the prime minister, and by the public
bureaucracy.

These political actors operated at some remove

from the political parties and the legislature, as there was
no populist political tradition in white politics, at least
not until the 1960s.

In the absence of such a tradition,

some whites, (including white farmers and mining interests)
exercised political leverage with the executive-bureaucratic
alliance.

The political prominence of these groups was

largely a reflection of Zimbabwean society before the Second
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World War but, although the changes brought by the war
resulted in the rise of manufacturers and the decline in the
number of miners, white farmers maintained their political
leverage in the executive-bureaucratic alliance.

The policy-

making alliance was highly susceptible to external political
pressures, primarily because it was in agreement with f;ri tish
imperial aims· in southern Africa.

This voluntary cooperation

with Br5tish aims was reflected in the opposition to the
political developments of South Africa, particularly to the
course of South Africa's public policy directions after the
rise of Afrikaner nationalism since 1900.
The Zimbabwean regime's opposition to South African
policies is ironic, for there is a similarity and relatedness
between Zimbabwean and South African political development.
The arrival of the Matabele in the area north of South Africa
and the initial white settlement, for example, was a direct
outgrowth of the dynamics of South African society.

Later

developments in Zimbabwe, such as land apportionment and the
systematic exclusion of blacks from state power, is also
similar to South African practice.

Yet Zimbabwean whites

were opposed to South Africa's political directions, especially after the rise of Afrikaner nationalism after 1900.
Before the Second World war Zimbabwe's economy was of
the colonial export type.

Initial white settlement was pre-

mised on the hope of discovering a "second Reef" but when this
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failed to materialize white farming and mining became the
mainstays of the economy.

There were some secondary indus-

tries, but they were dominated by the activities surrounding
the extraction and export of primary goods.

The export-

oriented industries encountered several difficulties before
the Second World War as they were subject to fluctuations
in world market prices, overproduction and ecological disasters.

This led the state to aid and regulate economic pro-

duction; even before 1940 the state in Zimbabwe had adopted
an interventionist posture as far as the economy was concerned.
During and after the Second World War Zimbabwe experienced strong economic and political pressure.

The political

pressure to adopt racial reforms as a prelude to the creation
of the Central African Federation soon evaporated, but the
pressure for increased production was sustained throughout
the 1950s.

With its powerful bureaucracy and its interven-

tionist posture, the Zimbabwean regime embarked on a policy
of modernization, aided by the enlarged market created by
the CAF and the influx of capital from British and CAF sources.
The policy of economic modernization was particularly aimed
at increasing the number of secondary industries in Zimbabwe,
as well as increasing the output of white and black farmers.
By 1965 the economic results of this policy were mixed.
Economic diversification did occur as the number of secondary
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industries and the volume and value of agricultural production increased.
vulnerable.

Yet each of the economic sectors was still

Black agricultural output was steadily diminish-

ing as a result of political opposition to economic reforms
and some questionable economic reasoning on the part of the
regime.

White

farmers did increase the volume of their out-

put, but its dramatic rise in value was attributable to
favorable world market conditions.

These conditions would

not necessarily prevail in the future, but white farmers
increasingly relied on tobacco production which was geared
to the export market.

The contribution of manufacturing to

the GDP increased, but production was of a limited range of
low-quality goods geared to the needs of black consumers and

.

their limited buying power and still faced competition from
high quality imports.
The white regime's efforts to reform the economy
encountered considerable opposition from whites and blacks
alike.

This opposition emanated mainly from the rural areas,

where reforms threatened rural customs and security and
undermined tribal political authority, threatening to deprive
white farmers of their increasing demand for black laborers.
The regime attempted to adjust to the loss of white political
support by creating a black middle class of a moderate political character, but this met with black disinterest and
opposition in some instances.

With its support base still
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narrow, the regime in the early 1960s encountered renewed
international pressure, this time in the form of pressure for
racial reform in exchange for the granting of independence.
This pressure radicalized the regime's reform program as it
allowed blacks formal political participation in the legislature and proposed to abolish the land apportionment legislation.
These proposals led to the demise of the UFP regime.
The white rural-based opposition grew rapidly and, as the
farmers alone or as a proportion of the electorate could not
defeat the regime, they developed a potent party-organization moulded by a populist philosophy.

This Rhodesian

Front organization defeated the UFP, transformed the mode
of governing in Zimbabwe from the dominance of the executive
bureaucratic

alliance in policy-making to one where policy-

making was dominated by the extra-parliamentary role of the
RF organization.

The RF also abandoned the reforms of the

1950s and was prepared to achieve independence by unilateral
means, as was reflected in its Unilateral Declaration of
Independence in November 1965.

UDI brought renewed interna-

tional pressure, but the RF seemed initially to thrive on
such pressure; it remained cohesive, used all the state
means at its disposal to maintain itself, and reversed many
of the moderate and multi-racial features of Zimbabwean life,
inviting comparisons with a one-party state and South African
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race policies.
For all its power, the RF was actually in the grip of
a political crisis.

Its power was unevenly distributed and,

like its predecessors, it had a narrow support base.

Pre-

vious efforts to create a black middle class had failed and
in the early 1960s blacks began to oppose participation in
the white electoral process.

With UDI this political crisis

acquired international-legal proportions as the Smith regime,
jud[ed by the standards of regime legitimacy prevailing in
Africa since 1945, was found to be illegitimate.
creased international pressure.
no obvious financial crisis.

This in-

As yet the regime suffered

Although its public debt rose,

the regime's survival now depended on the ability of its
diversified economy to sustain a growth rate in the face of
that international pressure and the ability of the regime to
quell any revolt from the blacks.
2.

Black Zimbabwe 1888-1962: The
Conditions of Pnlitical Action
The study shows that the first 30 years of white rule

introduced many of the changes that would leave black life
as it was known before 1888 in a condition beyond recall.
Many of the changes introduced came in the wake of black
resistance to the imposition of white rule, ironically con-

•

ceived as actions that defended blacks against white encroachments.
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Black life in Zimbabwe between 1888 and 1962 functioned
under the impact of at least three crises.

First, there was

a demographic crisis as the number of blacks increased from
an estimated 500,000 in 1888 to 3,550,000 in 1961.

The

steadily increasing number of blacks occupied land whose
supply was limited by law; this gave blacks in the reserves
a density of 25 per square mile in 1961, as compared to 10
per square mile in 1941.

By the 1960s an estimated 30 per-

cent of the blacks entitled to land by custom were, indeed,
landless.

Second, blacks lived under the impact of an eco-

logical crisis.

In Zimbabwe conditions for farming are

generally harsh and suitable farmland is limited to the
central highlands and the northeastern areas.

The manner in

which the reserves were created resulted in the allocation
~

of land to blacks in areas where the quality of the soil was
most questionable.

With the best farmland allocated to whites,

blacks lived only on the reserves where the combination of
demographic pressure and soil quality resulted in the steadily
diminishing ecological capacity of the soil and hence the
diminishing productive capacities of black farmers of the
reserves.

Third, there was a political crisis as the politi-

cal authority of the tribal leadership was undermined and then
re-introduced in a bureaucratic form.
Is there a common denominator among these changes?
Certainly the changes in the conditions of black life did not
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result from their exposure to rampant commercialism.

Blacks

were threatened by the encroachments of whites, their desire
for farmland, and their need of black labor.

Blacks were

also exposed to new notions, such as private property, wage
labor, electoral politics and so forth.

But the small

number of local markets in which blacks successfully participated were soon replaced by a labor and production market
regulated by an interventionist state.

AGcording to govern-

ment regulations the entry of blacks to tte cash economy
could come mainly as wage laborers.

Entry as producers or

owners of private property was limited to the small number
of purchase farmers.

By 1962 this left blacks in a situation

in which where they had been exposed to notions associated
with commercialism and capitalism, but in which few were
actually commercialized owners of private property.
As suggested by the above, the use of state power by
the settlers is the common denominator of changes in black
life.

Initially the white regimes assumed that blacks would

be progressively drawn into

w~tge

labor and enter the spiral

of socio-economic progress associated with white life.

Under

this doctrine of economic assimilation, tribal life was
beyond recall and reserved land only a temporary refuge.
When the settlers achieved self- or responsible government,
however, ·they used state power to reconstitute tribal life
in a form that was politically understood and desired by the
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whites in general and the Native Department in particular.
After the Second World War state power was again used in
an attempt to reconstitute tribal life as it was desired by
the white regime for economic reasons.

Clearly the changes

in black life can, then, best be seen as a result of the
use of state power to affect economic and political changes,
rather than of blacks' exposure to the dislocations brought
by rampant commercialism.
3.

The Struggle for Power: International
Nationalism, Guerrilla War and the
Response of the Regime
Although blacks lived under the impact of three crises

deriving mainly from the use of state power, the likelihood
of spontaneous and locally-led political action was remote.
Structurally the black population could be divided into the
blacks of the reserves, the purchase area farmers, black
laborers on white corporate and single-owned farms, and urban
wage laborers.

This structure was derived from methods of

land apportionment and the need of blacks to supplement
their subsistence needs with wage labor.

In each of the

black structures, conditions discouraged blacks from engaging
in collective political action.
In the reserves, local leadership and councils were
avenues of bureaucratic control rather than local autonomy.
Even if blacks were to seek alternatives for political expression and independence, these required government consent and,
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should this requirement be ignored, the regime had a vast
array of means to suppress local political initiatives.
As regards farmworkers, their position was even worse·as
they lived under the all-encompassing control of the employers and their assistants.

Discontent did occur, but this

tended to be expressed in non-political forms, such as
damage to property and absenteeism, and could be mediated
by employers in a variety of ways.

Urban blacks had engaged

in collective action but these were irregular and because
of the realities of urban geography and regime repression
they were difficult to sustain.

Compared to the above, the

purchase area farmers seemed to have the greatest scope of
freedom of action, but their small number and the small size
of the land they commanded militated against a powerful
political role in guerrilla warfare.
While blacks were unlikely to engage in spontaneous
political action by the 1960s, the decade preceding it had
produced a nationalist elite that abandoned the self-conscious elitism of earlier organizations and sought to ally
itself with popular black action.

Elsewhere in Africa,

black nationalist leaders were assuming power and the
nationalist elite of Zimbabwe was exposed to these developments in the Central African Federation by having contact
with the leaders of the nationalist movements in Malawi
(then Nyasaland) and Zambia (then Northern Rhodesia).
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Zimbabwe's membership in the CAF, however, was also counterproductive from the point of view of collective action in
that the violence in the two northern territories led the
Zimbabwean regime to take action that would preempt such
action in the southern territory.

Thus the leadership of

the nationalist organizations were arrested and detained,
the organizations declared illegal, and any black organizational activity beyond desired channels was restricted.
This limited the tactical scope of the nationalist groups,
particularly with respect to their access to rural areas.
Although the 1950s brought rural based black discontent in Zimbabwe, spontaneous black collective action in
the early 1960s was unlikely.

Most blacks, e.g., those in

the reserves and rural and urban wage laborers, were for
several reasons discouraged fr.om engaging in collective
action and the elites that sought to encourage such action
were decimated by regime repression.

Eventually the black

nationalist organizations were forced into exile, from which
it was far more difficult to organize and lead guerrilla
warfare.
As Skocpol and others have suggested with regard to
revolutionary conflict in the non-Western world, the conflict
in Zimbabwe was initially highly asymmetrical.

In Zambia

the nationalist groups' action revealed their weaknesses.
First, the nationalists were divided into two organizations
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(ZAPU and ZANU) and there were divisions even within the
respective organizations.

Second, the nationalists were

unsure as to whether they should concentrate their effo·rts
on foreign-diplomatic activity or on a guerrilla struggle
within Zimbabwe.

Although they prepared for guerrilla

struggle during the period between 1962 and 1970, they
focused mainly in their international audience.

Third, the

groups were in a period of organizational transition as
substitute leaders became the effective heads of the organizations and as they struggled to become entities capable
of waging guerrilla warfare.

Fourth, in Zambia the orga-

nizations were in exile condition, which produced morale
and discipline problems, exaggerated claims and factionalism.
Finally, Zambia had drawbacks as a base for infiltration,
as it only allowed narrow corridors of infiltration into
areas which were sparsely populated and had a harsh terrain.
Thus the initial guerrilla attacks were clumsy and usually
counterproductive.

In contrast the Smith regime had a well-

organized defense establishment and an extensive intelligence network that could alert it to guerrilla groups and
their location.
Given the nature of guerrilla infiltration and attacks
during the initial period, the Smith regime scored only a
qualified victory, but it saw this as decisive and became
overconfident.

Until 1970 the regime was indeed confident
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of its ability to maintain itself.

The Rhodesian Front,

in which rural interests were still overrepresented, dominated the legislature and the bureaucracy, overwhelmed the
political parties and forces of moderation, and maintained
its own cohesion.

Sanctions and other international pres-

sures did not shake their confidence and produce political
concessions.

Thf~

regime brought the economy under full

state management, encouraged agricultural diversification
and the development of more secondary induatries, and
replaced Britain with South Africa as its main trading partner.

As regards the blacks, the regime made no noteworthy

attempts to "win the hearts and minds" of black Zimbabweans.
In fact the regime felt confident enough to upgrade the
political authority of the traditional-tribal leadership
(seen as representatives of the blacks as a whole), passed
a new land act which left much of the previous land apportionment unaltered and increased segregationist practices.
Yet the Smith regime was not wholly invulnerable.
One vulnerability was the attrition factor of guerrilla
warfare which, while still modest,were growing in scope.
Another vulnerability was that the sanctions' cumulative
effect deprived the Zimbabwean economy of foreign exchange,
capital and investment.

This produced priority planning in

which certain societal sectors, like black education in the
rural areas and the transportation infrastructure, were
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deprived of funds and deteriorated.

Finally and most impor-

tantly, the Smith regime became deeply dependent on the
financial, military and political support of South Africa.
After 1970 the asymmetry between the contending parties disappeared but the contest still fluctuated.

The

Smith regime's intelligence network failed to alert the
regime to an-important development, ZANU's links with FRELIMO
and the switch in the focus of guerrilla actions from the
western areas adjacent to Zambia to the northeastern areas
adjacent to Mozambique.

With the help of FRELIMO, ZANU then

gained organizational access to the reserves and the purchase
areas in the northeastern areas.

When the Portuguese coup

occurred, the scope of this organizational access increased
dramatically.

The regime security forces were still able to

launch search and destroy missions against the guerrillas,
but they were hampered by the support ZANU received in the
area.
In general, Skocpol's and Wolf's identification of
the peasant groups, here simply seen as rural blacks most
active in revolutions; are supported by the nature of revolutionary activity in Zimbabwe.

Rural blacks from all popula-

tion groups supported ZAPU and ZANU, but only after these
organizations had acquired access to the rural areas.

How-

ever, the support given to the organizations varied.

In the

reserves and the purchase areas the organizations enjoyed
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freedom of movement because these areas were located in
territory adjacent to Mozambique and Zambia, the guerrillas
often acquired the loyalty and support of local authorities
(i.e. tribal chiefs) and tribal solidarity discouraged counterguerrilla actions and, most importantly, because the regime
until the early 1970s concentrated its repressive forces in
the western regions.

Contrarily, blacks employed on white

farms could support the guerrillas mainly by supplying information and not reporting their presence in the area, for they
were within the repressive reach of their white employers.
With regard to the nature of the nationalist elite,
events in Zimbabwe show how devastating the loss of a leadership element can be in developing an effective organization
and opposition.

Although leadership as a symbolic matter can

be sustained while leaders are incarcerated, leadership also
is a matter of daily administration of organizational affairs.
While the loss of the leadership element may occur as a
result of regime repression, the leadership may also destroy
its own effectiveness by personal rivalry and factionalism.
In this regard the nationalist elite in Zimbabwe was characterized by its competitiveness.

This competitiveness was

related to a variety of factors, such as personal animosities,
tactical and training differences, competition for a limited
supply of organizational positions and the uncertainty of the
exile environment, but the common demoninator seems to be
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personal and organizational ambitions.

For most of the Zim-

babwean nationalist elite the most formative experience was
the struggle for power itself, which lasted from at least
1955 (with the reconstitution of the ANC) to 1979.

Competive-

ness is thus best seen as deriving from personal and organizational desires to acquire and maintain power; whatever
tribal, regional, socio-economic and other differences existed
were manipulated to suit the pursuit of power.
The organizational forms generated by the guerrilla
struggle were loosely styled military organizations rather
than political parties.

As such the military leadership

was antagonistic towards the civilian-political leadership
and, in the case of ZANU, eventually led to the displacement
of political leaders by military ones in the organizations'
major decision-making body.

During the struggle these

military leaders dominated decisions about local actions and
were interested mainly in securing freedom of action for
the guerrillas rather than building alternative political
structures.

Because of the way the conflict ended, by

negotiation and election, the organizational resources of the
military commanders were crucial in mobilizing electoral support, but simultaneously the compromises made by the leadership at the Lancaster House conference requires the demise of
the military organizations as guerrilla entities.
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4.

Sanctions, Negotiations and the
Effects of Guerrilla Warfare
The ending of the Zimbabwean conflict underscores

Gurr's caution not to expect clearcut military victories in
revolutionary conflicts.

By the end of 1979 ZAPU and ZANU

actions were steadily increasing, but it was uncertain whether
they would be capable of, for example, invading Salisbury by
military foree.

Moreover, the regional patrons of the

respective groups, on whom the groups had become wholly
dependent, were exposed to the adverse effects of the war
and were willing to pressure Britain to devise a plan that
would end the conflict by other than military means.

When

Britain then devised a plan for ending the conflict on electoral grounds, the regional patrons pressured the respective
groups to accept it.
In the Lancaster House agreements the parties to the
conflict chose to preserve most of the major aspects of the
old order because it suited organizational and personal
struggles for power.

The structural features of the old order

were, moreover, accentuated by the guerrilla war.

First, the

lands previously designated as reserves are heavily overgrazed,
their population uprooted, property (cattle) destroyed and
schools, hospitals and stores either destroyed or in a state
of disrepair.

This not only brings rural pressure but also

urban pressure as blacks, unable to sustain themselves in the
rural areas, crowd the towns in search of wage labor.

Second,
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ZANU as the major political party commands a bureaucracy that
was expanded and centralized during the guerrilla struggle.
It is by far the most important single employer in Zimbabwe
(public servants' earnings are the largest proportion of all
economic earnings) and it provides the Mugabe regime with a
vast array of organizational resources.

Third, the economy

was further diversified as a result of the struggle, but each
of the sectors are still dependent on the availability of
foreign capital, exchange and investment.

In particular, the

struggle deepened Zimbabwe's dependence on South Africa.

As

was the case during the course of Zimbabwe's history, the course
of its future development will be influenced by the dynamics
of South African society.
The Mugabe regime's policy options are, like those of
its predecessors, constrained by the structural features of
the Zimbabwean society.

In an immediate sense the constrain-

ing role of these features is further complicated by the competitive nature of the black leadership and by the problems
presented by the demilitarization of a people-in-arms.

The

Mugabe regime differs from previous regimes, however, in that
its political legitimacy is not questioned, except in Matabeleland, and that it had, as the election results

show, a

wide political support base, at least until the end of 1952.
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According to the definition of revolution here adopted,
namely a form of change simultaneously affecting several
dimensions of society in a fundamental and progressive·manner
over a period of decades and culminating in a violent struggle for political control, the events in Zimbabwe can clearly
be described as a revolution.

But, in summary, what kind of

revolution occurred in Zimbabwe?
The preceding discussion shows that a revolution
originated in a pre-1945 Zimbabwe which, while it had been
exposed to some modern socio-economic and political forces,
lacked fully modernized economic, social and political structures.

In this transitional environment state power, charac-

terized by a highly bureaucratized internal composition and
operating at some remove from popular white political pressures, attempted to implement socio-economic reforms when it
was faced with external pressures generated by the Second
World War.

These attempted reforms (or modernization) en-

countered black and white rural based opposition.

The white

opposition then captured state power, suspended the reforms,
and with a narrow political support base attempted to maintain
itself under increasing external pressure.

This crisis in

state power eventually coincided with black collective action
led by a non-rural elite and based on the participation of
rural blacks in gu€rrilla warfare.

During the ensuing strug-

gle for state power the respective groups became dependent
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on regional patrons and it is the pressure of these patrons,
combined with that of Britain, that forced the struggle to
an electoral conclusion.
Thus the fundamental reality animating Zimbabwean
political life was its lack of modernity manifested in, among
others, a dependent role in the world economy, a domestic
economy only partially industrialized and reliant on the
export of a few primary products, a subservient political
relationship with Britain, and the non-recognition of the
principle of equality in political affairs.

This lack of

modernity rendered the Zimbawean regime vulnerable to external pressure and it is a bureaucratized regime's response to
that pressure that set in motion events that culminated in
the instrulation of a black regime in 1980.

To view the

events in Zimbabwe as another case in the decolonization of
Africa would, then, not be incorrect, for it illustrates the
formal aspects of a subservient relationship with Britain.
Similarly, the use of a perspective emphasizing racial exclusivism can be useful insofar as it reveals the denial of
political equality and its consequences.

However, these

perspectives fail to capture the extent to which a lack of
modernity, in different guises, permeated Zimbabwean life,
cannot explain the Zimbabwean regime's vulnerability to external pressure beyond noting the existence of anti-colonial
forces in Zimbabwe and the desire of Britain to rid itself
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of a troublesome territory, and cannot explain the post-1939
reforms except as a decades-long act of hypocrisy by a regime
expressing the racial fears and hatreds of whites.
Since the revolution in Zimbabwe has yet to run its
full course, it is important to note that the regime change
of 1980 came about as a result of the recognition of the
principle of equality in political affairs.
mental reality of being an only partially

But the fundamodernized society

faces the new regime as much as it did its predecessors.
Indeed the struggle for state power deepended Zimbabwe's
structural problems and it still faces external pressure,
now chiefly from South African sources.
5.

Revolutions, African Revolutions, and the
Structural Perspective: The Zimbabwean Case
On the basis of the preceding description of its

nature it appears that the Zimbabwean revolution comfortably
resides in the category of revolutions that occur in nonWestern or transitional environments.

The Zimbabwean case,

moreover, demonstrates that it is impossible to understand
the origins and, equally important, the course and nature
of these reovlutions without systematically relating the
attributes of the society, such as population structure,
economy, geography, and political life, to revolutionary
developments.
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With regard to African revolutions, the Zimbabwean
case shows that the relationship between socio-economic
development and political participation is more problematic
than suggested by the existing literature.

While there are

differences among the theoretical conceptions, a common presumption is that socio-economic development increases political participation, whether in the form of class action or a
desire of recently urbanized individuals to be absorbed by
political institutions.

While the

socio-e~onomic

development

of Zimbabwe may have increased political awareness, the nature
and extent of political participation and collective action
was thoroughly influenced by regime repression, the availability of groups that seek to encourage political action,
and the availability of regional patrons for such groups.
As such the theoretical arguments that revolutions in Africa
are rare because the requisite socio-economic developments
have not taken place, such as arguments stressing class formation, are less useful than those that systematically incorporate the effect of political conditions that discourage
collective and individual participation.
Knowledge generated by a comparative study of African
revolutions would be useful to address the debates about
the causes, course and consequences of revolutions such as
those in Africa, Angola, and Mozambique.

In the same vein,

a comparative study of African and non-African re:volutions
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(like that of Paige though, as will be argued, not using the
categories suggested by him), could yield useful information.
Broadly speaking the conflictual or violent latter period of
the Zimbabwean revolution is similar to the Maoist conception
of guerrilla warfare.

However, while it was argued that this

violence could not be understood without knowledge of the
preceding sc)cio-economic and political ch'anges' the question
arises whether the nature and extent of these changes is
similar to that of, say, the French, Chinese or Russian
revolutions.

Were the changes affecting rural blacks' life,

for example, similar to those affecting Chinese peasants?
As regards the debate within the structural perspective concerning the place of peasants, this study tried to
present the conditions of rural black life in Zimbabwe as
fully as possible.

Although, the Zimbabwean case illustrates

the difficulty in generating reliable demographic data about
peasant life, there are a variety of studies and supportive
data to draw reasonably concrete conclusions.

Studies on

Zimbabwe showed, for example, that rural blacks had multiple
sources of income, but proportional figures are unknown.

As

indicated earlier, the categories and theoretical predictions
of Skocpol and Wolf were useful; rural blacks from all the
population categories could be mobilized to participate in
the revolutionary movement.

In particular, Skocpol's emphasis

on the role of regime repression and peasant autonomy and
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solidarity is supported by the western geographic focus of
the Smith regime's repressive forces which opened the way for
mobilization in the eastern regions, by the proximity (or
lack of autonomy) of black farmworkers to their white employers which made them less successful participants in the guerrilla struggle, and the role of solidarity among blacks in
the reserves and the purchase areas in allowing ZAPU and
ZANU freedom of mvoement in their areas.
Since blacks in dissimilar positions participated in
revolutionary activity, the availability of political groups
that seek to encourage and ally themselves with collective
action naturally becomes crucial.

In this regard it is

important to note that the emergence of such groups and their
access to the rural population was strongly influenced by
external factors.
first by fellow

Black activists in Zimbabwe were influenced
activists from South Africa and then those

from the northern territories of the Central African Federation; these activists could avail themselves of doctrines
on guerrilla warfare and other tactics that were not locally
developed and, most importantly, revolutionary groups later
acquired regional patrons.

The participation of rural blacks

with dissimilar backgrounds also suggests that there are
different modes of participation in revolutionary activity.
This participation can range from simply not reporting
guerrillas in the area to actually joining the guerrilla
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armies; the theoretical development of these distinctions by
structuralists can be most useful to resolve the debate
about which peasants are most revolution-prone.
For Zimbabwe the last point is particularly important,
for, as the structural literature suggests, the role of
peasants in revolutions is often a tragic one.

The political

support of peasants is crucial in causing the downfall of
the old regime but, especially if they are not fully mobilized
by the revolutionaries and incorporated in revolutionary
organizations, their political demands are often forgotten
by the new regime.

Hitherto the support of rural blacks was

crucial to the development of the revolution in Zimbabwe;
its remaining development will show whether these rural blacks'
role is also a tragic one.
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